ELECTIONS

GRASSROOTS STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE

A USER'S MANUAL

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ELECTIONS: GRASSROOTS STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE

9 GRASSROOTS STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE An introduction, by Marc Miller

12 POLITICS MAKES A DIFFERENCE A call for a new movement, by Julian Bond

15 THE SOUTH IN CONGRESS Southern Exposure rates the South in Congress, by Bob Hall and Lorisa Seibel

20 THE PARADOX OF REFORM Black politics and the Democratic Party, by Manning Marable

26 NARAL’S NEW WAY Women in politics, by Valerie Rosenquist

32 TEN YEARS IN OFFICE Bennie Thompson of Bolton, Mississippi, by Frederic C. Cooper

35 WORKER IN THE SENATE Danny Corbett of the Communication Workers of America, by Gail Miller

37 WOMAN IN THE SENATE Sondra Lucht, NOW state president, by Kathleen Cullinan

39 THE SCHOOL BOARD Leon Crump of Cheraw, South Carolina, by Tema Okun

41 PLANTING SEEDS The Voter Education Project, by Bill Cutler

46 542 CAMPAIGNS The Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project, by Willie Velasquez

49 SOUTH TEXAS POLITICS Mexican-American voters take power in McAllen Texas, by Kenneth Bain and Paul Travis

53 AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW On voter registration, by Gary Delgado

55 DRAWING THE LINES A primer on reapportionment, by Brian Sherman

60 PROGRESSIVE NETWORK/PROGRESSIVE GAINS West Virginia coalition succeeds, by Kate Long

67 ELECTING OUR OWN The Florida Consumers Federation, by Andrew Banks

70 THE LIMITS OF POWER Dutch Morial, mayor of New Orleans, by Monte Piliawsky

76 RICHARD ARRINGTON, JR. Birmingham, from Bull Connor to a black mayor, by Kelly Dowe

79 THE APPEAL OF THE NEW RIGHT Jerry Falwell’s High-Tech/Low-Road Approach, by Barry Hager

86 AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE Lobbying for spouse abuse shelters in Virginia, by Maureen Morrissey and Linda Sawyers

90 MIDWIFERY IN ARKANSAS The delivery of a bill, by Arthur English and John Carroll

94 PROUD DAYS Henry Wallace’s third party campaign for the presidency, by Pat Sullivan

99 MONEY BUSINESS PACs in the South, by Bill Horgan and Diane Kiesel

105 HOW TO: CANVASS How I got my start as a standup comedian, by Jay Hepner

107 HOW TO: GO HIGH TECH Campaigning with computers, by Phaye Poliakoff

108 HOW TO: UNDERSTAND ELECTION LAW A guide to tax and election laws, by Thomas Asher

110 HOW TO: RATE THE RUNNERS Yardsticks for measuring candidates and officials, by Linda Rocawich

111 HOW TO: FIND THE ANSWERS Tactical and strategic research, by Barry Greer

114 RESOURCES On elections and campaigns

DEPARTMENTS

2 LETTERS TO THE EDITOR Women for peace, Proud to be SEIU, Who’s gay?

3 SOUTHERN NEWS ROUNDUP Gulf Coast opposes toxic incineration; Police spying; Grand jury selection reviewed; Montgomery police misconduct

7 FACING SOUTH Cora Tucker, by Calvin Miller

8 VOICES OF OUR NEIGHBORS South Africa preserves apartheid, by John Matison

120 VOICES FROM THE PAST Reclaiming the New South, by Henry Wallace

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Women work for peace

Dear SE:

The International Exchange Group is one of many groups that belong to the New Japan Women's Association. The association now has about 200,000 members in Japan and has been working for peace in Japan as well as for world peace without any kind of nuclear weapons.

We, as Japanese women, are always appealing that a nuclear war will destroy all the living on the earth, including human beings, and we claim every day that Japanese mothers and children never need nuclear weapons by informing [people about] the hell-like disasters [of] nuclear holocaust experienced in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

We would be very happy if we could get more information about peace movements and about women's movements in your organization and in your country.

-International Exchange Group

c/o Kurimoto
3-3-10 Tokugawa-Yama-Cho
Chikusaku, NAGOYA 464

Who's Gay?

Dear SE:

Your promotion material tells us your pages include "Growing Up Gay in Dixie." Perhaps this reaction is evidence that I'm out of fashion, but I have had several friends christianized/baptized/named "Gay" — and expropriation of the formerly pleasant term "gay" has by no means made life more pleasant for them — use homosexual — No?

-Melvyn H. Kerr

Proud to be SEIU

Dear SE:

As an employee of Schlesinger Geriatric Center, I appreciated the recognition taken of our recent union election victory [Southern News Roundup, July/August, 1983], but there was an important mistake in the notice. While we received some organizing assistance from 1199, the workers at Schlesingers voted 175 to 11 to be represented by Service Employees International Union Local 706. The 1199 assistance was a result of the joint organizing project between 1199 and SEIU. Since your article was published, we have completed negotiations on our first contract and made significant improvements in wages, benefits, and working conditions. We are proud to be members of SEIU and to be UNION.

- Doris Smith
Dietary Steward & Executive Board Member
SEIU Local 706
Beaumont, TX
Pollution fighters pledge to clean city

Angered by a city administration that kowtowed to the town's major industry, the "Time for a Change" coalition of Middlesboro, Kentucky, ran a slate of candidates in the city council elections last November and won seven of 12 seats. The progressive coalition includes Yellow Creek Concerned Citizens (YCCC), which has fought the pollution of Yellow Creek by the city's sewage plant and the Middlesboro Tanning Company since 1980 (see SE Jan./Feb. 1983); Citizens for a Better Middlesboro (CBM), which overturned the city's attempt in 1982 to increase residential sewer rates 400 percent, while increasing the already under-taxed tannery's by only 100 percent; and the Downtown Action Group (DAG), a group of merchants which sued the city when they were charged for paving downtown streets.

Time for a Change candidate Wes Blondell, who had been twice forced out of his job directing Middlesboro's community development office, was the top vote-getter in the election. At the victory ceremony, he announced, "We mean to change all the services of this city, and that sure includes the water problem down Yellow Creek."

The seven new council members bring diversity to the administration and show that angered citizens here care little about party identification. Among the seven new council members (from the coalition's slate of 11 candidates) are two women: Marva Taylor, the city's first black councilor, and Beverly Greene, a member of both YCCC and CBM.

As the new city council prepared to take office on January 10, the fight between the old guard and the new coalition continued. One retiring member introduced a measure in December to lower residential sewer rates drastically, an obvious move to embarrass the new council which would later have to raise the rates to a reasonable level. This measure passed on its first reading, but later was defeated. And at a meeting on January 3, the outgoing council gave the mayor permission to apply for an EPA grant to build a new sewage plant. This could commit the city and the new council to finding $1.4 million in matching funds.

The new council is wasting no time with its reform campaign. At their first council meeting, they plan to eliminate some positions loyal to the mayor, who has two years left in his term, and limit the power of the chief of police, who is seen as the real power in Middlesboro.

Plan to burn PCBs threatens Gulf waters

Chemical Waste Management (CWM), the nation's largest handler of industrial and Defense Department waste, thinks it has the solution to the PCB problem: ship this highly toxic carcinogen out into the Gulf of Mexico and burn it on CWM's incinerator ship Vulc anus. But thousands of Gulf Coast residents especially in south Texas, only 170 miles from the proposed burn site, and in Mobile, Alabama, where the PCBs will be loaded — don't like the idea.

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) allowed two test burns of 700,000 gallons each in 1981 and '82 and announced satisfaction with the results, despite severe criticism by independent scientists. Then EPA approved tentative permits to burn 80 million gallons of PCB waste, although it has no standards for ocean incineration.

Angry residents have reason for concern. On one hand, they worry about the potential catastrophe from a collision or spill at sea. Plans call for Vulc anus to carry 1.3 million gallons at a time. A chemical industry consultant calculates that if the ship ever dumped a cargo of half a million gallons, enough PCBs would be released “to pollute a circle of radius 200 miles to a depth of over 4,500 feet ... sufficient to deteriorate all life in the Gulf of Mexico.”

On the other hand, even if all goes well, the legal PCB emissions from a 700,000-gallon burn at sea would be 2,400 pounds -- enough, says the same consultant, that “a circle 130 miles in diameter could be contaminated ... at levels which would impair marine life, reproductive functions.”

Led by farm, labor and environmental groups in the Rio Grande Valley, 6,100 protesters, including the Texas governor and attorney general, attended an EPA hearing in Brownsville in November 1983 — the largest turnout in agency history. They delivered 19,225 signatures on protest petitions to a congressional subcommittee. They have made plans for a citizens' blockade of the port of Mobile if the Vulc anus tries to leave with a load of PCBs. And the attorneys general of Texas and Louisiana joined a coalition of citizen organizations and local government officials in a lawsuit to stop EPA from going ahead with approval of CWM's permits.

For its part, EPA agreed to hold another public meeting at the end of January 1984.

Superprofits attract timber industry South

After years of dominating the timber trade, the great Northwest is losing out to the South as the favored region in the U.S. for expansion by timber firms, according to business sources. As the nation's "wood basket," the South has surpassed the Northwest in plywood production, supplying two thirds of the pulpwod for paper products and one
third of the country's lumber.

The corporate move South, best symbolized by the recent relocation of the Georgia-Pacific headquarters from Portland to Atlanta, has involved a slew of acquisitions and new plant construction in the region. These new, more efficient plants are combining with the lower labor costs and cheaper taxes in the South to spur record profits in the industry.

At a mill International Paper opened last year in Mansfield, Louisiana, 400 workers turn out the same amount of containerboard that 2,000 people produced at a mill the company closed.

Calling 1983 a "banner year for the U.S. paper industry," Business Week recently reported predictions from timber producers that 1984 "will set the stage for record earnings in 1985." With increased profits of more than 50 percent over last year, paper manufacturers are currently running at 94 percent capacity and are sold out well into this year.

The timber industry likes the South's longer growing season and its flat lands, which make mechanical harvesting possible. Foresters say two people using traditional equipment can fill three or four trucks of pulpwood a day. But one person on a "feller-buncher" - which looks like a tank with a giant pair of scissors attached - can cut up to 12 truckloads a day.

The industry is also attracted by the lack of environmental restrictions on timber harvesting in the South. In the Northwest, the federal government owns more than one half of the commercial timberland, compared to less than one tenth in the South. But having most of the timberland in private hands poses other problems, including the danger that farmers and others will not replant their woodlands properly or that the industry will revert to the cut-and-run system of harvesting prevalent a century ago.

In Mississippi, the United Woodcutters Association (UWA) hopes to bring landowners, woodcutters, and timber companies together to develop a strategy for protecting each party's interests and avoiding the destruction of the state's timberlands. UWA has gained wide support from religious and grassroots groups in Mississippi, and it has turned his support for the woodcutters in their well-publicized disputes with large timber companies (see SE, March/April, 1982).

As paper producers' hunger for Southern pulpwood increases, conflicts between their desire for long cuts of wood and the limitations of traditional short haulers illustrate the potential for growing tensions. It is likely the UWA will ask the governor to help establish a new level of dialogue between the industry's various segments to ensure that the one-truck, one-chainsaw "sharecroppers" of the forestry business don't get pushed aside in the rush to harvest the trees.

Judge finds bias in SC jury selection

South Carolina's grand jury selection process is under investigation by the state's top law enforcement officials to determine if it systematically discriminates against blacks. The action follows the dismissal of 100 grand jury indictments in Fairfield County by Circuit Court Judge Robert McFadden, who ruled that a "significant underrepresentation" of blacks on the grand jury in that county violated the Supreme Court's 1979 ban on racial discrimination in the make-up of a grand jury.

McFadden's decision was based in part on the findings of a study of the county's grand jury selection from 1973 to 1983 conducted by Fairfield United Action. The citizen's group found that only 23 percent of all grand jury members were black during the last decade, while blacks make up 50 percent of the registered voters in the county. McFadden said discrimination occurred when the county's jury commission threw out the names of potential jurors whom they did not know.

Calling the unlawful practice in Fairfield County the "tip of the iceberg," South Carolina NAACP president Bill Gibson called for a full-scale investigation. The South Carolina Attorney General's office is expected to make a report sometime in February, but preliminary findings suggest there is a "little bit of tradition" involved in jury selection, according to spokesperson Mark Dillard. He expressed concern that "too much discretion would leave open the possibility of discrimination."

In a related case, the Supreme Court has decided to hear arguments on behalf of Wilbur Hobby, the former North Carolina AFL-CIO president who was convicted of fraud and conspiracy in 1981 (SE, Jan./Feb., 1982). Hobby's lawyers contend the system of selecting foremen for grand juries in the Fourth Circuit Court discriminates against women and people of color.

Hobby's defense has been backed by a study by James O'Reilly, a statistics and demographic analyst, which shows that between 1974 and 1981 all 15 foremen selected by the chief judge for the Fourth Circuit Court were white males. O'Reilly notes that if jurors were randomly picked from the voters in the district the statistical probability of this occurring is 90 to one.

"If judges are sexist and racist in their individual choice of selecting foremen by always picking a white, middle-aged male wearing a suit," argues Hobby's lawyer, Dan Pollett, "then you might grow distrustful of the system." Pollett contends that, "We don't have to show actual prejudice to Wilbur but rather injury to the system and society at large."

A decision is expected in the Hobby case sometime this spring.
Mayor, police caught spying on workers

Outlawed tactics used by corporations to fight union organizing routinely go unreported and are rarely prosecuted. But in Pulaski, Tennessee, the mayor and the police chief have been caught red-handed spying on United Automobile Workers (UAW) organizing meetings and supplying the names of those in attendance to the personnel director at the local Gabriel Shock Absorber plant. Workers at the plant detected signs of surveillance last spring after they called the union in to help organize the plant. "It got so that people were accusing each other of telling the company who was involved with the union," Lloyd Darby, a UAW organizer, told the union's paper Solidarity.

A former Pulaski policeman finally revealed the truth about spying when he told a federal court that the police chief had ordered officers to take down the license plate numbers of those attending union meetings. The UAW slapped a $1 million suit on city and corporate officials, and a preliminary injunction was ordered to prohibit further surveillance of union activity. Union officials argue the spying violates the Anti-Klan Act of 1871, which gives individuals the right to file a federal civil suit if a government officer prevents them from exercising a constitutionally guaranteed right such as the right to free speech and assembly. Sworn depositions taken in October reveal that the mayor, Stacey Garner, instructed chief Stanley Newton to record the license plate numbers of the cars parked outside of union meetings. The cars were traced to their owners, and a list of these names was then given to Bill Polly, the personnel director at the Gabriel plant.

Charges against the Meremont Corporation, parent of Gabriel, have been filed with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) on behalf of John Brown, a pro-union employee who was fired the day after attending an organizing meeting. A May 1 hearing has been set by the NLRB for Brown's case. But the UAW and Brown may get no more help from the NLRB than they did from officials in Pulaski. The NLRB's legal staff is now headed by Hugh Reilly, a former attorney with the National Right to Work Legal Foundation, an anti-union organization. Reilly was hired by the Reagan-appointed NLRB chairman, Donald Dotson, a right-wing ideologue who puts the blame for the decline of U.S. industry squarely on the back of organized labor.

Critics of the current NLRB contend that the board is being politicized by Reagan's appointees in a conscious effort to undermine unions, and they argue that a backlog of 1,400 cases is preventing workers from enjoying the fruits of collective bargaining protections. In calling hearings on the delays in processing NLRB cases last November, Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass.), chairman of the Subcommittee on Manpower and Housing of the Government Operations Committee said, "We are reaching a point where the legal rights people have under the National Labor Relations Act are in jeopardy because of the inability of the government...to make decisions."

Dotson blames the delays on the turnover of board members since December 1979. During the Reagan administration a full board has sat only half of the time. Because new members need time to become acclimated to their job, and because the NLRB has a policy of deciding major issues only with a full board, the ability to handle cases has been severely affected, Dotson told the subcommittee. Some legislators are now suggesting a law to ensure a full board is functioning by allowing outgoing board members to continue in office until their replacements are ready to serve.

While the backlog at the national level has not translated into similar troubles in the 33 regional NLRB offices, labor lawyers interviewed by Southern Exposure feel that the conservatism of the board in Washington is seeping into the regional structure of the NLRB. A survey of Southern regional offices shows that while the number of NLRB cases has declined slightly in recent years, mostly due to the recession, the number before the regional office is beginning to pick up as more organizing campaigns follow the economic upturn.

Big Brother in Florida targets freeze group

What would the arrival of 1984 be without fears of Big Brother? Members of the Central Florida Nuclear Freeze Campaign experienced the Orwellian nightmare first-hand, as targets of surveillance and infiltration by the Orange County Sheriff's Department.

Admitting he authorized the seven-month-old undercover operation against the freeze group, Sheriff Lawson Lamar defended the action to reporters in late December, saying the organization posed a potential threat because of its contact with people previously involved in illegal acts of protest.
Montgomery mayor
“mean/won’t change”

“M y job is to prevent crime and catch the criminals if I can... and I don’t do it with gentility, I don’t try to please. I’m mean and I make no bones about it,” declared Mayor Emory Folmar to members of the Montgomery, Alabama, League of Women Voters last December 14. Their “Dialogue with the Mayor” ended as a fingerpointing, shouting match.

Expressing concern about worsening relations between the black community and the police department, participants named the mayor as the chief cause of the conflict. “Y’all had your shot at me in the mayor’s race, and you didn’t win,” Folmar responded. “I don’t intend to change.”

Two months earlier, during what one critic called “the most racist campaign in Montgomery since Wallace/Brewer [gubernatorial race] in 1970,” the mayor garnered 59 percent of the vote to defeat his conservative opponent Franklin James. Folmar’s supporters admire his fiercely competitive and stubborn attitude, while his critics say he is paranoid and racist.

Even before Folmar’s first term as mayor, he and the black community were at odds. In 1975, as president of the city council, he frequently led the other four white members to oppose the four black members on controversial issues. In 1977 he won a special election to replace mayor James Robinson, who was forced to resign along with the public safety commissioner and nearly a dozen police officers following a scandal in which police wrongfully shot a black man, and then allegedly planted a gun on his body.

Folmar’s rigid approach to city management has done little to restore faith in the city’s officials. An ex-army officer and decorated Korean War hero, Folmar runs Montgomery with strict discipline and encourages a “the-police-are-always-right” mentality. Critics say his policies have resulted in increased police harassment of blacks and gays. Even within the department there are grumblings that citizens do not perceive the police as public servants, but rather as provokers of fear.

Several incidents in 1983 heightened tensions between the police and the black community. In April, an unarmed black man was shot by a white policeman who mistook him for an escaped prisoner. In May, a black policewoman killed a drunk but unarmed black man. And then in June, a white policeman, answering a report of a shooting, killed an armed black man.

The most controversial altercation occurred last February when eight black out-of-state mourners were arrested after two white policemen entered the home of their deceased relative. A white policeman was shot and a black officer who arrived later was knifed. The mourners say the two white officers burst into the home with their guns drawn, without identifying themselves, and that after disarming the intruders, the mourners called the police. The police claim they identified themselves but were held and beaten.

The highly publicized trial of the first of four mourners charged with attempted murder ended in a mistrial in November. Defense lawyers pointed out that their client’s gun did not shoot the bullet that hit the policeman, and the gun that did, a police service revolver, is oddly missing. In addition, the dispatcher’s tape recordings of phone calls to the police department that night are also missing. No other trial dates have been set in this case.

(When a similar case was declared a mistrial in Mobile, Alabama, in March, 1981, local Klansmen there sought vengeance. Henry Hays and another Klansman killed and then hung Michael Donald after the trial of a black man accused of murdering a white policeman ended in a mistrial. In December 1983, a Mobile jury convicted “exalted cyclops” Hays of the murder of the black youth.)

During the Montgomery trial, Folmar personally fired two officers who told the presiding judge they would testify against the defendant only because their jobs were threatened. And a former clerk for the police alleges she was fired because of her testimony regarding the missing police tape.

Police corporal and investigator Steve Eiland summarized the growing anti-Folmar feelings within the department in a satirical poem which he posted on three police bulletin boards on the eve of the mayoral election last October. Eiland’s spoof, which begins “Emory Amin is our ruling god,” first provoked only several chuckles – but then the humiliated mayor took action. He demoted the corporal to patrol officer, and Eiland took him to court. Eiland’s attorney, Julian McPhillips, says the situation rendered Folmar rather “like B’rer Rabbit with the Tar Baby: the more he messed with it, the more it stuck to him.” Eiland’s reinstatement was upheld because he showed disrespect for a superior; he is appealing the decision.

Meanwhile, attorney McPhillips initiated another suit against Folmar on December 29, this one charging the mayor with using favoritism in his promotion of city employees.
Cora Lee Tucker

HALIFAX COUNTY, VA — Cora Lee Mosley Tucker was born to poor parents here during the early 1940s. Her father died when she was three, leaving her mother to raise nine children alone. "My mother was a strong, independent woman. She did all kinds of work to take care of us, even sharecropping. And she never received welfare help," she says.

At age 17, Cora Lee married Clarence Tucker. They sharecropped for a while, then moved to the city for Clarence to work a municipal job. Cora, a mother of seven by then, remained a fulltime homemaker, exhibiting the same traits she admired in her own mother.

Life as a sharecropper left Tucker ill-prepared for the segregation and discrimination she met in town. "I’d see blacks walking down the street eating food purchased from white restaurants where they could not sit down," she recalls bitterly.

While working as a sewing machine operator in several years at Sales Knitting in nearby South Boston, Tucker met resistance when she tried to bring in a workers' union. "The people were afraid," she says. "The bosses even paid a woman to trail me to the bathroom to prevent me from discussing the union." This negative experience helped awaken her politically.

Then, when she quit because of three different back operations, Tucker found that the company illegally did not provide worker's compensation for its employees. After confronting the administrators, they gave her forms to complete and told her not to tell the other workers. Tucker knew this was wrong. "I took my compensation stubs down to the plant and showed all the girls," she says.

After that, Tucker became active in local politics. In fact, she hasn’t missed a county commission board meeting in 14 years. She met Congressman Parren Mitchell in 1975, and complained to him about the lack of progress in Halifax County. He urged her to survey her neighbors about their economic needs. To do this, Tucker required an organization's assistance. The local NAACP wasn't interested, so she founded the Citizens for a Better America (CBA), and became its president. The first members were mostly young people, blacks and whites, from Tucker's neighborhood.

Completing the survey in 1977, Tucker then launched a voter registration campaign. "The young people were really involved," Tucker recalls. "We registered 1,400 people in two weeks. All but 12 went to the polls."

In 1981, Tucker was a write-in candidate for governor under the auspices of the Fifth District Voters League. Both black and white politicians attacked and chastised her. On election day, she suffered a damaging blow. Tucker explains: "There were no pencils at the polls until 10 a.m. Once a person left a booth, he wasn’t allowed back in.

"I don’t know exactly how many votes I received statewide, but the 200 votes I received in Halifax represented the same number by which the governor lost our county. That’s exciting," she states, then adds emphatically that she would do it again. "Yes. Blacks are important to this state. If we cannot win, we can determine who loses. So let them start losing!"

Since that election, Tucker has suffered such harassments as slashed car tires and bomb threats for her political activities. The worst, a chemical dousing of her bed, sent Tucker to the hospital with a bout of nerves and shock, but she is back in the political arena.

Last year, CBA, whose organizing efforts have brought many positive changes to Halifax County, became one of about 100 civil and human rights groups who united to form Virginia Action. Throughout some early problems, Tucker, its president, remained optimistic about the statewide coalition's future: "This is really an unprecedented coalition...Now our organizations will be coordinating efforts to secure our fundamental rights as citizens."

That optimism has paid off: the coalition has successfully lobbied for voting, workers', and property rights, and against toxic wastes and discrimination in the public schools.

Black Virginians can be optimistic, too. Cora Lee Tucker is committed to working for their civil rights. Her membership in dozens of social change organizations reflects her commitment: "I will keep on fighting for what I believe is right."

—CALVIN MILLER
professor of political science
Virginia State University
Petersburg, VA

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SOUTH AFRICA
Preserves Apartheid

- by John Matisson

Following a landslide endorsement by whites of government plans for revising their constitution, South Africans appear to be on the threshold of a new era. But despite the highly-touted inclusion of so-called “Coloureds” and Indians in the planned constitution, there is good reason to believe that the new era’s primary effect will be the survival of the old, apartheid-minded South Africa.

From the very first, many of the government’s supporters saw the plan as the only way to ensure white control in an increasingly hostile world.

On November 2, 1983, white voters approved a constitution which will create two additional parliamentary chambers alongside the existing white House of Assembly: a House of Representatives to which mixed-race South African “Coloureds” would be elected, and a House of Delegates to represent citizens of Indian origin. The country’s 24 million Africans are still excluded from political representation.

Since South Africa’s 4 million whites outnumber the 2.5 million Coloureds and 750,000 Indians, the newly formed “mixed” cabinet will be predominantly white. Though in theory the new state president, whose powers will combine those of the present prime minister and the president, could be Coloured or Indian, in practice he will be a white male. To prevent an alliance of minority white liberals with Coloureds and Indians, the system provides that only the majority parties in each chamber will be represented in the electoral college choosing a president.

Every major African group saw the new constitution as a transparent ploy to co-opt the Indians and mixed-race citizens onto the side of whites, as reinforcement against the rapidly growing African population. The official opposition, the moderately liberal Progressive Federal Party, shared this analysis, and called on its supporters to reject the constitution.

Some white voters were confused by the fact that the government has allegedly hinted in private meetings, as U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger pointed out earlier this year, that there were plans in the wings to include the majority African population in the new system. Domestic constraints, government sources claimed, prevented Pretoria from divulging these plans too early.

In fact, in the last days of the campaign, documents came to light from the secret Afrikaner Broederbond [brotherhood], a white supremacist organization to which almost all cabinet officers belong, which revealed that the constitutional plan began within the Broederbond in 1971. The documents make it clear that Africans are not intended to be drawn into the central government of the new system.

While African local authorities will see their powers enhanced, at the national level existing policy will be pursued vigorously. That policy dictates that Africans give up citizenship in South Africa to exercise political rights in “homelands,” tiny and impoverished rural blocks of land. Dependent on handouts from the government in Pretoria for their survival, these areas are governed by Africans willing to endure the wrath of the majority of black South Africans in return for sham independence, or their own profit.

The homelands’ increasing brutality reached an apex in the months before the referendum as president-for-life Lennox Sebe of the newest such state, Ciskei, on the east coast of the country, imprisoned members of his own family and cabinet, and cracked down on a bus boycott in his territory.

To break the boycott, eight of 10 representatives appointed to negotiate its settlement were imprisoned, as was the lawyer who brought a successful court application restraining the army, the police, and party vigilante groups from forcing commuters to use the buses. The doctor who reported cases of commuters arriving at the hospital with gunshot wounds, reportedly inflicted by Sebe supporters, suffered the same fate. Residents of one Ciskei town, Mndamtsane, put the total death toll there at 90.

Opposition to the referendum was not predominantly liberal, however. Of the 33 percent of whites who voted no, the majority were from the extreme right-wing National Parties, whose members feared that once Coloureds and Indians were in the system, Africans would not be far behind.

Prime Minister Botha has plenty of time to overcome resistance to the plan, whether from the right or the left. The fine print of the legislation which sets up the new constitution stipulates that Botha need not hold another election, even for whites, until 1991.

John Matisson, editor of the Washington Report on Africa and one of South Africa’s most eminent journalists, has been the Washington Correspondent of the Rand Daily Mail, political correspondent of the Johannesburg Sunday Express, and president of the South African Society of Journalists.
When a million people march for peace, when an overwhelming majority of Americans favor equal rights for women, when most people cherish the environment — but still the government’s policies put property rights over human rights, we need to rethink our strategy for change.

In 1980, Ronald Reagan won the presidency, capping a decade-long slide to the right in American politics. The Senate went Republican and the House, never a progressive stronghold, offered only a sanitized Democratic version of the policies of the president. In state after state, city after city, similar patterns were repeated. Not only was the White House out of reach, but local officials became less and less responsive, both in their own views and because they had fewer resources themselves with which to bargain. As the Right organized and as the economy moved into depression, pressure politics Sixties-style — marches, sit-ins, occupations, even door-to-door nitty-gritty organizing — lessened and produced fewer and fewer gains.

Therein lies a personal conversion. I got tired of losing.

Today, we need to unite protest politics and our organizing around
specific issues with the single mechanism provided for Americans to choose who will make a great number of the social, economic, and political decisions affecting their lives. Elections, lobbying, and disciplined political organizing are not a complete recipe for progressive change, but these are skills and techniques we must master and use if we are serious about changing who controls this nation. We must not only begin to pressure the people in power, but become the people in power.

The idea for Elections: Grassroots Strategies for Change emerged from my own involvement in a painful defeat. In the 1982 congressional elections in North Carolina’s second district, Mickey Michaux, a liberal black U.S. attorney from Durham, ran a strong campaign for the Democratic nomination. He led his two white opponents in the primary with 45 percent of the vote in a district where 36 percent of the Democrats are black. In the runoff election, Michaux picked up few new votes, and the white arch-conservative, Tim Valentine, now sits in Congress.

Although Michaux lost, many progressives were spurred by their experiences in the campaign to think more boldly about what is possible and what to do next.

First: the campaign was bi-racial, with white and black organizations contributing thousands of volunteer hours and thousands of dollars. The campaign was a step — not the first, but a major one — in building working relationships among groups and personal relations among their members. But the bi-racial cooperation was limited within the campaign plan. There were, for the most part, two different campaigns: one by blacks for the black vote and one by whites for the white vote. And despite white progressive enthusiasm for Michaux, most of his contributions came from blacks and he received only about 10 percent of the white vote.

Second: the campaign relied heavily on a large voter registration drive. Although Michaux lost, several thousand new black voters were registered, and North Carolina led the nation in the number of new blacks elected to the state legislature (from a pitiful four to a woeful 12). Local progressive candidates benefited from the voter registration drive in the Michaux campaign, and also helped build organizations in cities and counties that strengthened the Michaux campaign. In Warren County, the site of major demonstrations against a hazardous waste dump, the entire county commission was thrown out in the 1982 elections.

Third: a national organization, the League of Conservation Voters (LCV), targeted the Michaux race, sending in organizers to canvass in selected precincts of white voters on the basis of a single issue: his support for the environment. The methodical canvass translated into an increased turnout of white voters for Michaux. The highly-disciplined LCV effort showed there’s no substitute for hard work, experience, and training. It also demonstrated that issue organizing can connect intimately with electioneering. On the other hand, the LCV entered the campaign at the eleventh hour, with only a tiny local base. Ideally, membership organizations working in the district throughout the year, year after year, would combine their resources and skills with those that campaigners from national groups like the LCV could offer.

Fourth: the campaign excited and inspired scores of volunteers, many of whom had been active and many others who had seen no vehicle to act on their anger at the direction American and North Carolina politics had been taking. A candidate who offered more than a choice between the lesser of two evils also drew in people who might otherwise snub electioneering and attracted more material resources than had been available in organizing around issues without a candidate.

Unfortunately, the lines between candidates were not always clearly and loudly drawn on the issues. Michaux was relatively silent on many of his positions. As a result, the election was more polarized around white versus black than it might have been had Michaux spoken out forcefully on matters of concern to white voters, just as the LCV did with success in their targeted precincts. Given the low response Michaux got from white voters, the question arises of how progressive a stance a candidate should take in order to win.

Of course, campaigns like Michaux’s have been happening all along, and for some people electioneering has been a consistent vehicle for social change. Elections: Grassroots Strategies for Change collects a portion of their experience and wisdom in one volume. In this user’s manual, activists and analysts discuss the potentials — and
limits — of political reform and show the changes black and Mexican-American voter registration drives have made in dozens of communities. The people in Elections describe the patience, tedious work, and flexibility required to assemble the 50-percent-plus-one needed to win at the polls or among legislators considering the laws that affect daily life. They look at PACs and voting records, political coalitions and political collusion. They talk about running your own friends and colleagues for office as a substitute for voting for the choice a machine presents. And they remind us again and again that issue organizing must never stop no matter who is in office.

Taken together, issue organizing and electoral activism offer the most potent force for progressive change now available to us. Consider, for example, the famous gender gap. In the '50s, women voted slightly more in favor of conservative candidates and positions. In the '80s, women vote more strongly for progressive candidates and positions. Organizing among women on social and economic issues created a new consciousness of how political decisions affect their self-interest. Bitter defeats, especially on the Equal Rights Amendment, are strengthening the resolve of women's organizations to engage in every phase of political activism.

For Durham, the fruits of the Michaux campaign — and of decades of work on civil rights, neighborhood and urban development issues — came in the fall of 1983 when three groups which had supported Michaux united behind a slate of city council candidates. The groups had cooperated on and off over the years, but it was during the Michaux campaign that they developed a new respect for their mutual self-interest and for the resources each could bring to a political coalition.

The oldest, and by far the strongest, of the groups is the Durham Committee on the Affairs of Black People. Working with the Durham Committee were two white groups, the North Carolina People's Alliance and the Durham Voters Alliance. Six of the 12 council seats were contested, and all were held by “good old boys” — conservative white men who consistently employed backroom politics and race-baiting to promote old-fashioned pro-business policies. The three organizations backed the same six challengers: five were elected. The Durham city council now has a progressive bloc of nine of 13 votes.

The candidates endorsed by the organizations were not political professionals. Most were community activists, outspoken partisans who as individuals or as members of local groups had lobbied earlier city councils on the issues: utility rates, urban renewal, bus service, toxic wastes, downtown development.

Durham is not unique. In West Virginia, a progressive coalition built over several years achieved a majority in both houses of the state legislature. A new coalition in Florida won five of the six county and statewide races it tackled. In Middlesboro, Kentucky, the “Time for a Change” coalition — which included the toxic pollution fighters in the Yellow Creek Concerned Citizens — won seven of 12 city council seats in their first shot.

In each case, people were sick and tired of public officials telling them, as the former president of the West Virginia senate once told a lobbyist for teachers, “As long as I sit in this chair, there will be no collective bargaining bill passed in West Virginia.”

The West Virginia senate has a new president, but public employees still do not have collective bargaining rights. In West Virginia and in Durham, it's time for the next step. With a strong majority of elected officials on their side, progressive coalitions must tackle the hard part: working together to produce a positive program those lawmakers can enact. In other words, it’s time to govern, and that is sure to test the strength of coalitions, the political ingenuity of their members, and their ability to keep the focus on issues more than any election campaign.

That's part of the challenge of using the political system to take control over our own lives. It's the step that follows the decision to use the vote to take over the seats of public power.

In 1984, half a million elected offices are up for grabs.
IF YOU EVER wondered what difference it makes who sits in the White House or whether electoral politics matters in your life, consider the sweeping consequences of Ronald Reagan's narrow victory in 1980. For three years, we've lived under an administration run by the amiable architect of avarice as social policy.

Over 8 percent of the nation remains unemployed. The unemployment rate for black adults is 20 percent, and for black teens it is over 50 percent.

Fifty-seven cents of every federal tax dollar are committed to military-related expenses.

Our government opposes abortion, and supports the death penalty — apparently believing life begins at conception and ends at birth.

They intend to rearrange America to fit their sterile vision, to force conformity with their small minds and smaller dreams. Riding the crest of a wave of antagonism against those Americans who cannot do for themselves, they intend to impose an awful austerity on us all.

At home — and abroad — they have surrendered the general good to the corporate will. They intend to radically alter the relationship between America and Africa, to substitute mineral rights for human rights, and they continue to embrace and endorse South Africa, the most horrific government on the face of the planet earth. America's position as the richest society on the planet too often identifies us with an old order that is passive and against a new order struggling to be born.

For the first time since the Nixon years, the actions of the Justice Department are subject to the review and approval of the White House, and to political intervention from powerful Republican politicians.

For example:

• The Justice Department — at the request of Alabama Senator Jeremiah Denton — removed the term "White Supremacy" from a suit against white supremacy in Mobile, Alabama.

• After House Republican Whip, Trent Lott of Mississippi, objected to a suit against jail conditions in his state, the attorney general's office announced that no longer would the Justice Department bring such suits.

• At the insistence of Senator Jesse Helms, the Justice Department agreed to an integration plan for North Carolina's public colleges that violated the standards set by the Department of Education.

• In school integration cases in Seattle, Nashville, and Chicago, the Reagan Justice Department reversed the position taken by its predecessors, and supported school desegregation plans that would reinforce segregated schools.
The assistant attorney general has restricted enforcement of federally-mandated plans for equal employment opportunity, and has retracted the requirement that federal agencies obey federal law, in hiring and promotions. As the destruction of civil rights has moved forward, the greedy appetite of the military machine grows more voracious every day. This administration is beating our plowshares into swords and our pruning hooks into spears.

The choice they put before us is greater than guns versus butter; it is soup kitchens and surplus cheese versus expensive airplanes and malfunctioning tanks.

On October 28, 1980, candidate Reagan asked the voters of America to ask themselves if they were better off than they had been four years before when Jimmy Carter was elected president of the United States. After three years of the Reagan presidency, that question must be asked again.

If you earn more than $100,000 a year, the answer must be yes. You’ll haul in an extra $2,000 a year from the Reagan tax give-away, and even at that level, $2,000 can’t hurt.

If you dump poisonous wastes in a river or a lake, it’s smooth sailing ahead; the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has cut back its enforcement forces.

If you manufacture products that could be dangerous to the public, you’re in good shape. The Consumer Products Safety Commission has dropped investigations of products linked to 60,000 injuries and 500 deaths each year.

If you own a factory that’s dangerous to your employees, you’re home free. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) inspections were down 17 percent in 1982.

A new kind of social Darwinism has been foisted upon us – the survival of the richest.

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Despite the oppressive forces around us, despite the heavy weight of the self-satisfied, the cold-heartedness of the neo-conservative confederacy, a great deal of the solution to our current condition lies within our hands.

The power of the ballot box is an undeveloped resource in much of America. Only 61 percent of eligible blacks were registered on November 4, 1980. Only 55 percent of them had the energy and initiative to actually vote. Only one-third of those blacks between 18 and 25 were registered to vote.

Almost nowhere do black and white Americans vote in equal percentages of their registered populations. Almost nowhere do progressive voters specify the demands we make on those who represent us.

Almost nowhere do Americans of different races work in effective coalition. Almost nowhere are we able to punish enemies as easily as we reward friends.

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If there is an opening for an American era of politics different from the past, then it must be a citizens’ democracy, insurgent, with its focus seriously aimed at power.

We seem to have forgotten a message Martin Luther King brought us in Montgomery and again in Albany, and in Selma and in Birmingham and in Memphis on the evening before his death. That message was not original with King, but few leadership figures in the struggle for human rights have expressed it so well before or since.

In our times, it began when a department store seamstress, Rosa Parks, refused to stand up on a Montgomery city bus so a white man could sit down. Until that day in 1955, most black Americans were little more than eager bystanders at the side of the stage upon which was acted their liberation.

The actors were those few black lawyers who could litigate the race problem, or black social scientists who could codify and chart and graph the dimensions of the terror of racial injustice. The average men and women who were black found their participation limited to voting — where blacks were permitted to vote — or to making a meager contribution in cash or kind to the works of that small band of civil rights professionals.

But when Rosa Parks refused to stand up, and when Martin King stood up to preach, mass participation came to the movement for civil rights.

For nearly 20 years, a progressive national movement, fueled by the fire from the Southern civil rights struggle and the national anti-war drive, armed by legions of youth from college campuses and corner pool halls, grew and prospered in the United States.

That movement passed two successive civil rights bills guaranteeing black Americans the right to public accommodations and the precious right to vote. Its lobbies and marches convinced 50 percent of the American population that the war in Vietnam was wrong, and that American adventurism ought to be abandoned. It nearly won important reforms in the nation’s oldest political party. It aided — often unwillingly — the rebirth of the movement for equality for women. It saw a concern grow for the quality of our air and water. It set college campuses aflame, and indirectly, raised public anger to set some cities on fire, too.

What is required now is a recreation of the vision and drive that wrote the 1960s Civil Rights Acts in the streets of Birmingham and on the highway between Selma and Montgomery.

One important prerequisite for action is the discarding of the debate about whether or not to be in “the system.” That is like telling a drowning man he shouldn’t be in the water; he is, and so are we. We had better learn how to tread water, swim, or build boats, for the water rises higher every day.

What we need to be about now — and for many, many years to come — is a version of politics which cannot be labeled by any of the old terms. If there is an opening for an American era of politics different from the past, then it must be a citizens’ democracy, insurgent, with its focus seriously aimed at power.

When I speak here of “democratic” and “democracy,” I do not mean the political party presently out of power,
or the system of selecting government leaders as presently practiced in America; I mean the system of equally distributing wealth and power in an organized society, through institutions based on the premise that we all have equal ability — and equal right — to make decisions about our lives and our future.

This will require the creation of a large cadre with the strategy, skill and vision to build a democratic movement in the mainstream — a reassessment of the plain truth that ordinary women and men have the common sense and ability to control their lives, given the knowledge and the means.

The instruments involved in building such a movement are more than electoral races, as important as they can be. The lesson we ought to have learned from the sixties is this: A mass movement must have an organizational base. Without organizations that are stable, continuous, and mass-based, the movements that do emerge eventually flounder and decay; the sixties — in retrospect — were merely a series of mass mobilizations, winning impressive victories and inspiring great expectations, but ultimately unable to sustain a living democracy at the base of society.

We must develop a political program broad enough to attract a large section of the population, real enough to have some expectation of implementation, and human enough to solve the problems which blacks have in abundance and which most Americans have in some measure.

As a beginning, let us agree that we want:

- To guarantee all Americans an equal opportunity to participate in this society, and in the shaping of public and private decisions which affect their lives;
- To guarantee that no one goes without the basic necessities — food, shelter, health care, a healthy environment, personal safety, and an adequate income;
- To meet our obligations to assist in the peaceful development of the world’s less developed nations and to desist from aggressive interference in their affairs.

To meet these goals, we must move radically away from an economy where the top one percent of the population receives more income than the bottom 20 percent, and where the richest 10 percent of the population receives the same income as the bottom 50 percent put together.

This redirection is a monumental task — its conclusion, after 200 years of struggle, is far from just around the corner.

Our goal is the elimination of privilege based on race or sex or class.

Our tools are our voices, our votes, our bodies, and our minds.

Fortunately, there are many Americans whose vision of their future does not match the view from the Oval Office. There is a sizeable body of opinion in America which refuses to surrender yesterday’s goals to the occupants of power and the princes of privilege. But these — our countrymen and women, young and old, of all races, creeds, and colors — mistakenly believe themselves to be impotent, unable to influence the society in which they live.

Twenty years ago, black young people in the South sat down in order to stand up for their rights. They marched and picketed and protested against state-sanctioned segregation, and brought that system crashing to its knees.

Today’s times require no less, and, in fact, insist on more. There is a large space created by the lack of effective political opposition to the selfishness that surrounds us — that space can and must be filled and the forceful opposition mobilized.

New voters must be registered and organized and educated and energized. The scattered and fractured constituency of progress — racial and language minorities, labor, the sexually oppressed, those for whom the American dream has become a nightmare — must mobilize their troops and lead them once again into the streets, against the barricades of apathy and indifference.

Less than 20 years ago, a sitting president, secure in his power, was forced to abandon plans for re-election as an angry nation shouted no to his plans for war financed at the expense of America’s poor.

That shout should be heard throughout America, at every ballot box, and every forum and every street corner where people gather and meet.

To accommodation with apartheid, we must say no.

To the reversal of racial equality, and defeat of the ERA, we must say no.

To the elimination of those programs that sustain life, we must say no.

To those who foul our air and water, we must say no.

To the planners of nuclear holocaust, we must say no.

To the forward march of militarism, we must say no.

We must say no to our self-imposed political impotence, to our seeming inability to organize and finance our own liberation.

We can prevail, and we shall endure, and we will overcome! □

Georgia state senator Julian Bond is president of the Institute for Southern Studies, which publishes Southern Exposure. Copyright ©1984 by Julian Bond.
The South in Congress
Southern Exposure rates the region's representatives

BY BOB HALL AND LORISA SEIBEL

The burden of Southern history—a system of slave labor and white male supremacy—afflicts not only the South but the entire nation. Our political representatives in Washington see to that.

Other regions elect U.S. senators and representatives who take a dim view toward affirmative action, the Nuclear Freeze, food stamps, the ERA, organized labor, and environmental protection. Senators Orrin Hatch of Utah, Gordon Humphrey of New Hampshire, and Richard Lugar of Indiana readily come to mind. But no region so uniformly sends to Washington lawmakers who champion conservative causes and defend the status quo against progressive reform as does the 11-state Old Confederacy.

In 1983, conservative Southern senators and representatives united across party lines and delivered the margin of votes needed to approve $2.1 billion for 21 MX missiles (see vote 16 on pages 18-19), while rejecting a loan program to help homeowners make their mortgage payments (vote 3). In the House, they limited the EPA's authority to sue toxic polluters (vote 14); in the Senate, they restricted the Justice Department's power to sue for school busing as a remedy for segregation (vote 8); and in both houses, they blocked approval of federal funds for abortions (vote 12).

Just how conservative are the South's representatives in Congress compared to other parts of the U.S.?

In an effort to assess objectively the relative liberalism, or conservatism, of members of Congress, the National Journal devised a complex system that identifies the patterns in each member's votes on selected economic, social, and foreign policy issues and then compares that pattern to those of other members to produce a liberal (and conservative) ranking. A score of 80 means the member is more liberal than 80 percent of his or her colleagues.

For the 1982 session of Congress, the average National Journal liberal rankings for the delegations from various sections of the country, by party affiliation, were as follows:

**SENATE** (no. members in parentheses)

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The South is on the bottom on all counts. That's not so surprising, perhaps, but one may have expected that in the last 20 years, the South would have significantly improved its standing compared to other regions. Two decades ago, the specter of the Solid South loomed large in Congress as men like Richard Russell, Menden Rivers, and John McClellan set records for longevity in office and unmercifully wielded their power as chairman of the key committees in each chamber. The racial rhetoric of the Confederacy's Congressional agents is not as extreme these days, nor is the South's domination of committee chairmanships (dropping from 10 of 18 in the Senate and 8 of 21 in the House as late as 1970 to the current 3 of 16 in the Senate and 7 of 21 in the House today).

We've experienced dramatic economic change, population shifts, the rise of a mass black political activity and of the Republican Party, and a rapid turnover in our Washington lawmakers (only 39 of the 138 in office now held their seats in 1973). Yet the numbers on the "Changes" chart on the next page reveal that as a whole, the region's delegates in Washington still place the same rightward pull on national policy as their predecessors did in 1963.

The chart compares the ratings for Southern and non-Southern (North) legislators compiled by groups ranging from the quintessential liberal Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) to the touchstone for conservatives, Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA). (See page 110 for a discussion of how ratings are done.) Observe:

- On civil rights issues (NAACP rating for 1963 and Leadership Conference on Civil Rights for '82), the South has shown its greatest improvement, while scores for Northerners—especially Republicans—have turned more conservative. The gap between regions on racial issues has narrowed, but the Northern retreat gives the total Congress a lower score, indicating that its leadership on civil rights issues has deteriorated since 1963.
- In the House, the gap between North and South has increased on labor issues, largely because the number of conservative Southern Republicans jumped from 11 to 38 while the North became more Democratic. The demise of the Democratic South in the Senate has not by itself hurt labor; the remaining Southern Democrats were more liberal than their 63 counterparts. But when the shift of 9 seats to the Republicans (where they joined John Tower, the lone GOP Southerner in '63) was added to the shift of 11 seats in the non-South, control of the Senate went to the Republicans, making life tougher for labor than reduced ratings can show.
- The ADA and ACA scores also reflect the liberal loss and conservative gains in the last two decades. The gap between rates for the North and South widened in the House, but narrowed in the increasingly conservative Senate. The widest gaps exist between Northern and Southern House Democrats (45 points for ADA and 35 for ACA), and the fact that these differences have remained constant after 19 years indicates how entrenched the conservative Democratic tradition is in the South. The notorious Boll Weevil caucus in the '81 and '82 Congress has roots as far back as cotton itself.
- The House underwent considerable change in '83, as shown in the
four right-hand columns. The South gained 8 seats from the North from reapportionment, and both regions took a total of 24 seats from the Republicans in the November '82 elections. The South lost only 3 of those 24, another indication that even in off years, Republicans are finding the South — and Sunbelt in general, rather than their former Midwestern heartland — as their most fertile territory. The newly elected Democrats from the South showed stronger kinship to their Northern counterparts, and pulled the 1983 ADA rating for the entire region up 13 points over 1982. Nevertheless the liberal gap between North and South has actually increased since '63.

RATINGS

- The table on the opposite page gives 1982 ratings by 7 liberal groups (see Key at bottom of chart), each specializing on a different issue. Generally, an individual who scores less than 35 on two issues is a conservative across the board. The lesson, of course, is that liberal issue-oriented groups should organize together to rid themselves of their common enemies.

- Some state delegations do better on one issue than another. For example, Alabama's delegation votes relatively more liberal on economic issues (votes 1-5 on page 18 and the AFL-CIO rating on page 17) than on the environment (votes 12, 13, and the LCV rating), a reflection of its populist past and the clout of organized labor in the state today. Louisiana does better on the environment than on foreign policy and military spending (votes 15-20 and ADA rating). The greater number of W=Wrong marks on these last votes, compared to those for social issues (votes 6-14) indicates the South's abiding and open affection for military solutions.

- The chart shows an interesting polarization between parties — no Republican got a grade above 25 — and between representatives within a state. South Carolina has the most polarized delegation in both houses, with Virginia close behind, having become more liberal since defeating 3 of the 9 Republicans who made it the most conservative Southern delegation in 1982.

- Seven of the 8 new House seats added to the South in 1983 were in Texas and Florida, two states least typical of the Old South and also most promising for modern Republicans. Their delegations herald the polarization between parties and between liberals and conservatives that other parts of the South may anticipate as their populations balloon. On the Southern Exposure scale, 7 of the top 11 and 11 of the bottom 27 are from Texas and Florida.

- The 40 Congressional districts with 25% or more black populations have some of the most conservative and least liberal Representatives in the South. The Second District of both Mississippi and North Carolina are the most black in their states; black candidates ran in the Democratic primaries in both states in 1982, but failed to muster enough support to defeat whites who went on to become the most conservative Democrats in each state's delegation. Eight of 27 Representatives with grades of 10 or less are in these 25%+ districts, as are 6 of the 11 with a grade of at least 80.

- The 11 most liberal Southerners in the House all come from districts that least fit the WASP mold of the Old South. They are: the South's only two black legislators, Mickey Leland and Harold Ford; 2 of the South's 6 Jews in the House, William Lehman and Lawrence Smith; Lindy Boggs, Gillis Long and Jack Brooks from districts with large black and cajan populations; Wyche Fowler from a 50% black district in Atlanta; Dante Fascell from a 34% Hispanic and black Miami-area district; Henry Gonzalez from a 32% Hispanic district in San Antonio; and John Bryant from a Dallas district that is 28% black and Hispanic.

There's a lesson for liberals here, too. Thirty-five years ago, V.O. Key noted a populist strain in his Southern Politics and speculated that "if the blue-collar vote in the South should double, Southern conservatives in Congress would probably be less numerous." He recognized the obstacle of racism to his vision, and he suggested that "if the Negro is gradually assimilated into political life, the underlying Southern liberalism will undoubtedly be mightily strengthened." The opposite way to view the challenge now appears to be more accurate: the task ahead is to approximate the typical white Southern voter into a political tradition charted by black, Hispanic, and non-WASP interests. That tradition, in cold numbers, votes more consistently for liberal policies that help the majority of white working- and middle-class citizens. Unfortunately, as Numan Bartley and Hugh Graham observe in Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction, Southern whites are persistently "more inclined to use their ballots in state and local politics to express their personal beliefs or prejudices rather than their socioeconomic self-interest." Until that obstacle is addressed (they suggest through political organizing that connects the vote to bread-and-butter issues), the South will remain a conservative drag on the nation.

Bob Hall is the director and Lorita Seibel an intern at the Institute for Southern Studies, which publishes Southern Exposure.

CHANGES IN LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE RATINGS FOR SOUTH & NORTH

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### U.S. Senate

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### How Liberal Groups Rate the South in Congress, 1982

**Key:** Ratings compiled by Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR), National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC), AFL-CIO, League of Conservation Voters (LCV), Consumers Federation of America (CFA), and the National Farmers Union (NFU) — all considered liberal organizations. Each group selected its own key votes reflecting its concerns; failure to vote lowers legislator's score for all groups, except AFL-CIO and NFU.

**Population of the legislator's district is 25%-50% Hispanic.**
### U.S. SENATE

| State     | Grade | 1  | 2  | 3  | 4  | 5  | 6  | 7  | 8  | 9  | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | % Black in Distr. |
|-----------|-------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|------------------|
| ALABAMA   |       | W | W | W | W | W | R | R | R | R | W | W | W | W | W | W | W | W | W | W | 26 |
| ARKANSAS  |       | R | R | R | R | R | W | R | R | R | W | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | 16 |
| FLORIDA   |       | R | W | W | R | W | W | W | W | W | R | R | W | W | W | W | W | W | W | W | W | 14 |
| GEORGIA   |       | R | R | W | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | 27 |
| LOUISIANA |       | R | W | R | R | W | W | W | W | W | W | W | R | W | W | W | W | W | W | W | W | 29 |
| MISSISSIPPI |      | R | W | R | R | W | W | W | W | W | W | W | R | W | W | W | W | W | W | W | W | 35 |
| TEXAS     |       | R | W | W | R | W | R | R | W | W | W | W | W | W | W | W | W | W | W | W | W | 16 |
| U.S. HOUSE |       | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | W | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | 18 |

### KEY VOTES

1. **TAX EQUITY ACT.** Senate. Final vote to place a $720-per-family limit on the 10% income tax cut scheduled for 7/1/83. Rejected 45-55, June 29. A YES vote is R.

2. **JOBS.** Senate. Amendment to add $1,6 billion for job creation and emergency food, health care and shelter. Rejected 34-63, March 11. A YES vote is R.

3. **HOME MORTGAGE.** Senate. Motion to table amendment for mortgage loan guarantee program for unemployed owners. Adopted 55-39, June 21. NO is R.

4. **FUNDING FOR POOR.** Senate. Amendment to spread funds for child nutrition, WIC, and other programs over a longer period of time. Rejected 24-73, June 29. NO is R.

5. **BUY AMERICA.** Senate. Motion to kill amendment for "Buy America" section in Surface Transportation Assistance Act. Adopted 84-29, Oct. 25. A NO vote is R.

6. **PUBLIC SERVICE.** Senate. Motion to kill amendment to allow a tax credit for private school tuition payments. Adopted 59-38, Nov. 16. A YES vote is R.

7. **SOCIAL PROGRAMS.** Senate. Motion to cut $964 million for social programs, including education, nutrition and job training. Adopted 53-36, Nov. 10. A NO vote is R.

8. **DESEGREGATION.** Senate. Motion to kill bill that would bar Justice Department's use of funds in bill to enforce school desegregation through busing. Rejected 29-52, Oct. 21. A YES vote is R.

9. **KING HOLIDAY.** Senate. Final vote for holiday honoring Martin Luther King, Jr. Adopted 75-22, Oct. 19. A YES vote is R.

10. **CIVIL RIGHTS.** Senate. Amendment to end employer sanction provisions in the Immigration Reform & Control Act after five years if they result in discrimination. Rejected 40-51, April 28. A YES vote is R.

11. **WOMEN'S RIGHTS.** Senate. Vote for a Constitutional amendment overturning Supreme Court's decision legalizing abor-
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### Key
- Legislative grade is the percent of right (R) votes, minus 2 points for each vote where no opinion is stated (A), W=Wrong, P=Present, V=Vacancy. Republicans are in italic, t Districts which are 25% or more Hispanic. See Congressional Quarterly for each date for longer descriptions of key votes.
The central dilemma confronting black politics, especially in the South in the 1980s, is the paradox of reform. There have been undeniable achievements in the struggle for black equality in every Southern state.

Since 1964, the number of black elected officials in the U.S. has increased from 104 to about 5,500. Major Southern cities – Atlanta, New Orleans, Birmingham – which vigorously maintained Jim Crow have had black mayors for years. In the decade between 1960 and 1970, the estimated percentage of blacks in the total number of registered voters soared: in Alabama, from 7.1 to 19.2 percent; in South Carolina, from 10.7 to 24.5 percent; in Mississippi, from less than 1 percent to 30.5 percent. The black electorate is such a decisive factor in state and local elections that even former arch-segregationist George C. Wallace aggressively courted black voters in his successful 1982 gubernatorial campaign in Alabama. Socially, racial segregation still exists, but its crudest manifestations have largely disappeared.

The basic and bitter irony is that the structural or institutional basis for racism remains, and in some respects has become worse in recent years. Thousands of black-owned small farms go bankrupt every year across the South, as the rural poor flock to urban areas of employment. Despite the growth of new industries and human service-oriented businesses, black joblessness rates in many Southern towns now rival those in Harlem and Chicago’s South Side. Politically, dozens of black elected officials, such as former Tchula, Mississippi, mayor Eddie Carthan, are the victims of harassment and legal indictment. The number of blacks imprisoned in Southern penitentiaries has increased dramatically and almost one million of the region’s 14.5 million blacks are arrested every year. Local patterns of political repression and extralegal racist violence are reinforced by the Reagan administration’s vocal opposition to civil rights.

Thus the root causes of racial discrimination, poverty, and unemployment, remain permanently in place, while the illusion of black equality is perpetuated within the public discourse. Qualitatively, the paradox of reform confronts the black freedom movement with new political and economic challenges for which the rhetoric and tactics of the “We Shall Overcome” period are inadequate.

The acceleration of systematic attacks against blacks has produced a variety of suggestions for the future of black political activism. In general, black political debate in the 1980s is characterized by its focus on three theoretical and strategic points.

First, what future directions should black economic policy take, for the South and the nation? Is it premature to discuss a democratic socialist option, or is a “neo-Booker T. Washington” approach of black capitalism more appropriate in the age of Reaganomics?

Second, how can we best relate our concerns about ethnicity and social organization to public policy? Is a black nationalist approach, which eschews biracial coalitions, meaningless in a post-civil rights period?

Third, these two concerns merge into an infinitely more complex set of questions about the utility of electoral politics itself. Is there an “electoral road” to black liberation in the United States? Can a strategy
based within the liberal wing of the Democratic Party successfully consolidate the civil rights gains of the '60s, and provide the basis for a more radical socioeconomic agenda for the future? Or, to restate a question Malcolm X posed in a Detroit speech in April, 1964: Is there really a choice between "the ballot or the bullet" in the struggle for black freedom?

"Our people get dragged into a series of disappointments via electoral politics," Brooks protests. "There are two schools of thought" on black political change. "One is that you can change the system from the inside ... that you have to elect a pretty, three-piece-suit nigger with four years of schooling, and get him inside." Brooks complains, however, that this tactic always fails, "because there is no mechanism within the black community that he is accountable to. We don't have the time and resources within the black community to engage in fruitless kinds of political endeavors."

When asked for an alternative approach, Brooks predicts that "black people are going to vote in ever diminishing numbers." A nonelectoral "black political instrument," he argues, could emerge as an "ongoing, living mechanism that attends to all of the aspects of black life." This nontraditional organization would concentrate on developing consumer and producer cooperatives to house and feed thousands of low-income people and to advance "independent political thought" within the black community.

Predictably, Brooks views any active relationship with the Democratic Party as antithetical to blacks' interests. He argues that black Mississippi "leaders such as Aaron Henry and Charles Evers have used the movement to advance their own political careers. They've led the black community down the wrong road - into the Democratic Party." Ironically, Brooks himself ran unsuccessfully for a seat on Greenville's City Council four years ago. The Delta Ministry's staff participates in voter registration efforts, and repeatedly uses traditional political forums to express the interests of their clients. Even for Brooks, a complete divorce from the electoral system is apparently neither possible nor desirable.

Another political strategy, which draws from a curious mixture of black nationalism, liberal corporatism, and electoral activism, is that of Jesse Jackson, leader of Operation PUSH (People United to Serve Humanity). Like the black nationalists, Jackson accuses the Democratic Party of "taking the black vote for granted," while the Republican Party writes blacks off. "For Democrats," he continues, "race is increasingly becoming a litmus test and the central threat to the viability of the Party." Jackson observes that when black Democrats win primaries in South Carolina, North Carolina, Mississippi, and other states, "significant numbers of white Democratic leaders and voters" support white Republicans over blacks. He notes that blacks regularly deliver one-fifth of the party's presidential vote, but receive "no shared proprietorship in the party - and investors without equity reap no dividends." Much of Jackson's devastating critique is reminiscent of Malcolm X's "Ballot or the Bullet" thesis, and in a limited way could be seen as a justification for launching a black political party.

Instead, Jackson's black national-
istic rhetoric eventually culminates into a two-pronged "assault" on the system. First, he argues, black consumers must unite to force corporate concessions to the fragile black entrepreneurial class. "Corporate economic rape," to use Jackson's term, can be curtailed by forcing "joint trade agreements: between civil rights agencies and big businesses." Typical of Jackson's efforts was the four-year "co-venant" signed between Operation PUSH and the Burger King Corporation on April 18, 1983. Worth an estimated $450 million, the food chain, which owns 3,400 restaurants worldwide, promised to increase the number of black employees, upgrade existing minority-owned restaurants, and significantly increase the number of black franchises.

Jackson himself quite candidly admits that the goal of these agreements is not socialism but an integrated private market economy. "Blacks and other minorities in this country need trade, not aid. The way to achieve equality is to allow minorities the opportunity to share in the trade with the whole community — to allow them to partake of the benefits." Jackson does not ask whether several black Horatio Algers, and the creation of a select group of black entrepreneurs will provide employment for millions of jobless women and men. Operation PUSH is a sophisticated attempt to reinforce the capitalist spirit among those whom the system has most brutally exploited.

The second and more dramatic aspect of Jackson's effort revolves on the concept of a black presidential campaign. In a strategy similar to his corporate covenants, the self-proclaimed "Country Preacher" is currently attempting to revive black hopes in the Democratic Party through a "semi-revolt." Jackson asserts that a black candidate would be able to "advance the issues of concern to Hispanics, women, the poor, and whites who are interested in social justice . . . as well as blacks. A black should run because bargainers without bases are beggars not brokers . . . . We cannot ride to freedom in Pharaoh's chariot . . . . All of Santa's other reindeer have had their chance to pull and lead the sleigh and present their gifts to the American people. Now it may be time for Rudolph, who has consistently pulled more weight, to have his turn." In short, Jackson sug-

gests that blacks' issues cannot be "put in the stomach of any of the present Trojan horses and expect them to come out once they are inside the White House fence."

More concretely, Jackson's purpose is to maximize black voter leverage within the Democratic party, and simultaneously establish Operation PUSH as the pre-eminent civil rights agency in the nation. The principal focus of this strategy is based in the South. In May 1983, at Jackson's request, the North Carolina Black Leadership Caucus invited him to the state to initiate a "Southern crusade." The announced goals of the crusade are "to focus on the lack of enforcement of the 1965 Voting Rights Act," to register an additional two million black Southern voters by November 1984, and "to pressure party organizations who are accepting integrated voting but practicing segregated slatemaking [by] always putting whites at the top of the ticket." Crusade activists staged local rallies and meetings in Raleigh, Rocky Mount, Greensboro, Charlotte, and in other cities.

The black community is currently deeply divided over the viability of Jackson's strategy. Mary F. Berry, a former U.S. Civil Rights Commissioner, argues that the mere threat of a black presidential candidate forces every white aspirant to speak favorably to traditional black concerns. Berry feels that any criticism of Jackson's questionable career is moot, given that none of the "more qualified" black politicians — Julian Bond, Congressman Walter Fauntroy, former Atlanta mayor Maynard Jackson, and others — had seized the "opportunity" to ride the crest of the black electoral wave so evident in the Chicago and Philadelphia mayoral races in 1983.

Randall Robinson, director of the influential lobbying group, TransAfrica, asserts that white Democratic candidates did not address U.S. relations with the South African apartheid
regime “until Jesse Jackson began to emerge as a potential candidate.” Roosevelt emphasized the distinction between a “black presidential option” for 1984 and the particular merits and/or contradictions inherent in Jackson’s own candidacy.

Even black nationalists who have traditionally stood outside of electoral politics voice support for this aspect of Jackson’s strategy. Maulana Karenga, founder of the “Kwanzaa” celebration and a leading black nationalist theorist, states that an independent challenge inside the Democratic Party is absolutely essential. “The political timidity of the Democratic Party in the face of the Rightist tendency in the U.S. makes it imperative that blacks play their traditional role of raising the radical and progressive banner around which others can rally,” Karenga argues. Only a black candidate “can produce a spirit of mobilization and organizational formations which can be used after the campaign in other projects.” Jackson’s campaign will “increase voter registration levels,” despite the fact that “one should have no illusions of a black candidate winning.”

Karenga’s analysis is reinforced by the views of a black former aide to George Bush, Thaddeus Garrett. The White House is convinced that Jackson’s campaign would weaken former vice president Walter Mondale’s chances of winning the nomination, thus giving the Democratic Party’s mantle to conservative Senator John Glenn. Garrett claims that Reagan’s advisers are convinced that the President can defeat Mondale, but that they would lose against the former astronaut. On the other hand, in late August federal auditors announced that Operation PUSH and a subsidiary misappropriated over $1.7 million in government contracts and ordered Jackson to return the money. Education Secretary T.H. Bell declared in a press conference that this was simply “a routine audit,” but added that “the reason there is all this publicity is the Reverend Jesse Jackson is considering running for President.”

Similarly, in early 1983, when aides to Congressman Ronald V. Dellums held discussions with several activists concerning a Dellums presidential campaign, the black socialist and his staff were charged with drug use. Perhaps this is merely coincidental — but it is clear that the leaders of both major parties, for different reasons, wish to discourage any black candidacy. As Congressman John Conyers notes, white opposition to the strategy “seeks to head off the democratizing trends of the presidential selection process.”

The third, and certainly the most conventional approach to black politics is represented by the NAACP, the agency of the black upper middle class. Joseph Madison, the NAACP director of voter education, argues that any black presidential candidacy would be “a hoax” that would drain black support away from liberal white candidates — particularly Mondale.

“Anyone with any deal of sense knows that the chance of a black being elected — we’re not talking about running, but being elected — is extremely remote.”

Madison outlines the problem by pointing to figures indicating that a maximum of 778 delegates out of more than 3,900 to the Democratic National Convention in 1984 will be Afro-Americans. Over two-thirds of these black delegates will already be pledged to white candidates, “meaning that the maximum of delegate votes that a black candidate should depend on would be 250.” Madison simply recommends that civil rights groups concentrate on registering an additional seven million voters by November 1984 — enough to shift the balance of power significantly in a national election. Implicit in this approach to black politics is the assumption that a black presidential candidate could not obtain enough support among other constituencies — feminists, liberals, progressive labor unions, Latinos, and the left — to win. It defines “politics” in purely electoral terms, despite the fact that many of the meaningful gains registered by the desegregation movement two decades ago occurred in the streets, through nonviolent demonstrations, marches, pickets, and other protest actions. It also implies a type of “proxy” politics, wherein blacks’ interests would have to be represented by white politicians.

What is particularly striking about all of these strategies is their profound pessimism. Brooks and other radical black nationalists assume that most whites are irredeemably racist, that authoritarian or conservative politics will define the social terrain for some time to come, and that the electoral apparatus is alien to blacks’ interests. Jackson’s challenge to the Democratic Party’s leadership has not yet advanced a program of radical social reform which qualitatively departs from that articulated by his charismatic white counterparts, the “Somunex Seven.” The NAACP’s bland emphasis on voter registration implies an acceptance of the liberal status quo, a resignation about serving as a loyal component of a fragmented New Deal/Great Society coalition which is increasingly irrelevant to the 1980s.

Each of the positions is a reaction to the contemporary crisis, rather than a qualitative advance in strategy. In any effort to find political answers in this period of rapid and confusing social change, we must first ask the right questions. Where should we begin?

The first and most essential question is the question of reform. In understanding the paradox of reform concerns the contradictory nature of the Democratic Party and its relationship to black people. During most of the electoral experience of blacks, the party which claimed our allegiance was the Republican Party. Few blacks voted for a Democratic presidential candidate until 1948. More than 40 percent of all black voters supported Dwight Eisenhower in 1956. Democratic Party officials and office holders worked hand-in-hand with white vigilantes when I was a teenager to keep my family members...
from voting. White Democrats did nothing when my wife's cousin was lynched outside Social Circle, Georgia, in late 1981. White Mississippi Democrats did virtually nothing to elect a black state senator, Robert Clark, to the House of Representatives in November 1982, despite blacks' support for their old arch-enemy, John Stennis. Unquestionably, the Democratic Party contains some of the most racist, pro-corporate, and sexist politicians this nation can produce. Yet this same party includes a progressive, antiracist, and democratic bloc which represents an American version of "social democracy."

This "party-within-the-party" articulates the material interests and political demands of blacks, as well as those of Latinos, feminists, gays and lesbians, labor, and peace organizations. Because no massive socialist presence in the U.S. national politics has existed since 1920, most black elected officials are "invisible social democrats," for all practical purposes. They do not consciously identify with European social democracy, and their own history is grounded in a pragmatic and often eclectical practice which is devoid of socialist, much less Marxian, theory. Nevertheless, the public policies they propose—from Dellums's extensive national health care bill to Major Owens's recent constitutional amendment calling for a guaranteed job for all American workers—directly parallel legislative reforms enacted by labor and socialist parties throughout the world.

Of course, distinctions must be made here: Dellums in the British political context would be Tony Benn, and Andrew Young would be Roy Jenkins—but they are acting in the very real world of American political culture, where Marxism is usually equated with Soviet or Chinese communism. The democratic left inside the black community does not need specifically to identify itself with "socialism" per se to exercise influence among black voters. Most blacks run as Democrats because, given the history of black folk since the New Deal, it makes "common sense" to do so. They operate as a democratic and antiracist political current within an admittedly undemocratic and often racist political formation. But when circumstances dictate that the interests of blacks will be better served by a third party candidate, an indepen-

dent, or even a liberal Republican, black voters and their representatives often revolt against their party.

Numerous incidents from the past several years illustrate this pattern of revolt. In a Mississippi election in 1978, for example, over 80 percent of the state's black electorate voted for an independent black candidate, Charles Evers, for the U.S. Senate, splitting the Democratic vote. As a result, a white conservative Republican, Thad Cochran, was elected. Black voters had concluded that there was no meaningful difference between the two candidates, and that an unsuccessful black challenge in the general election would do more to advance their interests in the long run than their becoming "yellow dog Democrats" in this particular election. This is not to suggest that the majority of black voters is ready to form either an all-black or a multiracial liberal-left political party; the avenues for meaningful reform within the existing two-party system have not yet been exhausted.

It is clear, however, that the actual political behavior of black workers and the poor in general implies a far greater sophistication than that exhibited by the NAACP leadership and others who cling to the simplistic notion that loyalty to white Democratic Party leaders transcends black electoral independence. When properly mobilized, the black electorate will turn out in massive numbers to support any candidates who advance their economic, social, and political interests, and will block those Democrats and Republicans alike who betray those interests.

Given the actual class status of blacks as a group, this independence means in practice that blacks form a decisive bloc for a uniquely American version of social democracy—without being called "socialism" by name. Moreover, for most black workers, voting is and will remain for the foreseeable future the central essence of "politics." Despite the chimeras of black nationalism, the hard-won democratic rights of blacks are deeply cherished within the Afro-American community, and the battle against Reaganism and institutional racism will continue to manifest itself as essentially a struggle within the existing political system. The fight for democracy thus becomes a battle against the racists and conservatives of both major parties.

We are now witnessing a fundamental and long overdue shift in the American political system. There have been others. The 1896 election contest between William Jennings Bryan and William McKinley established the Republicans as the dominant party for the next 35 years, buried Southern and Western populism, and created the basis for the solid Democratic South and Jim Crow. The elections of 1932 and 1936 created the New Deal coalition, which in turn coincided with the long and difficult process of creating a black voice in national public policy.

Despite initial appearances, 1980 was no watershed electoral year (though 1984 may well be). Nevertheless, there were some interesting and perhaps ominous developments in the Carter-Reagan race. Over 90 percent of all black voters supported Carter, while only 35 percent of all whites supported him. Fifty-six percent of all whites voted for Reagan, and in many Southern states (except Georgia) whites voted in proportions of nearly two to one for the California Republican. Beyond the election of 1984, if the current mobilization of black voter registration continues, the weight of the black electorate will have a major position in the viability of the Democratic Party, and within the public policies of the national government. The black voter will be the central component in transcending the limitations of New Deal liberalism.

To resolve the paradox of reform, black political activists (and progressive whites) must advance an "inside-outside" strategy for social reform. We must actively campaign for those progressives advocating programs which go beyond the old liberalism, both inside the Democratic Party primaries (against Democratic centrist and conservatives) and in general elections (against most Republicans). We must build a powerful, multiracial coalition of labor, women, and other potential allies inside the progressive party-in-the-party. Yet we cannot transform the system by working on the inside alone. Outside challenges must raise the issues of racism, sexism, poverty, and powerlessness and must occur simultaneously with electoral work—teach-ins, demonstrations, neighborhood organizing, civil disobedience, and
every form of nonelectoral protest. Both aspects of inside-outside work should be guided by a vision of human equality and greater democracy: guaranteed health care, full employment, universal education, decent public housing, workplace democracy, a nonsexist and antiracist society — along with massive reductions in national spending for the mechanisms of war, foreign intervention, and U.S. corporate domination of the Third World.

Much of the viability of the "inside-outside" theory rests with the left's ability to maximize voter turnouts at every election and to expand the national electorate through extensive voter registration and education campaigns. Poor people and national minorities often do not vote because they cannot see that it will produce any meaningful changes in their lives or in their communities. In Chicago, for example, black voter turnouts in South Side wards ranged from 40 to 22 percent until the late 1970s. Every political observer in Chicago knew that former Congressman Harold Washington did not want to run in the mayoral election as of mid-1982. What convinced Washington to run was the registration of an additional 150,000 black and Hispanic voters. Their mobilization, culminating in a nearly 80 percent turnout in the elections, shifted both Washington's campaign and the dynamics of Chicago politics to the left.

Conversely, any decline in grassroots mobilization creates the possibility of a restoration of conservative power. Fifteen years ago, Carl Stokes was elected mayor of Cleveland on the basis of an 81.7 percent black voter turnout. When Stokes betrayed his constituents' program, confidence in electoral political work declined, neighborhood groups began to bicker with each other, and finally a white Republican was elected mayor in 1971. By 1978, black voter turnouts in Cleveland had dropped to 30.8 percent.

The examples of Chicago and Cleveland indicate that black activists and the left should create independent political structures which can do three things: educate the oppressed to constantly demand their rights, promote massive electoral participation, and maintain pressure on elected officials to carry out progressive programs. Independent grassroots structures must never be tied to the Democratic Party, but they can use the party's primary process to get their agendas into the public discourse, and to elect their own people. Occasionally, independent races for elective office will be viable at local levels outside of the Democratic Party. The question of working "within" the Democratic Party is fundamentally a tactical one; our principles will not be compromised by such activity, so long as the goal of human equality and social transformation guides our practice, and our programs articulate the interests of the oppressed.

1984 confronts the democratic left with a series of problems. Much of the focus will be placed on the presidential arena. Despite a black candidacy — which despite its flaws merits at least critical support — in November 1984 we will be faced with a choice between Reagan and Mondale or Glenn. It's certain that the overwhelming majority of black people will repudiate Reaganism, and that any third party candidacy will be viewed as irrelevant or sectarian. Thus the energies of activists must be focused at the municipal and state level, building wherever possible upon the "coalition of conscience" constituencies which were mobilized by the August 1983 March on Washington. Independent candidates must be run in nonpartisan races, in Democratic Party primaries, and/or occasionally outside both parties, depending primarily upon local conditions and the prior establishment of progressive political structures and multiracial/multiclass coalitions. Sometimes we will have no alternative except to embrace the "lesser evil." The classic case here is provided by North Carolina, where Governor James B. Hunt is challenging well-financed, incumbent Senator Jesse Helms. Hunt is undeniably a poor alternative, but Helms's pivotal role as the leading national ideologue for racism and reaction may well induce progressives to support Hunt. This must not rule out, however, a progressive challenge against Hunt inside the Democratic Party's primary.

Our ability to overturn the historical limitations of our political consciousness, and assert our optimism in the capacity of blacks, poor people, women, and labor to mobilize themselves — both within the electoral system and outside of it — may determine the future course of American politics and society. Our capacity to transcend the structural limits of reform depends in part upon our active intervention inside the system. Our opportunity to create a unique American form of democratic socialism and the basis for human equality rests with our efforts both to challenge and to transform the Democratic Party and also to create a permanent grassroots protest movement divorced from electoral politics. []

Manning Marable is director of the Africana and Hispanic Studies Program at Colgate University and is National Vice Chairperson of the Democratic Socialists of America.
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mericans love politics and power, complete with all the trappings. They love to wipe the slate clean with drama and fanfare. But there are at least two things wrong with our mental pictures of politics. They don't include women, and they perpetuate the myth that politics is a dramatic event, thus obscuring the mundane day-to-day work and the numerous ways that politics touches every aspect of life.

Both of these factors are changing, because the media, the parties, and the polls have all discovered the gender gap—a new cliche, but also a reality of formidable political potential. The gap, quite simply, lies in the difference between the female and male vote. Women are finally going to the polls in numbers equal to men, but the percentage of the vote they give to the more progressive candidates is often from six to 12 points higher than men's.

Such a margin can be critical in a close election, and both major parties have taken notice and are studying how best to woo women to their side. The major national women's organizations have also given notice: women can vote as a bloc, and they will. Women have begun raising money among themselves to support their candidates from either party. In 1982, the first year for a Minnesota women's fund, donors contributed more than $100,000. Given the option to designate whether their money went to Republican or Democratic candidates, 90 percent checked "Don't Care."

What is happening? Women are finally identifying the issues important to them as women and then voting in their own interests. Party affiliation is secondary; women are hurt the most by conservative economic policies so progressive politics are in their interest. In the past, when they organized, they contented themselves with a major win—prohibition or the right to vote, for example—and then returned to quiescence, allowing men to go about running the affairs of politics. But times have changed.

Women have learned that predominantly male governments produce policies and laws that hurt women and have decided the solution must be to elect more officeholders sympathetic to their half of the population. So women have decided to learn the rules of the game and are ready to play to win.

The Reverend Jeannette Stokes of Greensboro, North Carolina, long active in the fight for the ERA, reflects on the increasing sophistication of North Carolina activists during six attempts to get the amendment passed: "With every successive fight, the forces got smarter. We made all the mistakes. We lobbied the wrong people at the wrong time, had the wrong people introduce the bill—the whole thing. But each time the women involved got more sophisticated about it. The effort even propelled several women into running for local offices themselves. And successfully."

The new activism involves political organizing, learning the techniques of politics, raising millions of dollars, and running candidates. The dollar figures alone are impressive. According to the November 1983 issue of Working Woman magazine, the National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC) spent $550,000, the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) more than $646,000, and the National Organization for Women (NOW) about $3 million on the 1982 elections. By the autumn of 1983, 17 political action committees (PACs) had been formed to finance women's campaigns.

There is nothing revolutionary about the women's tactics. They rest on the assumption that politics is hard work, that women have not been part of the process, that education is necessary, that victory is not only possible but probable.

NARAL is one of the many groups that have organized around women's
issues. In this case, around just one issue — keeping abortion safe and legal. NARAL’s effort cuts across party, class, and racial lines, mobilizing some 170,000 people in the past three years. As those who wish to outlaw abortion have grown more strident, NARAL’s membership has grown both in numbers and in its ability to counter that threat. The two sides fight it out in the state-houses and in Washington as one side attempts to infringe abortion rights and the other tries not only to save them but also to make those rights available to all women equally. (Medicaid and federal insurance programs do not pay for abortions in most states.)

A near-perfect illustration of the national schizophrenia on this issue can be found in North Carolina. As one NARAL-NC member observes, “We’re one of the few states that has an abortion fund. And we’re one of the few states that has a senator who will vote against everything that has to do with women and children and their well-being.” Perhaps nowhere else is the political environment so raw, yet proponents of pro-choice so well organized.

NARAL-NC’s History

Almost immediately after the Supreme Court’s Roe v. Wade decision in 1973 made abortions legal — though not necessarily accessible — anti-choice people began organizing to try to reverse the court’s ruling. Right-to-life became a major plank in the platform of the Moral Majority, while pro-choice people formed NARAL and its various state affiliates to counteract the strategy of the Right.

In North Carolina people formed chapters in Charlotte, Guilford County, Raleigh, and Chapel Hill in 1977. Lorna Chafe, one of the first members in Chapel Hill, recalls that their chapter concentrated on education. They held several forums to talk about the issue and distributed literature. They also monitored the state legislature and started a phone tree: when relevant legislation was being debated they activated the phone tree to get many people to contact the appropriate elected officials personally.

After a few years it became obvious that this activity was just not enough to ensure that abortion remained an option for all women. During programs, Chafe notes, people would ask the same questions about morality. “We were getting impatient with it. felt it was time to go further — to take people who knew how they felt on the issue and work towards keeping the legislation pro-choice. Our goal wasn’t to try to convert anyone.”

At the same time other state affiliates, in contact with each other, were developing politically successful organizing tactics. As the Moral Majority picked up steam before the 1980 national election, NARAL decided to develop a concerted strategy — Impact 80 — to counteract the Moral Majority hit list. The effort proved too little too late: that election brought the defeat of staunch pro-choice senators Birch Bayh, Frank Church, Warren Magnuson, George McGovern, and John Culver, and the victory of an anti-choice president and a Republican majority in the U.S. Senate.

NARAL members regrouped. Impact 80 became Impact 80s, and the vision grew broader. Organizers developed a multi-level national strategy not for just one victory but for the long haul. Its goal was to elect pro-choice candidates throughout the '80s and to educate, politicize, and train American women.

Here NARAL-NC came into its own as the leading proponent of abortion rights and of organizing women to address women’s issues. North Carolina was targeted as a state important to the national abortion issue because it has state funding for abortions for poor women and a legislature that consistently votes for choice. Thus, if a U.S. constitutional amendment outlawing abortion had come to a state-by-state vote, as seemed likely in 1981 and 1982, North Carolina was a probable member of the 17-state bloc needed to defeat it.

The state is even more important in 1984. Jesse Helms, one of its U.S. senators, is the champion of the national anti-choice forces. NARAL considers his current re-election race against Governor Jim Hunt to be “a campaign of national significance,” one of the most critical elections of the year. Helms is the proclaimed leader of the right-to-life movement and the Moral Majority, and other anti-choice senators have backed off in acknowledgment of his leadership.

In the summer of 1983, the constitutional amendment to nullify Roe v. Wade, called the Hatch Amendment in honor of Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah, failed in the U.S. Senate by one vote less than a simple majority. Although an amendment needs a two-thirds vote to pass, the message was clear that the Senate is half anti-choice; a bill which requires only a majority might easily pass. In November 1983 President Reagan signed into
law a measure that for one year bans abortion coverage, except in medical emergencies, by federal employee health insurance plans. Another provision of this law, the well-known brain child of Congressman Henry Hyde of Illinois, prohibits the use of Medicaid funds for abortions.

Helms has another constitutional amendment, the Respect Human Life Amendment, which he introduces periodically; it would make these two measures permanent law and introduce other severe funding restrictions on any health program related to abortion. And he and his allies have recently begun a new campaign: to increase the size of the Supreme Court; the additional justices, who Ronald Reagan could then appoint, would probably be anti-choice and could help to overturn Roe v. Wade.

Leaders of the Right have vowed to support Helms’s campaign. Robert Tobin of the Committee in Defense of Life says, “The [defeat of the Hatch Amendment] will galvanize the Right-to-Life forces for the 1984 elections because President Reagan alone can add the fifth and decisive justice to the Supreme Court to reverse the Roe Case.” And Moral Majority leader Jerry Falwell, preaching to an assembly of ministers and lay people in Charlotte, pronounced (according to the Charlotte Observer of July 6, 1983): “If for some reason a determination were made that we are a benevolent dictatorship and only one person could run it — I couldn’t want that, never going to have it — I wouldn’t have to think twice. I’d say Jesse Helms. He is a national treasure.”

Recognizing the importance thus attached to the right-to-life agenda by the political Right, the NARAL Foundation developed an extensive, sophisticated training program for organizers of its state affiliates and found seed money to hire staff. Within a few months of being hired, every staff member goes to a three-and-a-half day workshop on basic organizing skills; a more advanced one is offered periodically. Workshops on the use of the media and on fundraising have also been developed, so a state affiliate can send different staff for training in particular skills and interests. Wendy Berg, a North Carolina organizer, recently attended the latest of the workshops, electoral training to prepare for the 1984 elections. She says it was “superb.” The role of the statewide NARAL-PAC board in relation to the state board, the role of staff in the 1984 campaigns, how to negotiate with candidates, how to target campaigns and candidates within the state, and how to keep the affiliate alive and thriving during all this electoral work are among the topics covered.

Organizational Structure

The organizers of NARAL cherish the membership. Marilyn Butler was the first staffperson hired for North Carolina, in 1981, and she is now director of NARAL-NC. She had been on the staff of the state’s Public Interest Research Group and brought to NARAL skills learned there and in the civil rights, feminist, and peace movements. She says, “When I was hired, I sat in the office by myself and I looked around. I had a card file and I had a board that was spread everywhere in the state. I went through the membership list and found all the Raleigh and Durham members, people who had given money to NARAL-NC at some point in the last four years. I called them and told them what we were doing and said that this stuff was different from what we’d done in the past. And some of them were real excited about it, and I asked those people to either host a house meeting themselves, give me names of their friends to invite, or phone their friends to come to a house meeting, or whatever. Volunteers have been the backbone of NARAL-NC from the beginning. I cannot stress that enough.”

The house meeting is NARAL’s fundamental building block. Twelve to 20 pro-choice people gather in someone’s home to learn about abortion rights and how they can get involved. There is a presentation on the status and history of abortion rights at the national and state levels, and people are asked to contribute money and time. The speaker describes numerous tasks — all broken down so they can be done easily and efficiently — and asks the guests to host meetings in their own homes. Everyone is asked for a list of their pro-choice friends who might be invited to future meetings. Some 2,000 different people have attended in North Carolina during the past two-and-a-half years.

Butler describes how the movement grew: “After the first house meeting, we got more hosts to sign up to do a house meeting, and for every house meeting I would call three phoners, a month ahead of time, and ask them to make phone calls, send them the list, and get back to them. Eventually I got one of them to be the phone coordinator, so there were four people involved in each house meeting besides me. And eventually people that had signed up to do speaking got training, where we taught them the basics of how to speak in public and what to say. They went with me to a couple of house meetings, and then they did one of their own and became volunteer speakers.”
The structure of NARAL demands that members continually learn new and more advanced political skills. Besides the phoning and phone-banking and training as house meeting speakers, volunteers can learn the fundamentals of politics at skills workshops. These workshops, says Butler, are meant to “de-mystify the political process. They are an introduction for people who have never been involved in grassroots politics or campaigns and are intimidated by the idea of walking cold into a campaign office when they don’t know the basic structure of a campaign or the jargon.”

The workshops, planned by a committee of 12 to 18 NARAL volunteers, feature a panel consisting of elected officials, campaign workers, and some volunteers who speak on particular aspects of political work. The topics are fundamental: what it means to be partisan, what is the difference between a primary and an election, how anyone can work on a campaign. The result: people who have never before registered to vote are suddenly motivated to work on a campaign and to get others to work too.

One volunteer who typifies this pattern is Tracy Sloop, a native of Wilmington, North Carolina, now living in Raleigh. She signed up for more information at a booth at the state fair and received an invitation to join NARAL-NC. She was one of the first people Butler called when the Raleigh office opened. Sloop recalls, “I had done no volunteer work at all until Marilyn contacted me. NARAL would just call and ask if I’d be interested in doing something, and if I was, I would. I started at the bottom, with phone calls, that sort of thing. As things moved along, I volunteered a lot, so I’ve been involved in almost everything they did. I was more interested in doing things for NARAL, rather than getting involved in politics, because I’m a federal employee and not allowed to work on a campaign. But this is an issue, so I can work with it. I can get other people interested in NARAL, and interested in politics, and work around it that way.”

Sloop recently coordinated a political skills workshop by herself and thinks that the importance of learning about the political process cannot be over-emphasized: “I had never even voted until I got involved with NARAL and started realizing that people can make a difference. I was always under the impression that politics was dirty and that politicians were all crooks. As I started doing things with NARAL, I realized that you can make a difference, and if you’re well-organized, you can make a big difference.”

She got interested in the abortion rights issue as an extension of her concern that women have the power to control their bodies. It angered her that most government officials are men: “I looked around, and the people that were saying that women could not make decisions for themselves, that they had to go out and bear children whether they wanted to or not, were male, and could never know what that meant and never have it apply to them or affect them. And it struck me as not quite fair.”

Sloop has also worked extensively on another major aspect of NARAL strategy – fundraising (see box on p. 31). The organization sees this work not only as the way to keep itself alive but also as another way to train volunteers in skills that will translate to campaign work.

Butler explains, “We work fundraising into our planning and we see fundraising as part of the process of leadership development and organization building. And we set our sights high; we don’t put two months into a fundraiser that’s only going to bring in $1,000. We decide that we’re going to bring in $4,000 or $5,000, and we are able to get together the committee with the energy to do that. We rely on our members to sell tickets and keep things medium-priced so that a lot of people can come and have a good time. We make the events fun.

“In the process, people learn. People who have never done it before learn the principles of good fundraising: how to plan for it, how to do the project matrix [which involves going through each category of things to be done, dividing up each task, placing those components on a week sheet and eventually on a timeline so that everyone knows what needs to happen what week]. We don’t think that volunteers should be involved only in the political work; we think they should be involved in making the organization go, keeping us alive, and learning all the skills. That’s a lot of its success. And people think it’s fun.

“The committee gets real up about it, about doing a lot of work and raising a lot of money – being successful. But it does require that you know how volunteers fit in from the very beginning, and if you’re in an organization that doesn’t have a membership or constituency to speak of, if nobody’s ever been asked to do anything, then it might be hard to carry something like that off, because it does require large numbers of people who are willing to put in some work.”

SOUTHERN EXPOSURE 29
All of this planning and strategizing—the house meetings, fundraisers, and gradual building of the political and public skills of the membership—has resulted in an organization currently supporting four full-time staff with a membership base of 3,000 and an annual budget of $54,000. In August 1983 the staff and board decided it was time to organize a political action committee. Butler explains the need: “What we’ve been working for all this time is to get people involved in the elections, and we can’t do that with NARAL-NC because of its tax-exempt status. What we needed was a vehicle to make good what we say we’re going to do. We have the direct hands-on ability to turn people out for elections. Our expertise and our skill is in turning out a large number of people to do some activity, and that’s what we would do in a very concerted way with a campaign.”

Butler anticipates that the NARAL PAC would organize its membership very systematically, not only to ensure that NARAL gets credit for victories but also so the membership can continue to develop political skills: “We know how to treat volunteers in a way that’s respectful and makes it a good experience. We are selfish in that way: we don’t want our members to have a bad experience. We want them to want to come back again and to feel good about what they’re doing. We’ll try to keep the work itself educational and oriented toward leadership development, so that people can be involved in a campaign on their own and eventually run a campaign or run for office.”

This concern that the political experience be palatable and positive rather than intimidating is valid, given the constituency of NARAL. The state movement for the ERA, the state NOW, and the Women’s Political Caucus attract politically active women, but the NARAL membership comes from a previously untapped population: predominantly young, educated, politically inactive white middle-class women. Many of the women attending house meetings are not registered to vote. Most have lived their mature lives with abortion an assumed right, and the possibility that the right could be denied hits them at a gut level. Minority and poor white women have not responded actively to the abortion rights issue, and NARAL members, like other progressive predominantly white organizations, have agonized over why these women do not respond and if there is a moral or practical imperative to try to get them involved.

Jeanette Stokes, NARAL-NC board chair, reflects on several dimensions of the issue: “I think that abortion is a good issue around which to organize middle and upper-class white women because most of them have some experience with it. My belief is that justice is this big kind of ball that people come at from all points, but once you get inside the hope is that you’ll see all the connections. That what’s going on in El Salvador is connected with how much secretaries are paid and whether they get to go home when their children are sick. I think it’s responsible to try to draw people into the struggle for justice at whatever point they can understand it.

“If you’re talking to farmers, you talk about the price of crops. If you’re talking to upper-class white women you talk about some issue they have experienced some pain around. And abortion for a lot of women is a real issue. They have daughters or sisters or friends that have dealt with it. The important thing is to get people involved in the struggle for justice.

“It’s similar to the role of black women in the state fight for the ERA. For a long time black women were saying, ‘Leave us alone. Yes, we think that women’s rights are important, but our particular history does not make us want to trample all over black men like you guys want to trample all over white men. It’s not their fault. Yes, they may be sexist, but they’ve also gotten kicked in the head just as much as black women.’ I think that if we really want to be fair, and interracial, we’ve got to be willing to sit down and put all the issues on the table, and try to decide which are the most important. I doubt that we’d find that for black women abortion is top. When I look at the issues that most affect the poorest women in this country, they are food stamps, AFDC, organized labor—and abortion rights get all tangled up.”

Nonetheless, NARAL is concerned that its appeal is limited almost exclusively to white middle-class women. In 1984, NARAL plans to broaden its constituency by concentrating on getting rid of the Hyde Amendment which prohibits Medicaid coverage of abortion. A candidate’s position on abortion funding for poor women will be used to measure the extent and sincerity of that candidate’s pro-choice stance. In this way, NARAL hopes to mobilize women across racial and economic boundaries. At the state level, organizers will begin to reach out to black churches and student groups, and do neighborhood canvassing.
For Marilyn Butler, this new strategy of expanding the organization's work on abortion is required in her interpretation of the NARAL mission statement: "To develop and sustain a constituency which effectively uses the political process at the state and national level to guarantee to every woman in the United States the right to choose and obtain a legal abortion." She explains, "The important thing about this is that women have the right to choose, that they can make up their own minds about whether they are going to bear a child at this time in their lives. The right to choose means that poor women have the right to choose as well. It doesn't matter if abortion is legal if you can't afford to pay for it."

North Carolina is one of nine or 10 states — and the only one in the South — with some sort of public funds for abortions. Because North Carolina has a strong pro-choice legislature (which has gotten progressively stronger in the last few elections), the abortion fund remains intact; in fact, it was increased from $1 million in 1982 to $1.374 million in 1983. But this money is available only to the poorest of the poor — the eligibility level is well below that of Medicaid and other social services. Many ineligible women still cannot afford abortions and therefore are still not free to make a choice.

Freedom to choose is what NARAL organizing is all about, but NARAL organizers see many connections with other women's issues. Butler explains, "Although we've been focusing on abortion rights specifically, philosophically we feel that those rights have to do with the right of a woman to control her childbearing and in a sense her own body. As long as women don't have this control, then there's no way that women really have equality or can be free to make decisions in other parts of their lives. Equality for women, and equal pay, and equal chance for employment, cannot exist if a woman is being forced to have a child. The freedom isn't here, and it's related to a lot of other questions of economics and opportunity and racism."

NARAL organizer Wendy Berg adds: "The organizing strategy is based on the principle of people becoming involved in issues that affect their lives. This leads to learning how to hold candidates accountable, which requires women to become more involved in the democratic and political processes in this country. Women need more power in that process. NARAL shows women a way to get that power."

The next step for women working on a single issue, such as abortion, is to form coalitions with other social justice groups. NARAL has already begun joining with other groups in the state in their efforts to influence the 1984 elections and put people in office who will work for social justice, and coalitions are where the gender gap becomes a powerful force.

In North Carolina, as elsewhere, the various women's organizations have worked individually and collectively to develop a fighting constituency. They have laid the groundwork for active democratic participation and have learned the rules — when to strike off by themselves and when to join with issue-sympathetic politicians and "hold their noses," as one ERA worker puts it. They are determined to put good people in office, and they know that their own members can do at least as good a job as those now in office. Jeanette Stokes says, "I want to get legislation passed. The best way to get that done is to be a legislator. The next best way is to work on the campaign. The ultimate goal is to get more women, women who share my concerns, elected to office." □

Valerie Rosenquist is a graduate student in modern American social history at Duke University and is now organizing electoral politics workshops for the Institute for Southern Studies. She joined the board of NARAL-NC in 1983.

SOUTHERN EXPOSURE 31
On August 22, 1973, Bennie G. Thompson became the first black mayor of Bolton, Mississippi. Twenty miles west of the capital at Jackson, Bolton is a small town with about 700 residents, two-thirds of whom are black.

Prior to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, not a single black resident of Bolton was registered to vote. Registration drives produced three black aldermen in 1969, but this attempt at biracial government met with opposition from the white mayor and aldermen and failed. White resistance prompted more organizing in the black community, paving the way for Thompson's victory in 1973.

Since then, blacks have retained political control of Bolton. The town now has its second black mayor, Lawrence Butler, and for the past decade, at least four of the five aldermen have been black.

Black control of the Board of Aldermen was institutionalized in 1976, when Bolton became the first town in the state to voluntarily change from at-large elections to elections by ward. There is now one white-majority ward, three black-majority wards, and one at-large slot for aldermen.

The success of black rule can be seen in the confidence, pride, and self-respect of Bolton's people. The town was the first in the state to adopt a human relations ordinance outlawing discrimination in housing and in the use of public accommodations and establishing a commission to oversee its implementation. Perhaps most symbolic of the changes in Bolton are the local police uniforms: the department's uniform must be the only one in the country displaying a red, black, and green flag, symbolizing black liberation, in place of the traditional red, white, and blue.

**ELECTORAL VICTORIES BY BOLTON'S BLACK MAJORITY HAVE TRANSFORMED WHAT WAS A marginal government entity into a service-oriented, active municipal body. Before Thompson took office, the town hall was usually open only three hours a week, mostly to collect water bills. In contrast, since 1973 town hall has stayed open from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m., five days a week, plus Saturday mornings. These days, it's not unusual to see a black person in the mayor's office complaining about a water bill, trash pick-up, or some other municipal concern. As Thompson puts it, "One of my campaign pledges was to open the doors of local government to all people. The doors have been opened and they are staying open."

To alleviate the most pressing problems of poverty and housing, Thompson went after outside funding. With varying degrees of success, he secured financial assistance from federal agencies, foundations, and various nonprofit groups. This may be the greatest accomplishment of black political control of Bolton.

Partly as a result of these outside resources, local people were able to secure jobs and income. Contractors on new city projects hired local laborers, social service programs provided jobs, as did the town's access to funding for youth programs. All this,
and 80 CETA jobs, inspired a quip that Bolton was the only town in America with full employment.

The various federal funds secured for construction projects and social service programs brought further material improvements to Bolton. Streets were paved; houses rehabilitated and weatherized; a community center built to provide day-care for children, meals for the elderly, and other activities; and a fire station opened.

Perhaps the accomplishment Thompson takes most pride in is a 40-unit rental housing development. The duplex apartments are well constructed and air-conditioned, and the rents are subsidized. Spending months arguing with the Farmers Home Administration, Thompson made sure that the agency provided sufficient loan funds for quality construction. He then personally watched over the shoulder of the contractor. The location of this development — in a previously all-white residential area — has great symbolic meaning.

A black controlled nonprofit corporation, the Bolton Development Corporation, owns and operates the development. It is now the single largest source of municipal property taxes in Bolton, with about half of the town’s black tenants living in the housing. Besides getting desperately needed high-quality shelter, the low-income families are “no longer dependent on white landlords and plantation owners for their housing. That is one less point of stress in their lives,” according to Thompson, who is secretary of the development corporation.

The existence of the rental housing is a tribute to black control and power in a biracial setting. Today, Bolton’s whites recognize, tolerate, and at times acquiesce to the power of the black majority. However, the first several years of Thompson’s term as mayor saw frequent harassment and subversion by whites. Various challenges to the 1973 elections delayed the inauguration of the newly elected officials by almost two months. At least seven unsuccessful law suits were filed to stop or overturn the election results, leading Frank Parker of the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law to comment, “More lawsuits have grown out of the Bolton 1973 elections than any other election in the history of Mississippi.”

Other post-election harassment included withdrawal of county services from the town, including the use of a garbage truck, and the hiring of an attorney by white leaders to attend every meeting of the town’s Board of Aldermen for nearly a year after Thompson took office. The mayor and aldermen also received frequent crank calls at all hours of the night. And when Thompson ordered a property reassessment, virtually every white owner requested a hearing to protest the revised figures. It was determined that not a single assessment was calculated improperly or unfairly. Only a few years later, white property owners accepted, with little more than a whimper, the town’s first land-use ordinances, including a zoning ordinance. Thompson figures this turnaround took place when whites realized that “they couldn’t break us. They ran out of options other than extreme violence. We proved to whites and blacks that a black person could do a good job as a chief elected official of a town.” Nonetheless, Thompson does express regret that “whites in this area were not more receptive. We certainly could have accomplished more with support of the total community.”
BENNIE G. THOMPSON

The success of black officials in Bolton has also pointed out some shortcomings. While controlling the political machinery, the black community has yet to break their economic dependence on white owners. This is symbolized by some white-owned businesses, including the town's only bank, that still refuse to hire blacks.

While the flow of funds and assistance to Bolton helped pay for correcting decades of neglect and deprivation, it also reinforced a sense of dependence. There seems to be a lingering sense that the federal government—even in the days of Reaganism—will somehow bail the town out of its bigger problems.

Over the past decade, there has been little new private investment in Bolton. The town's efforts to lure industry to the area have so far been unsuccessful, due in large part to insufficient utilities and, until recently, a lack of city-owned industrial land.

Even so, Bolton is far better off than many small, and in particular black-controlled, towns. Property taxes have been reassessed and modernized—the wealthy now pay their fair share—water rates occasionally adjusted, and building permit fees instituted. There has not been a major flight of capital either, while black land and home ownership has increased. In 1973 about one-half of the black families rented their homes, mostly from whites; today, about three-fourths of the black families are homeowners, due in large part to federally funded community development projects.

C coinciding with the need for economic independence is the need for management skills. For example, despite their new fire trucks, a new fire station, and extended water lines, the town's fire insurance premiums have not decreased. This is because the volunteer fire department is not well managed: regular meetings and training programs are not scheduled or held and records of fires and equipment maintenance are not kept.

Like many other municipalities, Bolton has fallen victim to building contractors, engineers, and architects who take advantage of the town's inexperience with construction projects. Lacking local funds to make up for contractor foul-ups, several projects have gone unfinished. The new fire station needed a paved driveway, and construction of a new library was halted when the contractor went bankrupt.

Officials attribute such management problems to the fact that there were no administrative procedures to be inherited by the black leadership from their white counterparts. Improvements in this area have been made. For instance, Bolton now has its water billing computerized and handled by a black-owned firm in Jackson—in contrast to the scribbled list kept by earlier administrations.

Thompson and his followers have also found that while they are able to come up with much needed innovative plans, it is a struggle getting officials to accept new ideas. To combat this, and to develop local leadership, Thompson organized black mayors into the Mississippi Conference of Black Mayors. The group serves as a forum for sharing information and ideas, and strives to develop strategies for dealing with state policy issues that affect small black-led communities. Heads of various federal and state agencies are frequently invited to explain their programs to the group.

Thompson feels that another important ingredient in helping elected officials develop progressive programs and agendas is a sustainable local community organization: "A process should take place where candidates are selected and not just elected. Getting someone elected is just the beginning. Officials must be kept accountable; this is a lot easier if there is an organized group attending meetings and making itself visible. Also an active group can back up a progressive official when he is politically isolated."
For former mayor Bennie Thompson, things continue to move ahead. During this year's elections in Mississippi, Bill Minor, a syndicated columnist covering Mississippi politics for 35 years, observed that "Thompson apparently has the potential of becoming the single most influential black figure to emerge [in Mississippi] since the heyday of Charles Evers's away over the budding black political force in the late 1960s." Before the 1983 gubernatorial election, Minor wrote that Thompson spent a week talking to black leaders. The campaign called him a direct line to 250,000 votes and many people are attributing Allain's victory to support from these black leaders.

Change for the better in Bolton has spilled across its boundaries into the rest of Hinds County, including Jackson. Black political achievements in and around Bolton have grown to include a successful suit against the state highway patrol to end harassment and the arbitrary stopping and searching of blacks in Hinds County. The action is believed to be the first where state highway patrolmen were convicted of brutality in federal court in Mississippi.

Another suit forced the county to redraw its five county supervisor districts. Without the new district lines, blacks — who make up over 40 percent of the county's population — could not get elected to office. In 1979, Thompson and another man were elected as the first black county supervisors in Hinds County since Reconstruction. At this time other blacks were elected to the county election commission, the school boards, and judge's court. In 1983, for the first time, a black, Walter Robinson, was elected to represent the area in the state's House of Representatives.

Frederic Cooper, a city planner, lived in Mississippi for nine years. He was community development director of the Mississippi Institute for Small Towns. Now head of planning with the National Demonstration Water Project in Washington, D.C., he is a member of the Planners Network, a national organization of progressive planners.

### Profiles

**PROGRESSIVES TAKE POWER**

**2. WORKER IN THE SENATE**

**BY GAIL MILLER**

**IF YOU ASK DANNY CORBETT WHY HE HAPPENED TO RUN FOR THE ALABAMA SENATE, HE'LL TELL YOU IT'S BECAUSE "Dutch Higginbotham made me mad."**

But Corbett is not an angry young man; he's more like the people to whom author Coleman McCarthy paid tribute in his book, *Disturbers of Peace*. As area vice-president of Communication Workers of America (CWA) Local 10908 in Montgomery, Alabama, Corbett is a "disturber of the peace." When he sees something wrong, he feels compelled to try to right it.

So it was in the case of Dutch Higginbotham, a conservative senator who served in the state legislature for 12 years without once casting a pro-labor vote. Three years ago, he sponsored a bill to prevent workers from suing their employers if they were injured on the job. "I'll get you for this, Dutch," said Corbett before he rallied the support of labor lobbyists in Montgomery to defeat Higginbotham's proposal.

Afterward, at the urging of the central labor council and the Trial Lawyers Association, the CWA leader decided to challenge Higginbotham for his Senate seat in the 1982 elections. Talking about his pro-labor campaign, Corbett says, "Working people — union people — get a short shrift in the South, and I wanted to try to do something about it."

Corbett was already well known as a friend of working people in his district. Shortly before the battle over Higginbotham's bill in the legislature, Corbett spearheaded a successful campaign to block South Central Bell from closing its business office in Phenix City, Alabama. Nineteen people faced layoffs if the office closed, and residents of the area would also be deprived of local access to the telephone company for services such as billing adjustments.

Taking off from work to fight the Bell decision, Corbett went on full-time with the union for three months. He succeeded in getting virtually every civic group in Phenix City and the adjoining communities to pass resolutions protesting the closing, as well as gathering 27,000 signatures on a petition objecting to the action. Using the petition and the resolutions to support his argument, Corbett filed a formal complaint with the Public Utilities Commission, which then issued a stay against South Central Bell.

A court later ruled that the company could transfer some services to its Montgomery office, but the Phenix City office would have to remain open. Although the office currently employs only five people, the original 19 got what they wanted — some transferring to other locations and jobs, and others opting for early retirement.

Corbett's first campaign move was to write a letter to the 4,000 members of his district's labor council telling them where he stood on the issues, and what his past achievements had been. He asked for their help — and got it.

He then established campaign committees in each of the three counties in his district. His campaign co-managers were Larry Wofford, prim
ALABAMA STATE SENATOR DANNY CORBETT

dent of CWA Local 3212 in Columbus, Georgia, and Mike Davis, secretary of the United Rubber Workers in Opelika, Alabama. “We’d call someone on a campaign committee in a town 30 or 40 miles away and tell them we needed 30 workers to spend all day on a Saturday at a rally or picnic — and instead of 30, we’d get 40 or 50. The people were just wonderful, and it made all the difference,” Corbett recalls.

Throughout his campaign, Corbett told everyone, “I’m not just a working man’s candidate — I am a working man.” Wherever he went, his union card was his badge of honor. Even in the most hostile areas, he proudly identified himself as a union leader. “I went on television in an area that is almost solidly textile — non-union — and the first thing I said was, ‘I’m Danny Corbett — area vice-president of CWA Local 10908 in Montgomery.’ And it paid off. We got the big guy.”

Noting that Higginbotham “spent a fortune” of the business community’s money on his campaign, Corbett says proudly, “We beat him with $32,000 and a lot of legwork.”

He attributes his victory to the all-out support of CWA and other unions in the district. The $32,000 came from CWA-COPE (Committee on Political Education) in Mobile, Birmingham, Selma, Montgomery, and Columbus, Georgia (a city on the state line whose CWA local represents members in both Georgia and Alabama).

Corbett also received financial help from District 10 and District 3 COPE treasuries, as well as contributions from the Steelworkers, Mine Workers, Textile Workers, Rubber Workers, and Laborers unions. The Trial Lawyers Association and the Alabama Education Association also made contributions.

“But it was more than the money,” says Corbett. “They also gave their time. They made telephone calls to get out the vote. They knocked on doors for me. They distributed leaflets describing my stand on the various issues. They helped me produce radio and television ads and we did all the print advertising ourselves.”

Corbett says he mobilized this support by carefully putting into practice skills he had gained at a CWA-sponsored leadership training program at the University of Alabama in Birmingham. “This program gave me everything I needed — both to be an effective union leader and to run a successful political campaign,” he says. “They teach you public speaking, how to come across well on television, and some basic psychology, along with how to handle grievances and other union procedures. The way I look at it, there’s not much difference between representing union members and representing a political constituency. In many cases, they’re one and the same.”

And so they are for Corbett, who still has his job as a residential service technician with South Central Bell. He’s in his second term as area vice-president of CWA Local 10908, and in the Senate he’s serving on six committees, including those for Business and Labor Relations, Finance and Taxation, Consumer Affairs, and Aging.

After a couple of terms in the Alabama Senate, Corbett would like to think about running for the U.S. Congress. “I guess that’s the goal of anybody in state politics,” he says. “You’d like to try to do some good at high places.”

This article previously appeared in CWA News.
SONDRA LUCHT, ONE OF THREE WOMEN IN THE WEST VIRGINIA SENATE, IS A FEMINIST AND FORMER STATE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN (NOW). IN 1982, SHE WAS ELECTED WITH THE BACKING OF A STURDY COALITION OF LABOR, TEACHERS, SENIORS, CONSUMER GROUPS, AND BLACKS — AS WELL AS FEMINISTS. A TEACHER AND SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGIST, SHE IS ALSO A LONG-TIME COMMUNITY ACTIVIST IN THE EASTERN PANHANDLE REGION OF THE STATE, WHICH SHE REPRESENTS IN THE SENATE. IN A RECENT INTERVIEW AT HER HOME IN MARTINSBURG, SHE TALKED ABOUT HER NEW LIFE AS AN ELECTED OFFICIAL, BEGINNING WITH SOME THOUGHTS ON HOW HER BACKGROUND IN THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT LED HER INTO POLITICS.

I WAS STATE PRESIDENT OF NOW DURING THE FIGHT TO EXTEND THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (ERA) RATIFICATION DEADLINE BY THREE YEARS. THAT TIME FOR ME WAS A TIME OF DOING THINGS I HADN'T DONE BEFORE, LEARNING ON THE JOB. I LEARNED HOW TO ORGANIZE PEOPLE AND HOW TO FACE A HOSTILE CROWD OR A CROWD THAT MAY BE CLOSED TO ME AND WHAT I AM TRYING TO PRESENT — THE ERA FOR INSTANCE. I LEARNED HOW TO WORK WITH A CROWD LIKE THAT BY STARTING WHERE THEY WERE, RELATING TO THEM, AND THEN TALKING WITH THEM RATHER THAN BOMBASTING THEM.

WHEN I WAS THE LOCAL NOW PRESIDENT WE STARTED TO ORGANIZE A SHELTER FOR BATTERED WOMEN, AND WE HAD PUBLIC MEETINGS. ONE OF THE FIRST MEETINGS WAS A PUBLIC FORUM, WITH 200 TO 300 PEOPLE ATTENDING. AND WE HAD LAUGHING, BOOING, AND HISsing IN THE CROWD. SO I LEARNED HOW TO DEAL WITH THAT KIND OF SITUATION — OR RATHER I LEARNED NOT TO SET MYSELF UP FOR THAT KIND OF SITUATION.

I FOUND THAT IT WASN'T TIME YET FOR THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS WE WERE MAKING, THAT WE HADN'T DONE OUR HOMEWORK. SO WE WENT BACK AND TALKED WITH THE DIRECTOR OF THE LOCAL MENTAL HEALTH CENTER ABOUT WHAT WE SAW AS A BIG PROBLEM. THEY REALLY HADN'T THOUGHT OF SPUSE ABUSE AS A BIG PROBLEM IN THIS AREA. BUT AT THE TIME I WAS GETTING THREE OR FOUR PHONE CALLS A WEEK AT HOME FROM WOMEN WHO NEEDED SHELTER, AND WE FINALLY FOUND A PRIVATE HOME OR TWO FOR THEM. WE STARTED DOING SOME WORK WITH THE MENTAL HEALTH CENTER STAFF, AND THEY STARTED TO KEEP SOME RECORDS. THEN WE WENT TO THE POLICE DEPARTMENT AND DID THE SAME THING.

SO YOU LEARN TO DO YOUR HOMEWORK BEFORE EVER GOING PUBLIC. WITH THE SHELTER, THE CITY ITSELF FINALLY BACKED A LOAN. IT TOOK FIVE YEARS FOR THE THING TO REALLY GET GOING — THREE YEARS' INITIAL WORK, TWO OF THEM JUST FOR BACKGROUND AND LEGWORK. YOU LEARN THAT THINGS WON'T JUST CHANGE OVERNIGHT. YOU LEARN PATIENCE. YOU LEARN THAT MAKING SOME LASTING CHANGE IS A LONG, INVOLVED, EDUCATIONAL PROCESS. THERE ARE TIMES TO GO OUT AND MAKE YOUR FIERY SPEECHES, BUT THOSE ARE USUALLY TO THE PEOPLE WHO ARE ALREADY CONVERTED.

WHEN I WAS IDENTIFIED WITH NOW, MY MEDIA IMAGE — THE WAY I'VE ALWAYS BEEN PERCEIVED BY PEOPLE WHO READ NEWSPAPERS OR LISTEN TO THE RADIO — WAS A WILD-EYED, CHANGE-THE-SYSTEM NOW TYPE OF PERSON. WITHIN MY OWN GROUP OF FRIENDS I AM SEEN AS MORE OF A DOWN-TO-EARTH, LET'S-DO-OUR-HOMEWORK, VERY NITTY-GRITTY, MORE MODERATE TYPE OF PERSON. SO I USED TO GET KIND OF A KICK OUT OF MY MEDIA IMAGE.

WHEN I MET PEOPLE WHO HAD ONLY READ ABOUT ME, THEY WOULD SAY, "MY GOODNESS, YOU'RE NOT AT ALL LIKE I THOUGHT YOU WOULD BE." I RAN INTO A LOT OF THAT DURING THE CAMPAIGN.


IN THE SENATE, I'M THE FIRST WOMAN WHOSE BACKGROUND WAS PRIMARILY IN FEMINIST ACTIVITIES. NORMALLY A GREAT DEAL OF INITIAL POWER IS ASSUMED TO GO ALONG WITH ANYBODY COMING INTO THE SENATE WHO COMES FROM A STRONG GROUP. AND I HAD STRONG BACKING NOT ONLY FROM THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT BUT ALSO FROM A COALITION OF LABOR, TEACHERS, BLACKS, AND SENIOR CITIZENS. IT WAS A STRONG WORKING UNIT IN WHICH NO ONE OF THE GROUPS DOMINATED.

BUT I THINK THAT MOST LEGISLATORS PRIMARILY SAW MY CONNECTION WITH THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT, AND I THINK THERE IS A TENDENCY TO DISCOUNT THAT AS TRUE POWER. THERE IS STILL A WIDESPREAD ATTITUDE OUT THERE THAT IF YOU CAN GET THESE WOMEN ALONE, RATHER THAN IN A GROUP, YOU CAN GOOD-OLD-BOY THEM INTO DOING WHAT YOU WANT; THAT THEY'LL SEE THE LIGHT AND SEE HOW TOTALLY RIDICULOUS THEY HAVE BEEN.

WHEN I FIRST WENT TO CHARLESTON, FOR THE FIRST THREE OR FOUR WEEKS, I DIDN'T SPEAK ON THE FLOOR AND I SPOKE VERY LITTLE IN COMMITTEE. I DID THAT BECAUSE I KNEW A LOT OF THEM THOUGHT, "HERE'S BELLA ABZUG AND SHE'S GOING TO JUMP AND SCREAM." THAT'S NEVER BEEN MY STYLE — EVEN IN MY MOST VITAL DAYS,
SONDRA LUCHT
STATE SENATE

"Sondra Lucht is a new type of politician. She has proven that she is dedicated to working for the people of the Eastern Panhandle. Her record as a concerned citizen shows her to be extremely hard working and honest. Residents of the Eastern Panhandle are lucky to have such an outstanding candidate for State Senate."

Kate Long, President
West Virginia - Citizen Action Group

Someone who will fight for consumers.

Sondra Lucht.

and I've quieted down quite a bit since then. When I did something in the senate, I wanted to make sure I didn't fall on my face. I wanted first impressions to be good impressions. So I waited until I was fairly sure of what was happening and when it was happening, then I sat down and listened. As a result, a lot of legislators came up and said that very thing - that they had expected me to be screaming and yelling and instead they wanted to know if I even talked.

I cannot just be a senator. I am always a female senator. At first I represented that, but I think it is indicative of my era to be seen that way. I hope the next era will see men and women as senators regardless of their sex. Now I don't resent it so much as I wish that we were further along.

Nationwide we are seeing some change. Of course, there is the new emphasis on women and politics. Even more important, over the past 10 years there have been real changes in attitudes, real changes in the recognition of people and their capabilities apart from their color or their sex. I don't believe any longer, at least in this area, that if you are a feminist activist people will think that is all you know.

BEING A SENATOR IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM BEING AN ADVOCATE, AND IT'S HARD AS HELL. When I was an advocate, I was right. Always. I could be outrageously demanding. I could be self-righteously perfect and insist that others be the same. In the senate, it's not that you don't have the same passions for truth and justice, but you can't be as outrageous about them. You have to take a reasonable time line. You have to consider that change is extremely disruptive to society and to people's lives. You have to consider that the advocate trying to cram 10 years of progress into one year does not have to consider. As a senator you have to reckon for each of those years and realize that people have to adjust, adapt, and adopt new attitudes.

I feel a real need to make people here in the eastern Panhandle feel comfortable, feel that they can trust me and will not be embarrassed by me. I want them to know I will fight for them and work for them, that I'm open, that I'll differ with them sometimes and agree with them at others. But most of all I want them to feel they have someone to represent them in a strong, articulate, and credible manner.

If, every time my constituents pick up the paper or hear someone talking about me, all I'm talking about is women's issues, then I have not related to a whole lot of my constituents up here. They need to know that I have an interest in agriculture. They need to know that I have an interest in the things they are interested in and have some knowledge about, and that I am working on them.

So I can't always have, as a senator, the same priorities I had as a women's advocate. □

Kathleen Cullinan is a freelance writer who lives near Fairview, West Virginia.
4. THE SCHOOL BOARD

BY TEMA OKUN

THEY WERE HAVING FIGHTS ON THE BUS AND NOBODY WANTED TO KNOW WHY. PARENTS CALLED me and said, “Well, we elected you to find out why buses aren’t coming into our area.” The girl who was driving the bus was a white girl and she was stopping every tenth of a mile and picking up the white kids, and then after she picked up all the white kids who were up near the heat, she’d come back and pick up the blacks. They’d be sitting in the back of the bus and they’d be cold and they’d say we’re not going to take this. If we have to fight every day, we’re going to fight. These are just the things that happen in a small, rural town.

Leon Crump, a young black man who grew up in Patrick, South Carolina, now lives in nearby Cheraw, where he has served on the school board since 1980. The population in Cheraw and the surrounding county is about 40 percent black. It is a rural county; J.P. Stevens, Burlington, Stanley Tools, and Pepsi are the major employers.

Cheraw is a pretty town. There are five schools — three elementary schools, a junior high school, and a high school. I got involved on the school board when a retired social worker started referring to me the children that were having problems in the school and I would go out and talk with the parents. I have kids of my own and I want them to have a quality education. Education is the key; if you don’t have that, then you’re in trouble, you’re headed for a life of misery.

It was Crump’s efforts to help a child who had been expelled that brought him to the attention of the social worker, who then encouraged him to run for a seat on the school board.

A whole lot of issues were raised in school board meetings that some of them refused to listen to. It doesn’t appear to be sensitive to the people, to the regular everyday people’s lives. One of the problems, I think, is the detention hall, kids being kept after the buses leave with no way to get home and some of them have to walk long distances and be out at dark. And expulsion of kids from school.

I don’t think you can put kids out of school for a whole year and expect them to come back a grade below and not have some alternative education for them. They need some things to do or they’re going to get in trouble. It’s mostly black kids that are getting expelled, but I don’t care about that, about whether they’re white or black. I want everything for all kids, white or black. That’s the reason I’m on the school board, and what you do for one you do for all.

In addition to serving on the Cheraw school board, Crump is a rural educato on the staff of the Rural Advancement Fund, a nonprofit organization based in Charlotte, North Carolina, that works to protect the interests of family farmers. He is married and has two children.

My father was a sharecropper. He left home when I was five and we couldn’t stay on the farm, so what my ma had to do was move in town and take a domestic job in someone’s house, and for 10 dollars a week she used to try to feed seven kids. So I know what struggle is about. I know how important it is to get something to move on.

I spent two years in the Marine Corps, 13 months in Vietnam. I got wounded twice, two Purple Hearts. I almost lost my eye, shot in the leg, so when I came back to the States, it was hard for me to realize that I was supposed to take a seat in the back of the bus, you know, because I feel nobody knows the price of freedom except those who fought for it, and I felt that I had fought for it, I’m not going to stand for anything that’s not equal and just. That’s one reason that I think I fight so hard for things I do believe in.

I am not satisfied with government. Blacks don’t have a 40 percent presence in town decisions and employment. There are five paid firemen and none of the firemen are black.

And in the schools, there are 477 teachers and only 71 are black — 45 percent of the students are black. There are no black male images in the school system.

Crump ran for school board with six other candidates for three available spots. He had never run for public office before.

I wanted to make the announcement that I was going to run [for school board], I went to the paper and asked if they would take a picture of me [to run in the paper] and they said, “well, we don’t take pictures.” I said, “okay, fine,” and I went out and had a picture made of me and my wife and my two children. I turned it in to the paper the following day and when the paper comes out, my picture is on the front page and everybody says, “Wow, what’s Leon doing on the front page of the paper — a black person!” Well, what happened, it was like a gift of God. They would usually run six candidates on the front page, but that night the pictures they had taken of the other candidates burned up in the darkroom, and the only picture they had was mine because I had brought mine in.

We had posters made, we passed out leaflets. The Cheraw school area encompasses other towns, and we felt that if we could consolidate the black vote and get some of the white vote, we could win. We would go to churches on Sunday mornings and talk to church groups and Sunday schools. We started one month before the
I had to have a meeting with the school superintendent and the guy who was in charge of the buses. We went up there with the NAACP committee. I told them that we just were not going to tolerate this, something had to be done. Now the driver stops every two-tenths of a mile and picks up people and goes on. So that was resolved and we felt good.

I think the school board members possess a lot of power, but they fail to utilize it because they don’t realize their potential. In the coming year, two new black principals will be replacing two black principals who are retiring. What’s usually been happening is that a black retires and they replace him with a white, so this time we were able to get two black principals to replace two blacks and we had a few black teachers hired, more than I feel would have been hired without this committee.

I think the newer candidates for school board are coming on because they want to try to upgrade education. I think this board is more activist than the board before Crump was elected. I think it can really be effective.

I don’t particularly care for politics. I was young, I didn’t realize what I was getting into when I got on the school board. I was lucky enough to become elected and while I was there I did the best job I could possibly do. I could run for another term, but I think I’ve done what I can do, and I have a contact now and could probably do as much from the outside as I could sitting on the board.

Politics is a dirty business because people make selfish deals, just for their own interests and not for their constituents. That’s why I really feel that if you’re going to be in politics, you really should be a one-term man and then let somebody else continue. It might not be so dirty.

The Education Committee has been discussing one or two possibilities to replace me in the next election, just throwing names around. But it definitely won’t be Leon Crump.

Tema Okun was a guest editor of Southern Exposure’s special issue on sports, “Through the Hoop.” She currently works for the Rural Advancement Fund in its Pittsboro, North Carolina, office.
"If you can afford to vote, you don’t need a loan.” That’s the way a Mississippi banker and member of the White Citizens Council pressured black citizens to refrain from voting in the early 1960s. “I know you’re not going to go down and vote,” an employer in Georgia is quoted as telling blacks on his payroll in 1983.

The present-day intimidation black voters face in the South may be slightly subtler than it was 20 years ago, but it is no less effective. Bob Flanagan, Field Services Director of the 21-year-old Voter Education Project, characterizes the difficulty he faces in current voter-registration efforts in the South: “These are hard times for people. They don’t want to risk their jobs. A man might come to a mass rally; and he might tell you he’s going to go down and register, but then when it comes down to doing it, he doesn’t, because he’s thinking of one thing — survival. He says to us, ‘You’re not hiring anybody, but these white folks are hiring everybody, so why should I jeopardize my job for you?’”

Since 1962 the Atlanta-based Voter Education Project has been struggling not only to increase electoral participation by black Southerners, but also to get black people to see that voter registration is their priority, not someone else’s concern. The struggle has been marked by extraordinary successes. It has also been fraught with danger and frustration. During a period in the late 1970s, the project had to combat the notion that its work was completed and needed no more support. “The organization went through some hard, hard times,” says Georgia state senator Julian Bond. “It went down and was in real danger of going out of business. Now it has begun to come back up and is going to thrive.”

Founded in 1962 as a project of the Southern Regional Council (SRC), a nonprofit research and education organization founded in 1944 to promote improved race relations, the Voter Education Project (VEP) had to confront civil rights activists who suspected its formation was a plot to siphon energy away from direct street action into efforts to maintain the status quo. A history of VEP compiled by the staff during its darkest period (in 1979) summed up four theories about how and why the organization was started:

a) it was inspired by wealthy individuals and foundations with either foresight or disapproval of such direct action as the freedom rides; b) it was Kennedy administration-inspired, to get more politically related progress from the “civil rights” energies being expended; c) it was a carefully contrived ploy by the major black civil rights organizations to use the “respectable” biregional Southern Regional Council as a front and conduit; d) it was a remarkably wise plan devised by SRC to use its particular skills and assets.

It is likely there is some measure of truth in each of these speculations.

Observers of VEP generally agree that Attorney General Robert Kennedy’s request for a “cooling-off period” during the freedom rides of 1961 influenced the founding of the organization. In 1962 Louis E. Lomax wrote in The Negro Revolt, “During the early months of the Kennedy administration, civil rights leaders were informed that the administration would be pleased if, in addition to sponsoring freedom rides and sit-ins, the various civil rights organizations joined together and undertook a major Negro voter-registration program in the Deep South.” An SRC pamphlet published in 1963, entitled “Direct Action in the South,” analyzed the Movement’s options:

The titanic energies enlisted by the sit-ins and the freedom rides — where were they to go? To some, it seemed that they could best go into making the South the kind of place which could and would solve its own problems, i.e., a huge effort to get the full measure of Negro Southerners registered to vote, thus establishing for the first time the possibility of true representative government in the South. During the late spring and the summer of 1961, it was hardly a secret that the Department of Justice was among those quietly, but strongly, urging this emphasis.

John Lewis, then head of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Com-

BY BILL CUTLER
 commemorate (SNCC) and later executive director of VEP, recalls that when Kennedy proposed the cooling-off period and urged blacks to get off the streets, Martin Luther King resisted, saying the streets “had been cool too long.” A major split occurred in SNCC over the new emphasis on voter registration, with many activists insisting that they must continue to focus on direct street action.

Today Lewis, now a member of the Atlanta City Council, considers that “the shift in emphasis of the Civil Rights Movement from direct action on the streets to the courthouses paid off, but we needed to keep the pressure on in the streets. It all worked together. It was a wise, sensible way to move.” In practice the activities funded by VEP did not differ from earlier civil rights efforts. “Under the guise of doing research as to why blacks were not able to participate in voting,” Lewis says, “VEP made it possible for the first persons from SNCC to go into Selma [Alabama] and Greenwood [Mississippi] to do community organizing.

In order not to jeopardize SRC’s tax-exempt status, VEP was conceived as its electoral politics research arm. In Lewis’s view the Kennedy brothers Wiley A. Branton, a respected attorney from Pine Bluff, Arkansas. Working with a staff of four in 1962, Branton coordinated the efforts of numerous organizations registering black voters in 11 Southern states; he also received reports from the field on the problems encountered, the solutions developed, and the results of the various programs. As has been true throughout VEP’s history, funding for the initial voter registration efforts came from foundations. In the first year of its operations VEP raised $265,673, mostly from the Taconic and Field Foundations and the Edgar Stern Family Fund.

Convincing foundations of the need for a concerted drive to increase black registration in the South was facilitated by SRC data showing that black registration in eight Southern states decreased by 45,845 between 1956 and 1958. This figure did not include information from states that would not make registration statistics available to SRC. Between the formation of VEP in April 1962 and the end of the first phase of its operations on November 1, 1964, some 688,000 additional black Southerners registered to vote, bringing the total in the 11 states to 2,174,200, or 43.8 percent of those eligible. VEP made direct grants to organizations that registered 327,588 people in that period and gave non-financial assistance to many others.

As important as voter registration was VEP’s documentation of voter fraud and intimidation, which “made the case for the Voting Rights Act” of 1965, according to John Lewis. In those early years, Lewis says VEP also:

helped to create viable, indigenous units all around the South which have continued to work long after VEP’s funding has ended. The investment VEP made in those early years is now paying off. It’s like planting a seed and cultivating a plant. VEP provided groups with seed money to get people together and transportation to bring people in from rural areas. These small grants of maybe a hundred dollars a week for six weeks provided the resources to meet certain basic needs and also provided encouragement. It mattered to people in remote areas to know that SRC and VEP cared what they were doing. The organizations have continued their work and brought forth leaders — old VEP workers and administrators who have become elected officials around the South.

The first phase of VEP’s activity also brought specific instances of defeat. Early in 1963, Wiley Branton announced a “saturation campaign” to register voters in Greenwood, Mississippi, following repeated acts of terrorism by local whites. Only a little more than six months later, however, Branton had to write his field forces in Mississippi “reluctantly” canceling all VEP funding for projects in the state. The executive director noted that more money had been spent with fewer results in Mississippi than in...
any other state, and that further spending would take funds away from projects in places where the likelihood of success was greater.

The percentage of registered black citizens eligible to vote in the 11 Southern states by November 1964 reflected the successes and failures of the voter drives: from a high of 57.7 percent in Texas, the figures drop to 23 percent in Alabama, and then the bottom falls out to a low of 6.7 percent in Mississippi.

Branton resigned as director of VEP in April 1965, and a skeleton staff was retained while SRC debated the merits of a second Voter Education Project. Upon approval of the continuation of the project early in 1966, SRC staff member Vernon E. Jordan became VEP’s new head. Under Jordan’s direction over the next four years, VEP funded more than 600 projects in 11 Southern states. Overall, more than one million black Southerners registered to vote between 1965 and 1969.

Jordan extended the organization’s activities beyond basic voter registration to include get-out-the-vote campaigns, citizenship education, leadership training, workshops for black candidates and poll watchers, technical assistance to newly elected black officials, and the publication of Know Your Government booklets describing state and local governments.

Jordan’s decision to resign and become the director of the United Negro College Fund in February 1970 coincided with a major change in VEP’s status. Under provisions of the Nixon administration’s Tax Reform Act of 1969, agencies engaged in voter registration were prohibited from receiving more than 25 percent of their support from any one donor. To meet the new provisions, it was decided that VEP should separate itself from SRC, obtain its own tax exemption from the IRS, and conduct funding drives independent of SRC.

John Lewis, the newly appointed VEP director, was known throughout the South as a hero of the 1965 March from Selma to Montgomery, when his skull was fractured during the “Bloody Sunday” confrontation with state troopers at the Edmund Pettus Bridge in Selma. After leaving SNCC, Lewis had worked briefly with the Field Foundation and then with SRC. As the new head of VEP, Lewis launched a series of “Voter Mobilization Tours” throughout the South in 1971 with his long-time friend, Georgia state legislator Julian Bond. The first of these tours covered 39 stops in 25 Mississippi counties and resulted in the state’s largest voter turnout to date and the election of 51 black officials. Shortly after its conclusion Lewis analyzed the campaign: “Our trip was an attempt to conquer the fear that black citizens have. We had to demonstrate to the people of Mississippi that they were not alone in their struggle. We did not tell them who to vote for or what political party to join, but simply that they could begin to control their own destiny by registering to vote.”

Julian Bond also remembers the tours:

When we first started doing them, there was a slight element of danger. When we finished doing them, that had passed, and we were being escorted around by sheriffs, greeted by mayors. The most dramatic thing I can remember is being in Belzoni, Mississippi, where a guy had been murdered some years before on the courthouse steps in broad daylight —shotgunned. So we’re speaking at this church in Belzoni, a real small church, hot as hell, and while I’m in the pulpit speaking and the crowd is with me, this white man starts to come down the aisle, and I’m nervous as hell. I thought he was going to do something. He strode up to the pulpit, and he said, “Welcome to Belzoni. I’m the mayor.” I said, “Oh, my God!”

Also in 1971, VEP launched a campaign to register Chicano voters in Texas, which eventually led to the creation of the Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project (see page 46). Over 30,000 Mexican-Americans were added to the voting lists that year and in 1972 VEP began printing bilingual citizenship education materials.

The decade of the 1970s, however, saw more retrenchment than expansion of the organization’s programs. Foundation funding continued to flow during national election years, but in between available resources dropped dramatically, from $708,331 in 1972, to $478,873 in 1973, to a low of $206,487 in 1975. In 1974 the size of the staff was cut from 21 to nine.

In December 1976 Lewis resigned his post at VEP to make an unsuccessful bid for the Congressional seat.
vacated by Andrew Young. And a general turnover in the staff increased the feeling of instability. While VEP's board searched for a new executive director, Archie Allen, the former research and communications director of VEP from 1971 to 1976, became interim head of the organization. Describing the problems VEP faced at that juncture, Allen says:

John Lewis personified the work of VEP. He was seen by people like Fannie Lou Hamer in the Delta as one of the real heroes who had come in when the times were really rough and other organizations were hesitant to provide support, and had stood by the people. He would be introduced as 'Mr. Voter Registration' on these tours. Foundation people saw him in the same light. They had a long record of working with him. They knew and trusted him. Of course, he had inroads to the foundation community based on that experience, and so when he left, it broke that continuity on both the local community basis as well as the fundraising support.

In July 1977 Vivian Malone Jones, who had integrated the University of Alabama in the 1960s and then held federal jobs, was chosen as VEP's fourth executive director. But the organization's budget continued to decline, due to shrinking interest and a crippling recession that eroded the financial health of private foundations. The effectiveness of VEP was further crippled when Jones contracted a serious illness and resigned at the end of 1978. Much of the following year was spent assessing the continued need for the project. Board member Julian Bond took part in these discussions and remembers, "There was some pressure on us to fold it up or merge with other organizations." Yet the board "stuck with" VEP, according to Bond, even through this disastrous period that was characterized by illusions of adequate black progress, financial shortages, and leadership changes at the top of VEP during critical phases of its operation.

By June 1981, when VEP's current executive director Geraldine Thompson took office, the once distinguished organization was a shadow of its former self. Thompson recalls, "People believed black people had it made." On her first day at work she found $111.76 in VEP's bank account, a staff of six that couldn't be paid, no money for overhead expenses, and - the most startling discovery of all - that she was pregnant with her fourth child. To try to make ends meet, the organization surrendered its copying machine, borrowed typewriters, and cajoled foundations. Thompson, who had previously held important administrative positions with the City of Atlanta and the federal government, believes the challenges she faced "made the job that much more exciting."

Says a board member who asked not to be identified, "Geri [Thompson] has gotten the respect of the foundation people without being obsequious. She deserves a lot of credit."

By October 1981 Thompson was able to pay the phone bills, thanks to a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. VEP's fortunes continued to rise and the following February the Field Foundation put up $7,250 for a successful one-day voter registration drive in Mississippi to coincide with a federal program to give away cheese and butter to needy families. Four thousand people in 38 Mississippi counties were registered that day. In the process, Thompson says, "People were educated. They hadn't realized why their welfare checks had been cut back. We told them they had to get involved in politics. It was a way of showing people how politics impacts on their lives. These times that are tough for so many are ideal for VEP."

The success of the "Cheese Project" led the Field Foundation to request other proposals from VEP, and when Thompson was able to persuade the Ford Foundation to renew funding for her organization, she says, "that set the tone for others. When we got through our tough time, it proved that we would make it." The budget grew from $244,000 in 1982, the first successful year in the recent period, to $450,000 in 1983, with a projected budget of $1,000,000 for 1984. In 1983 VEP funded the largest number of projects (92) in one year in its history, and has 150 planned for 1984. Says North Carolina VEP staffer Jonathan Edwards, "Our job is not to organize new groups," but to encourage existing groups to form short-term coalitions to register voters.

Currently the organization will work with and fund many groups' voter registration efforts. In 1983 SCLC and NAACP chapters received funds from VEP, as did the Georgia Black Women's Coalition and Coretta Scott King's Citywide Coalition to Get Out the Vote. In Virginia, VEP is funding a registration drive in public housing projects, training young people to canvass. In addition, since 1981 VEP has funded seven conferences for public officials on topics such as strategies for registration and enforcement of the Voting Rights Act.

Geraldine Thompson was one of the first people to call attention to the continued need for proper enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, and recent experiences by VEP's field staff show the wisdom of her perception. Says Field Services Director Bob Flanagan about Mississippi's local elections during the summer of 1983, "The racists really went to work. They work their hardest in majority black areas where there is a threat of a black takeover. We found that they resolved to vote, they resolved to steal [the election] and intimidate when it's a threatening situation of electing two or three blacks, a black sheriff, or something. They make up their minds that they [are] going to win that thing regardless of what they have to do to do it."
In light of the disappointing 1983 election results in Mississippi, Flanagan is skeptical about recent highly publicized voter registration drives in rural Southern communities. He speaks guardedly when he says, "We are concerned — at least, I'm analyzing in my mind — whether or not it's strategically astute to send big names, your Jesse Jacksons, your Andy Youngs, Coretta Scott Kings, near the election day. What that does, really, is rally the white vote out, I'm wondering whether we shouldn't use the old VEP tactics of silently letting the local folk motivate and rally the people and ease them out to the voting place as opposed to all of this high visibility stuff."

Much of VEP's current work involves attempts to overcome impediments to registration, such as restricted hours and places for registering. In Georgia, Flanagan says, "Registrars don't like to get a whole lot of people on the books, white or black. It's more work for them, and their bosses would rather have a low registration list than a big one and a diverse one because that's more people he has to 'constitch with — his constituency becomes diverse."

Flanagan's assistant, Charles McCant, says Georgia is now the Southern state with the least cooperative and least sympathetic registrars, a perception that may help explain why Georgia currently has such a large number of unregistered black voters — more than 500,000 out of a total eligible black population of 1,027,000. As a result VEP is currently concentrating much of its activity in Georgia, with 38 projects in 1983.

A change in Georgia statutes that went into effect this year permits registration at sites other than the county courthouse, a longtime symbol of oppression. Individual county boards of elections, however, are not required to add registration sites, and many refuse to do so. In Bibb County, made up almost entirely of the city of Macon, McCant says, "We fought them on other sites for registration until we were wet with sweat. When you encounter racism like that, it makes you want to get out of the business of voter registration. I thought registering to vote was the easiest part, but it's the hardest. People will do whatever they can to keep us from making it."

Black churches, in particular, are often excluded as registration sites on the grounds that they are not "frequently by the general public." But a favorite method of restricting black voting continues to be locating polling places in establishments such as barber shops patronized only by whites. VEP field workers recognize the importance of churches in voter registration and try to work with them.

While VEP has regained its momentum in the field — anticipating the addition of 350,000 black voters to registration rolls in 1983 and 500,000 in 1984 in 11 Southern states (not including Hispanic registration in Texas) — Bond would like to see the organization regain its old ascendency.

**VEP DIRECTOR GERALDINE THOMPSON**

**Bill Cutler is a freelance writer in Atlanta.**
542 CAMPAIGNS
THE SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION AND EDUCATION PROJECT

Willie Velasquez is director of the Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project. Founded in 1974, SVREP is widely considered to be one of the most successful voter registration efforts in the nation. It has conducted 542 registration campaigns, registering Mexican-American and Indian voters, educating voters, researching laws and restrictions, and initiating lawsuits against unfair election practices. The article that follows is adapted from a speech Velasquez gave in 1983 to the "Consultation on Citizen Responsibility, Political Participation and Government Accountability" sponsored by a number of foundations concerned with voting rights.

When the Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project (SVREP) began in 1974 — 542 registration campaigns ago — we had noticed that Mexicans didn't vote. They didn't register and they didn't come out to vote. We had also noticed that a lot of money was spent to register Mexicans. It used to come from the East in a reverse migrant stream every four years, come to pick the Mexican crop of votes, to herd us to the polls, to vote for the Democrats. Every four years, just like the swallows returning to Capistrano, the high-powered types with money — a lot more money than we had — would come down. But they didn't register people.

So we were told to expect a tough row to hoe. And when you looked at all the data, all this information, you could get yourself depressed. You'd start thinking that maybe the major reason why Mexicans and Indians in the Southwest didn't register and vote — maybe it was totally our fault, maybe it was in our genes or something, maybe we were programmed not to vote. Over the years, I've changed my mind substantially on that question; I don't think it's in our genes anymore.

You see, Mexicans and Indians in the Southwest are starting to register and vote. I want to discuss why I think that is, why I think it is a long-term process, why I think it is going to continue in the future, and what I think the effects on this country will be.

We at SVREP decided early on that if we were going to presume to register Mexicans in the Southwest we ought to know a little bit about what we're doing. Why is it that Mexicans don't vote? You want to know that before you construct a campaign; you need a set of data, some facts. So we thought we'd better ask the people. That was a novel thing for us — in the past we had always asked our leaders.

Of course, we also asked our leaders — good guys, mostly men, good people throughout the Southwest. Most of the leadership said the reason that the Mexicans don't register, don't vote, and don't win office is because of "group problems." They were saying that we don't have enough education, that Anglos don't vote for it, they don't like us, things like that. Lack of sophistication, lack of all sorts of stuff.

When we asked the electorate what the biggest problem was, though, they said different things, a lot of different things. They said the biggest problems were local. The biggest problem they talked about was drainage — the custom in the Southwest is you don't pave the Mexican side of town. Then the second biggest problem was bad schools. That was very important to us — very, very important. Bad schools, bad municipal services — this is what was bugging the electorate. People came in with a lot of money every four years to herd the Mexicans to the polls to vote for a Democratic president, but the streets and the schools never got better. As a matter of fact, they got worse.

So we decided to do things differently, to gear our resources toward the elections that are important. And the elections that are important to the Hispanic and Indian electorate in the Southwest are local elections: school boards, city councils, county commissions, and then (if I must prioritize) state representatives, state senators, and then Congress and the rest.

Asking those questions was very important to us, because it told us something important. There is a strong role for research in this operation. Our first employee was a research director; I didn't even have a field director until...
after a while. I was doing all of the field work.

So now we knew something about why our people didn't register and vote and about what is bugging them. The next step was simple: let's do something about it. But that brought up a philosophical point: this isn't the national game, designed to get a particular party into power. This actually is a Mexican game plan, and an Indian game plan, to get Mexicans and Indians to win on the local level. And that is the difference. Mexicans are registering to vote now in record numbers in many areas. From 1978 to '82 there was an 86 percent increase in the total number of Mexicans voting in Texas alone. We were very proud

resolve those problems that are most hurting our community.

I'll turn now to the subject of just what a registration campaign is. First, we don't go to a city and tell people they ought to register and vote. We respond. After 542 campaigns, and after seeing their neighbors next door win an election, the Mexicans now call us and tell us, "We need a registration drive." "Why do you need a registration drive?" "We want somebody to get elected." "Why do you want somebody to get elected?" "Because we want paved roads." Or, "Because we want schools."

Some people drove down, with no appointment, nothing, from north Texas, about 650 miles, got in the car and drove to San Antonio, walked into our office. They said, "We need a registration drive in Hondo, Texas." Why? "Well, we have a bilingual program in our school, but not a single teacher can speak Spanish." So the first thing is to find the hot elections where something is hurting the Mexicans.

The second thing is training, and you spend almost as much time training as you do raising money for the campaign. Last year we did 93 campaigns, and at each site you form a coalition. Each site gets a two-hour training seminar. And at each site you pick the best of the bunch to be coordinator. Usually about 55 to 60 percent of the coordinators are women. Then you either bring that person to San Antonio or you have campaign manager training on site.

So you have a hot situation where people want to do something. You spend a lot of time on training. You build a coalition that includes all the responsible groups and even the irresponsible ones. You get the best person available, and you train her or him in basic, basic stuff.

Now what do you do? In the 542 campaigns that we've undertaken, we've learned one very important thing: there's no shortcut to registering voters. You've got to go from door

when we found out that the Mexicans in New Mexico had outvoted the rest of the state in the 1982 elections, but the secretary of state there said, "That's not news; they've outvoted the rest of the state every year since 1978."

I feel that the reason why such large numbers of Mexicans are registering, why such large numbers are turning out, is that we are now gearing our resources to those elections that are important. That is the key. It is a Chicano-Indian game plan, our game plan, to get our people in power, to
then said we can't fund it because we can't win. The first four rural areas were all gerrymandered against Mexicans. We learned that from research. What good is it to do a registration drive if you can't win?

We thought it might be a coincidence that the first four rural areas were gerrymandered, but we thought we ought to look into it. Then we looked at five, 10, 20, 40 – the next 66 towns in a row were all gerrymandered against Mexicans. Sixty-six in a row. That is against the law. That’s against the state law, and that’s against the federal law.

I remember the fourth county, Medina County. We went in there, we told them they can’t do a registration drive. "Well, why? We’re a large percentage of the population, we’ve never won, and we do good work." "Nope, can’t do it." Look, that county, the last time the county commission redistricted was 1896. They ought to do it every 10 years, each census, but 1896! For 84 years the Mexicans have been running there, every year, and losing. You know, it reminds me of Charlie Brown: 583 games in a row he lost, right? And he says, "How can we lose when we’re so sincere?" Well, that’s the way the Mexicans were. They worked hard and everything, but they couldn’t win. So that was the fourth county. And we did not find one county in the state of Texas gerrymandered for Mexicans. Now that’s beyond the realm of statistical probability. You can’t find 66 in a row against and not one for.

Our research department is able to figure out those kinds of things. The legal department takes the next step. Together with the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, and California Rural Legal Aid, New Mexico Rural Legal Aid, and Texas Rural Legal Aid, we have sued and settled out of court, or settled, or are currently negotiating with 63 jurisdictions. We’ve never lost a case. We failed to get remedies in two of the

PARTISAN VOTER ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN DEMOCRATS, BENEFIT FROM NON-PARTISAN VOTER REGISTRATION EFFORTS

cases, but 61 out of 63 is pretty good – mostly because the gerrymandering is so bad, so obvious: 35 voters in one county commissioner’s precinct and 1,500 in the adjoining, to name one example. Well, the law says the deviation can’t be more than 10 percent. In that precinct, 17 people voted, eight from the same family. They elected their father county commissioner. Anybody with a law book could win that case. But there are 128 of these counties throughout the Southwest.

Now that’s why I started changing my mind about Mexicans – about its being in our genes not to register and vote. Put yourself in the position of those people in Honda, Texas – Medina County. For 84 years in a row you’re losing; every year you come close to winning. Lose, lose, lose. Well, you’re going to get depressed about the whole deal after a while; you’re going to get depressed about the political process, think it doesn’t work. And the reason you’d like to get somebody elected is because you want the street paved. You want a better school for your kids.

Actually, Mexicans vote a little bit like immigrants. We’re unusual immigrants – some have been here 380 years, others came over last night – but we do exhibit traditional, immigrant, working-class voting behavior. It is our older people who vote. When I go to Pecos or Honda, Texas, or to Eloy, Arizona, and I look around at the people, the troublemakers, who are bringing these outsiders in to register voters, I see older people. The ones they vote for tend to be younger, and sometimes the chair tends to be younger, but you know who it is that brings the outsiders in to do the registration drive? It is the mechanic who is 45 years old, the older person, the working person, the one with calluses on his hands. They are the ones who do it, and who are bringing a little bit of democracy to their communities.

Those people didn’t always used to vote. In some of those places, elected office was a patrimony to be handed out to whoever was next in line: "Now it’s Billy Joe Bob’s turn to be county commissioner." But now the Mexicans come in; they want the votes counted, and they want the lines drawn, according to the law. That has happened many times before in our history.

Now it is happening again. In the United States we have a tremendous fount of good will toward our immigrant tradition – but never for the current immigration, always for the previous generations, for when our grandparents came. And this is a repeat of history; only this time it’s Mexicans, and it’s good for the country. We didn’t write the law. Somebody else did. But we want it applied. That’s really what’s happening in the Southwest.
Politically speaking, south Texas has been a forgotten region. But in 1984 it could figure dramatically in the outcome of the presidential election. Thanks to a recent revolution in voter registration among Mexican-American citizens there, Hispanic voters could very well determine who carries Texas in the race for the White House. And Ronald Reagan's campaign strategists are taking note of that fact.

This has not always been the case. Juan Maldonado, chair of the Mexican-American Democrats (MAD), a statewide political organization, remembers when few Mexican-Americans voted, let alone ran for office: "I don't think the power elites 10 years ago were very interested in having all these people voting. It wasn't that good an idea. You had the poll tax for a time and people got the impression it was going to cost either money or time or something to participate. Gradually, people decided they didn't want to vote. All you had to do was listen to the boss-man."

Sitting in his office at Stephen F. Austin Junior High School in San Juan, in the southern tip of Texas, Maldonado recalls the old days in south Texas politics. He knows the situation well. He was among the first Mexican-Americans to serve on the San Juan City Commission — elected in 1971 — and was elected mayor in 1977.

"I think it was the old patron system that kept people from voting."

Maldonado says, the patrones, he explains, were:

the few Mexican-American people who had a business, the ones who owned a trucking company or the ones who were close to a certain Anglo person with money. The big businessman would pick a couple of people whom he wanted to be the "pushers." El Puche is the guy who pushes the people to produce for the man, and the man would say, "If you behave — a few of you are real smart and know how to read — and if you stay in line, then maybe one of you might be a pusher in the future." They decided who would vote, who would run for office, and who would win.

When I first decided to run, we approached some business people, white and brown. They said, "You need to talk to Mr. So-and-so and Mr. So-and-so. They can give you the green light and you will win. If you don't, you'll lose." Most people didn't vote because it didn't make any difference. A few people called all the shots.

Maldonado is not the only one with memories like these. In McAllen, the area's largest city (15 miles west of San Juan), City Commissioner Ricardo Salinas, now mayor pro tem, recalls that many Mexican-Americans used to ask, "Why should we vote? It doesn't matter who wins. I'm still not going to get anything out of it. That attitude comes from never having any of their own elected."

Fear was also a big factor, Salinas adds, "Fear of the machine. Fear of intimidation. Fear of being seen and fear of being photographed [at the polls or political rallies]. We [Mexican-Americans] don't want to be in the news. We don't want people to talk to us [about our political feelings]. Anglos, they have power, and the newspapers cater to all their feelings and, psychologically, they have the advantage over us."

Rodolfo Rocha, assistant professor of history at nearby Pan American University and director of the Lower Rio Grande Valley Archives, says that part of this fear was a legacy of the early twentieth century: "In 1915, in the Chicano revolution, in which Mexican-Americans were trying to determine their own political future, between 3,000 and 5,000 were killed. Many fled to Mexico. It was the same thing that was happening to blacks in the Deep South at the same time."

Rocha recalls that his grandfather would say — in Spanish, of course — "Never fight with the gringos, you'll never win." He continues, "My father was afraid to vote the wrong way for fear someone would find out and he'd lose his job with the city of Brownsville."

And then there was the poll tax. Until the mid-1960s anyone wishing to vote in Texas had to pay a small tax. In poor Mexican-American communities, where a family's income was typically no more than a few hundred dollars a year, voting could take food off the dinner table. Even after a con-

BY KENNETH BAIN AND PAUL TRAVIS

SOUTHERN EXPOSURE 49
stitutional amendment and the Voting Rights Act abolished the tax, many Mexican-Americans still did not vote. "It was tradition," says Juan Maldonado. "People still had the impression that it was going to cost them something to vote."

In the early '70s Maldonado, Salinas, and others began challenging tradition. "I knew that we could not win the way it was," says Salinas. "But then I started to study [voter] registration. I'm probably the first person here who really studied it in depth, and I said, 'We can't win unless we change the registration route.'"

Maldonado was a student at Pan American University at the time. He and some classmates began voter registration drives in the predominantly Mexican-American communities lying just north of the U.S.-Mexican border.

The best approach is door-to-door canvassing, because you have a list and a map and you can record all the information. You record whether the people who live at a certain address are residents but not registered, how many are at home, what political affiliation they are, what their economic status is, whether they are likely to vote conservative or progressive. All of these factors you can document. So you get those people registered.

At the same time you are also taking a survey of what's out there so that, come election time, you can come back and you know pretty much where everybody is and where to go and what to avoid. You just take people and tell them, "Okay, these two blocks or these four blocks are yours." You assign them each with a responsibility. Every home is a square. You can even note, "Brick or frame,

in the lower Rio Grande Valley. At least 80 percent of the population was, and still is, Hispanic, but there were few Mexican-American voters and only a handful of Hispanic office holders.

"The Voting Rights Act helped us a lot," recalls Maldonado. "It encouraged people to work at improving the system. It gave us a feeling of security that what we did would make a difference." Adds Salinas, "It put some federal teeth into registration."

But how do you register people who traditionally do not vote? Maldonado has an answer:

family of four, family of 10, six can vote. Father or mother, one son, one daughter. 'Take down the names and register them if they aren't already registered. All of the information you can keep and submit a copy to the [county Democratic Party headquar ters] and when election time comes around, you will be able to walk those same streets."

Because of efforts such as these, the last five years have seen a dramatic increase in the number of Mexican-American voters in Texas. From 1978 to 1982, for example, the number voting in the gubernatorial election almost doubled. In the same period non-Mexican-American voters increased their numbers by only 31 percent. Registration was the key: there were 41 percent more registered Mexican-Americans in 1982 than in 1978.

In the two counties at the tip of south Texas, these statistics have a special meaning. Hidalgo County, where Maldonado and Salinas live, and neighboring Cameron County are both predominantly Mexican-American. In Cameron 92,000 of the 130,000 residents of voting age are Hispanic; in Hidalgo the figures are 130,000 of 171,000.

Most of these people are poor. Indeed, Cameron and Hidalgo counties are only two of four poverty-ridden border counties in the lower Rio Grande Valley with a population of nearly half a million. This is one of the few areas in the country where Hispanics are the overwhelming majority — 82 percent — and Spanish is often the primary language. The Valley is also the winter home of more than 100,000 migrant and seasonal farmworkers and another 100,000 elderly people who come here from their Northern homes to escape the cold winter months.

Agricultural communities dominate the area, and they harbor some of the deepest, most extensive poverty in the country. The nation's two poorest standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs) are McAllen and Brownsville, both in the Valley. In 1977 over 50 percent of the people there lived below the official poverty level, and the same is true of neighboring Starr County. Current unemployment rates in the area are the highest in Texas.

Yet enormous wealth can also be found amid this poverty. The warm climate and rich soil support huge agribusinesses of vegetable farming and a major citrus belt. Enormous cattle ranches dotted with oil and gas wells fringe the northern edge of the Valley. A major tourist industry exploits the region's proximity to Mexico and the Gulf of Mexico, and has produced a boom town of luxury resorts and condominiums on South Padre Island off the mainland of Cameron County. With few exceptions, non-Hispanics have reaped the profits of these enterprises.
Statistics on family income clearly reveal the economic gap between the Mexican-American and white communities. In 1979 the average income for Hispanic families in Cameron County trailed that of Anglo families by more than $4,000. In Hidalgo County the difference was more than $3,000 per family. Nearly half of all Hispanic families earned less than $10,000 a year.

But the Mexican-American community has begun to stir politically. By late 1982 more than 100,000 Hispanics were registered to vote in Hidalgo and Cameron counties; and Maldonado, Salinas, and their allies have benefited enormously. In the small towns across the area, Mexican-Americans began winning control of city governments and school boards in the early 1970s. By the late '70s they were winning county offices.

One major prize seemed always beyond reach: elective office in McAllen, the largest and most economically important city in Hidalgo County. Hispanics are in the majority there as well, but, says Salinas, "it is a different story here in McAllen. All of the people in the surrounding areas who did not want to have Mexican-American leaders moved to the city of McAllen. They were afraid of the new leadership [in the small towns]."

Salinas says that these people were well-organized, lived largely in the same part of town, and had considerable political savvy. For 10 years after Juan Maldonado won office in San Juan, the Anglo leadership of McAllen benefited from low Mexican-American voter turnouts.

"It made it harder for us," Salinas says, "because we were now dealing with the hard-core Anglo." Maldonado agrees: "We beat them [in San Juan] and they go to McAllen."

In 1981 a coalition of Mexican-American leaders finally made a concerted challenge to the traditional leadership of McAllen. Ramiro Casso (a local physician), George Gonzales (a professor at Pan American University), and Ricardo Salinas (an engineer and University of Texas graduate) ran as a slate for mayor and two city commission seats. A major scandal over alleged police brutality had attracted national publicity in the period before the elections, and national attention turned also to this contest between Casso and the incumbent mayor, a prominent agribusinessman named Othal Brand. For weeks before the election Mexican-American businesspeople, farm laborers, and some Anglo sympathizers canvassed neighborhoods, held political rallies, and prepared for the showdown with the establishment.

When it came in early April, Salinas won his seat easily. Casso and Gonzales were not so lucky. Both polled more votes than any of their opponents, but both were in three-way races and were forced into run-offs. For the next four weeks the challengers and their supporters continued to organize.

In the early May run-off election, Casso ran ahead of Brand in the precinct voting but the mayor won anyway with most of the absentee votes—nearly 5,000 of them. Among these absentees, "winter Texans" predominated—the retirees who live in local trailer parks during the winter months and return to their Northern homes in the spring.

One of Casso's political advisers says, "When we looked at the precinct-by-precinct returns after the election and at our own telephone surveys, we discovered how important the 'winter Texan' vote had really been. Even a count of out-of-state license plates at the polling place during the absentee voting gave us an early indication that the tourist vote would be substantial."

For two years Salinas—now the sole Mexican-American on the McAllen city commission—prepared for the next election. Coordinating efforts with the Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project (SVREP) headquartered in San Antonio, Salinas and his aides registered nearly 6,000 new voters. SVREP had been encouraging Mexican-Americans across the Southwest to register and vote since the early 1970s (see the description of SVREP by its director Willie Velasquez on page 46).

Velasquez and SVREP first became involved in McAllen politics in the winter of 1980-81 when they provided the leadership and financial backing for a campaign that signed up 14,000 Hispanic voters in Hidalgo County. The organization also investigated charges of intimidation in the 1981 election, finding widespread irregularities that often discouraged Mexican-Americans from voting. But Velasquez and his associates could do little more than denounce such practices.

Salinas and the SVREP leadership learned that future success would depend on three key ingredients: a voter education program to help Mexican-Americans feel less intimidated at the polls, a drive to register more Hispanic voters, and, for 1983, a low-key campaign designed to avoid arousing the opposition. (The highly visible 1981 campaign had stirred conservative Anglo voters so that they turned out in large numbers and even
organized the "winter Texan" community.

As the city elections approached in the spring of 1983, there were few indications that a quiet revolution was taking place. While the Anglo candidates spent large sums on their campaigns, plastering yards with billboards and filling television screens with snappy commercials, the Mexican-American candidates on Salinas's slate unobtrusively organized their neighborhoods. They avoided notoriety in the Anglo community. And their strategy paid off as two more Mexican-Americans won seats on the McAllen city commission.

JUAN MALDONADO, CHAIR OF MEXICAN-AMERICAN DEMOCRATS

Salinas is quick to emphasize that he and his allies were not seeking an ethnic takeover. "It has more to do with philosophy," he says, explaining that he supports any candidates — Anglo or Mexican-American — who are sympathetic to the needs of the people. "I would rather have an Anglo with whom we stand together philosophically. It doesn't have anything to do with race."

Salinas does want qualified Mexican-Americans to be treated fairly in the electoral process. Currently, he says, "we have to find a super, super Mex-

ican" to run for office with any chance of winning. Salinas's running mate Ramiro Casso, for example, often faced charges of being unqualified despite his long record of service and leadership in the community and a degree in mechanical engineering from Texas A&M, a master's degree in chemistry from Baylor, and a doctorate from the University of Texas School of Medicine.

Despite the successes of recent years, the Mexican-American community in south Texas still lags behind its non-Hispanic counterparts in voter registration and participation. In 1982 only 40 percent of the Mexican-Americans in Hidalgo County cast ballots in the gubernatorial race, while 57 percent of non-Hispanics voted. In Cameron County the figures were 37 percent and 49 percent, respectively. In the two counties, more than 100,000 Mexican-Americans of voting age are still not registered, while only 17,000 non-Hispanics remain unregistered.

It remains difficult for poor people to be involved in the voting process, says Juan Maldonado. "It was very hard for my dad, working at a packing shed or as a custodian, to have the same opportunity to vote. You can't tell the boss-man, 'Hey, stop the conveyor belt! I'm going to vote.' We ought to make it easier for the factory people to vote." Salinas also notes that only about 10 to 15 percent of 18- and 19-year-old Mexican-Americans bother to register or vote.

Language is also a barrier. Many Mexican-Americans, especially older people, do not speak English. The fact that Texas ballots are printed in both English and Spanish does not eliminate the trouble. Maldonado says, for example, "My dad votes by the number because he doesn't know how to read or write."

Despite these difficulties, the Mexican-American community in south Texas is part of the political process now, and holds considerable hope for the future. Its potential power reaches beyond the lower Rio Grande Valley. Using the community's potential remains the focus of efforts to register Mexican-Americans across the Southwest. In the 542 campaigns in five states that Willie Velasquez and SVREP conducted since 1974, 80 to 90 percent of the campaign resources have been focused on predominantly Mexican-American communities (with the balance among Indians, Asians, and blacks).

Richard Martínez, SVREP's field director, reports that the organization has budgeted $2 million (of which $1.6 million has already been raised) for a voter registration campaign in 200 communities between now and October 1984. As Jesse Jackson told a predominantly Mexican-American audience at Pan American University in October 1983, nearly half of the six million Hispanics in the U.S. eligible to vote have not yet registered. When they do, politics in the United States may never be the same. □

Kenneth Bain is the author of March to Zion: United States Policy and the Founding of Israel and the forthcoming America and the Arab World. He is director of the Honors Studies Program at Pan American University in Edinburg, Texas. Paul Travis is associate professor of history at Pan American University and directs the History Teaching Center.
An Alternative View

Will it build the power of low-income people, or deliver them to the Democratic Party?

BY GARY DELGADO

All over the country, low-income people generally, and people of color in particular, are being accosted by the advocates of the New Movement Strategy. We are organized on the food stamp lines, agitated as we try to get our unemployment checks, and hustled as we trek down to the welfare department to try to qualify for emergency assistance and processed cheese. The strategy? Assault the White House? Rip off the big chain supermarket? Eat the rich? No - register to vote!

Noting that huge numbers of unregistered voters could make a significant difference in the 1984 presidential election, literally hundreds of student groups and community organizations, as well as the whole welfare establishment, have taken up the banner of voter registration as a major progressive counterthrust to the New Right’s control over federal and state government.

The notion of registering voters to ensure accountability from the state is not new. Many groups, including the Voter Education Project, the Urban League, NAACP, Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project, and League of United Latin American Citizens, to name a few, have been registering thousands of voters for years. The most consistent advocate of this tactic in the black community was Bayard Rustin, whose 1964 article “From Protest to Politics” argued that the primary strategy for consolidating the gains of the Civil Rights Movement was through the election of black candidates. Voter registration became a major thrust in the political organizing which elected black mayors in Gary, Newark, Detroit, New Orleans, Atlanta, and Los Angeles. Similarly, the Latino community, particularly in the Southwest, has been registering voters and pressing for the bilingual ballot.

So why the big splash in 1983 over voter registration?

First, the Right has done what no progressive organization or charismatic leader of the Left has been able to do: provide a unifying focus. The massive redistribution (read cutbacks) of the budget from human needs to the military, failure to initiate a jobs program, intervention in Latin America, continued support for repressive regimes around the world, and the escalated possibility of nuclear war have forged a broad-based constituency whose common aim is to oust Reagan.

Massive voter registration as a pro-
gressive strategy received intellectual and political legitimacy from another quarter when scholar-activists Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward published a key article in Social Policy entitled “Toward a Class Based Re-alignment of American Politics: A Movement Strategy.” Bolstered by the Piven and Cloward analysis, voter registration has become not simply “a way to get Reagan,” but a politically correct action as well. The Piven and Cloward strategy, which relies on student and social welfare agency employees as voter registrars, demonstrates that the left/liberal infrastructure can be mobilized, and that low-income people of color will, in fact, register.

So what could be wrong with a voter registration campaign focusing on low-income third world people? First, there is the question of options — for whom or what will people be able to vote? A choice between Mondale and Glenn is not particularly exciting. Nor do these candidates represent political positions that are in concert with the interest of low-income people of color. On the contrary, it could be argued that Mondale and Glenn represent corporate interests that demand increased tax breaks, lower labor costs, and decreased regulation of plant mobility, occupational health and safety, and environmental safety. Both, in general, support American economic and military international interventions.

Then there is the question of realignment. In looking at the rule changes within the Democratic Party, it appears that the party has already been realigned — toward the party regulars. While the Democratic Party opposed Reagan on some issues, there has been no significant Democratic opposition to workfare or Simpson-Mazzoli or subminimum wage. So as we embrace the “strategic opportunity” afforded us by our friends in the Democratic Party, we ought not to be surprised if they act like they knew we had no place else to go and they don’t have to make us any concessions.

If there are concessions, who’ll cut the deal for low-income people of color? Aside from the Democratic Party heavies, the most likely person to be in a position to cut deals will be Jesse Jackson. Yet no other aspect of the issue of running a black presidential candidate has caused such an uproar and split in the black leadership as the prospect of Jesse Jackson as that candidate.

Voter registration experts note that Jackson’s candidacy will spur black voter registration and that the support generated for Jackson’s candidacy will certainly give him some deal-making ability after the primaries. But questions arise concerning whom and what Jackson represents. As a recent article in The New Republic points out, “[Although] praised for his dynamics and his electricity, Jackson is chided for being arrogant, shallow and a one-man show whose programs are long on style and short on content and execution. Jackson is no revolutionary: he seldom takes a position that might alienate his supporters. His beliefs are still basically Baptist and fundamentalist, including his (now muted) anti-abortion stand.” So the question remains whether registering to vote gives low-income people of color any real choice.

While it is true that registering low-income people to vote may be an important tactic in pressuring the Democratic Party (the spigots of social spending will definitely open wider), it is without question not a strategy for party realignment, let alone for fundamental change.

In order to move a disfranchised low-income constituency into a position where we can effectively manipulate the state, it is necessary to demonstrate electoral clout. Voter registration alone, however, does not constitute a strategy, for a strategy would include a process of organization to develop grassroots analysis and action on issues; a tactical repertoire of direct action as well as electoral activity; and the development of an alternative social and economic program, so that, regardless of the personalities involved, we could understand not only what we are against, but also what we are for.

While voter registration does have tactical importance, it is clear that the current campaign may not reach the strategic level of projected political significance unless political education, direct action, and policy development become an integral part of the organizing.

Gary Delgado is director of the Center for Third World Organizing. This article is reprinted from Third Force, the newsletter of the Center for Third World Organizing.
Drawing the Lines

Reapportionment — readjusting the lines of election districts — occurs, or at least should occur, every 10 years, when the results of the

census are released. Three years after the 1980 census, some jurisdictions (states, counties, municipalities) have not yet completed their reapportionment plans. Other plans have become the subject of lawsuits which will take many months to resolve.

Many jurisdictions in the South persist in using reapportionment as a means to prevent blacks and other minorities from full political participation. Blacks tend to be severely underrepresented at every level of government. There are still many counties and cities where blacks constitute a majority of the voting-age population but whose elected officials remain all white.

Most visibly, there are no black governors and no black U.S. senators. Only two blacks — one from Texas, the other from Tennessee — sit in Southern delegations to the House of Representatives. Only 5.9 percent of the members of state legislatures in the Old Confederacy are black, while the black population of these states is 19.7 percent. Only 46 municipalities in these states have black mayors. Invariably, blacks win elections only in jurisdictions or districts which are clearly majority black and only after they have overcome various impediments placed by established white power structures.

In recent years, the major obstacle to black representation has been white bloc voting in combination with either at-large or unfairly apportioned electoral districts.

In developing standards for enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, the U.S. Department of Justice has come to recognize that, at present, the only way blacks will win representation is by election in districts which are majority black. Consequently, the department has defined a fair reapportionment plan as one in which the percentage of majority black districts in a jurisdiction comes nearest to the percentage of blacks in the population. If a county, for example, has a five-member elected commission and population which is 41.6 percent black, a fair plan will provide for two of the five districts (40 percent) to be majority black.

The Department of Justice defines a “majority black district” as one whose population is at least 65 percent black. This figure takes into account the greater percentage of blacks than whites in a jurisdiction’s population who are under voting age and the fact that blacks usually have lower registration and voting rates than whites. These lower rates can be partially explained by the greater number of blacks than whites who are poor. Poor people are less likely to be able to leave work to register, less likely to have transportation to distant registration and polling sites, and less likely to be members of special interest groups which have the money to mobilize their members.

In addition, the legacy of terror and oppression to which blacks have been subjected is perpetuated by intimidation, threats, and other abuses. Many thwarting devices remain. Inaccessible registration sites and polling places, uncooperative registrars, menacing poll-watchers, discriminatory purges of the voting rolls, and absentee ballot abuse are some of the most frequent obstacles faced by blacks.

Since 1965 all of six Southern states (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia) and parts of three others (Florida, North Carolina, and Texas) as well as all of the counties and municipalities in them, have been required by section five of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to submit any proposed changes in any aspect of the electoral process to the Department of Justice for preclearance. The jurisdiction must submit a description of the planned change along with evidence to show that the change will not discriminate against blacks or other minorities. If the Justice Department agrees, the change is precleared and can go into effect; if it is considered discriminatory, the assistant attorney general for civil rights will write an “objection letter” informing the jurisdiction that the plan is not precleared.

When a jurisdiction receives an objection letter, it should withdraw the proposed change and offer a new non-discriminatory plan to the Department of Justice. Ideally, blacks will be included in discussions leading to the development of a new plan. They will negotiate with white leaders to reach an agreement. Often a consensus is arrived at because whites realize they will be vulnerable to a lawsuit unless a fair plan is developed. Predictably, if a plan has received the support of both blacks and whites in the jurisdiction, the Justice Department will preclear it.
Often, however, white leaders refuse to negotiate with blacks. Some jurisdictions make no changes even after receiving an objection from the Department of Justice, and other jurisdictions don't submit their plans for preclearance. In either case, the plan goes into effect. Other than preclearing or objecting to plans, the Department of Justice rarely takes an active role in the reapportionment process. Local black leaders who have carefully monitored the reapportionment process and find a proposed change to be discriminatory often have to initiate litigation in order to stop a discriminatory plan from going into effect.

Even a Department of Justice with officials at every level determined to enforce the Voting Rights Act would have a difficult time assessing all plans for discriminatory intent or effect. The task is made more difficult by the professionals (lawyers, demographers) often hired by jurisdictions to prepare elaborate materials purporting to show that the submitted plan is not discriminatory. Unless local black leaders are aware of what the jurisdiction is doing and communicate with the Justice Department directly or through civil rights groups, the Justice official assigned to the case may see no reason to believe the plan may be discriminatory. With only 60 days to review the plan, the official may find no justification for any other action besides preclearance.

The attitude of the president and the Justice Department is critical. An obviously discriminatory plan may still be precleared if the Justice Department has other things on its mind. This was the case after the 1970 census when the department, under the direction of Attorney General John Mitchell, was more concerned with mobilizing white support for Richard Nixon's re-election than with enforcing the Voting Rights Act. Emblematic of the discriminatory plans which the Nixon-Mitchell Department of Justice ignored was the Mississippi congressional reapportionment plan which fragmented newly franchised black voting strength in the Delta by dividing it among three districts. Blacks continued to be underrepresented throughout the South and had to wait until after the 1980 census for their next opportunity for electoral fairness.

Supporters of fair reapportionment increased their political sophistication and organization during the 1970s, hopeful of implementing fair plans for the 1980 census. Unfortunately, in many instances, Ronald Reagan and his appointees to the Department of Justice displayed as little sympathy and understanding of fairness during their first two years in office as had Nixon and his appointees.

Early in 1983, however, the supporters of fair plans began to notice a shift in the way the Justice Department reacted to the submissions for preclearance. The department has written objections to a greater proportion of the plans during 1983 than in the previous two years. Yet some fear

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The Department of Justice and the courts follow a number of criteria in assessing whether or not a plan is fair. Included are retrogression, intent, effects, and totality of circumstances.

A GAZETTEER OF INEQUALITY

A fair reapportionment plan is one which, following the "one person, one vote" principle, gives every significant population group the opportunity to elect representatives of its own choice. Each district should contain more or less the same number of people. Districts should be compact, with few twists and turns to their boundaries. They should be contiguous, not chopped into more than one part.

The most common techniques used by incumbent white elites to prevent the development of fair reapportionment plans are dilution, packing, gerrymandering, packaging, and rationalization.

- **Dilution** fragments concentrations of black residents into as many districts as possible so that no one district has a sufficiently large black vote.
- **Packaging** puts as many blacks as possible into as few districts as possible.
- **Gerrymandering** distorts the shape of a district, abandoning the ideal of compactness to create a district whose voting majority supports the incumbent power-holders.
- **Rationalization** involves the submission of an unfair plan while claiming that for some reason or other, it should be accepted by the Justice Department anyway. One form of rationalization argues that the proposed plan uses districts which are already in place for another purpose.

56 ELECTIONS
of blacks in the jurisdiction with special attention to the nature of black participation in political life. With regard to the plan itself, one can ask: Was there black involvement in its preparation? Were discussions of the plan public? Were blacks intentionally or unintentionally excluded from the discussions? If blacks made public their criticisms of the plan, were they taken seriously? More generally, one can ask: How have whites responded to black efforts at increased political participation? How have white leaders responded to black attempts to mitigate the effects of the legacy of segregation and racism?

Answers to these questions often come from the personal archives kept by many blacks involved in struggles for fair treatment. Their letters, leaflets, clippings, old maps, lists, tables, charts, etc., provide a wealth of details not only about their particular situations but about the operation of power in their jurisdictions. Information from these archives along with interviews and quantitative data from a variety of sources can be combined into a powerful analysis of the level of local discrimination.

FOUR RECENT CASES

The following cases, all from 1983, involve a reapportionment map submitted by a jurisdiction to the Department of Justice for preclearance. In each, the Voting Rights Project of the Southern Regional Council (SRC) consulted with a group of black citizens in the jurisdiction who felt that the plan was discriminatory. SRC gathered as much data as it could in preparation for a “comment letter” which asked the Justice Department to object to the plan. To show what a fair reapportionment plan would look like, SRC also drew alternative maps. In each of these cases, the department did object to the jurisdiction’s changes.

Only one of the cases described below has been resolved. In the other jurisdictions, blacks are attempting to negotiate with white political leaders in order to reach a consensus which includes a fair reapportionment plan. Illustrative of both the strength and the limits of the Voting Rights Act, if the negotiations are unsuccessful, these cases may mean blacks have to go to court.

1876: “Of course, he wants to vote the Democratic ticket! You’re as free as air, ain’t you? Say you are, or I’ll blow yer black head off!” – Despite intimidation, most blacks voted for the Republican Party that year.
The Voting Rights Act has not been interpreted to mean that the Justice Department must take an active role in securing fair reapportionment plans. Usually, a jurisdiction's black citizenry, relying upon limited resources, must initiate litigation. A Justice Department objection letter, or the documentation of failure to submit a new plan for preclearance, may provide strong supportive evidence but doesn't necessarily mean that the courts will rule favorably or that a fair plan will be adopted. Without the Voting Rights Act, blacks might still be excluded completely from the reapportionment process in the South and be absent from elected positions altogether. Yet much more white resistance must be overcome before blacks will gain fair treatment.

**Caddo Parish**

Caddo Parish is located in northwestern Louisiana. Over 80 percent of its population lives in its largest city—Shreveport. The parish submitted a plan for the reapportionment of its police jury (analogous to structure and function to other states' county commission) which was a textbook case of retrogression.

Under the existing plan there are 20 members of the police jury. Six, or 30 percent of them, are black. Under the proposed plan, in which the police jury was to have shrunk to 12 members, only two of the 12 districts or 16.7 percent were majority black. A third district was almost, but not quite, majority black. Even if this district were counted as majority black, the plan would remain retrogressive (black representation declining from 30 percent to 25 percent).

White parish officials rationalized, saying that their plan was identical to a school board plan already precleared by the Justice Department. Upon a closer look, however, the school board plan appears to be retrogressive. The school board plan had been precleared early in the Reagan administration when the Department of Justice was not objecting as frequently to discriminatory plans.

There were other grounds for suspecting Caddo Parish's proposed change in the police jury. The demographer hired by the parish to draw and present the plan was president of a company which, according to its own advertisement, had prepared reapportionment plans for many other jurisdictions, including over half the parishes in Louisiana. He was surely aware of the retrogression criterion and the likelihood of objection by the Justice Department once it realized the plan was retrogressive.

The Voting Rights Project sent a letter to the Department of Justice with a statistical analysis indicating the retrogressive effect of the proposed plan. SRC also drew and sent an alternative, fair plan. Caddo Parish is 38 percent black. SRC argued that the fairest plan would provide five majority black districts in a 12-district plan. We showed that because Shreveport is so rigidly segregated, it is possible to create six majority black districts, so there is no excuse for Caddo Parish not to provide five.

This case has not yet been resolved.

**St. Helena Parish**

St. Helena is a rural parish northeast of Baton Rouge, Louisiana. It has a six-member police jury and is slightly more than 50 percent black. The parish submitted a plan which provided for only one majority black district. Their proposed plan was transparently discriminatory. The parish's white power structure packed the one majority black district that they couldn't avoid drawing, adding to it a gerrymandered slice from an adjacent district and hanging this slice, like a tail, down from one corner (see accompanying map).

In the comment letter which the Voting Rights Project wrote to the Justice Department, SRC analyzed this plan and some of the factors which helped account for it. The parish was run in a manorial style by whites who held essentially feudal attitudes and committed rather unsophisticated offenses against civil rights and electoral laws. A television reporter from nearby Baton Rouge showed that some of the names on the voting rolls were the same as those on parish grave stones. Votes were bought seasonally at a local sporting goods store. There is a pattern of harassing black leaders which has forced several to leave the parish because of firings or threats.

St. Helena Parish presented an additional difficulty. SRC was unable to send a fair alternate plan along with the comment letter because of the unavailability of detailed census data. The white incumbents simply made their own head counts, but provided no information about how they did it. When census data are not available, the Department of Justice says it is reasonable for jurisdictions to make their own counts, but only if all groups in the jurisdiction agree on how the counting will be done. Blacks in St. Helena are attempting to get the white leaders to agree to this process. Otherwise, they will have to go to court in pursuit of a fair plan.

**Williamsburg County**

Williamsburg County, South Carolina is 61 percent black. Its county council has seven members. Before reapportionment, there were three majority black districts. This enabled whites to hold a four-to-three majority on the council. The reapportionment plan proposed by the council was designed to preserve the white majority. Blacks had no opportunity to discuss the proposed plan because no
public meetings were held. Under South Carolina state law, a county's representatives to the state legislature have authority to develop new reapportionment plans. In Williamsburg, one state senator had the main voice in development of the new plan. He and other state legislators met with the county council at a closed meeting. Neither the press nor the public was notified. A local reporter tipped off about the meeting was allowed to stay only through the insistence of a black county council member—a member who, under the proposed plan, was to lose his well-defined black majority district and be thrown into a non-majority black district with a white incumbent whose father was the state senator who supervised the development of the proposed plan. When the reporter asked for a copy of the plan, the senator refused, saying it might "confuse the public."

In a front page editorial, the newspaper in Kingstree, the county seat, pointed out that the secrecy of the meeting violated South Carolina's Freedom of Information Act and was also solid evidence that the county did not intend to allow black community participation in the development of the plan. Despite newspaper stories and protests from the black community, the county approved the plan, sent it to the Justice Department, and without waiting for preclearance, prepared to put the plan into effect for upcoming county elections.

In order to dilute three adjacent districts, the proposed plan packed a large proportion of the county's blacks into a single district which one observer said was shaped like a "crawling snake." It also fragmented a large concentration of blacks in one of the poorest regions of the county into three separate districts.

Black leaders in Williamsburg County contacted the Voting Rights Project and asked that SRC help. The Justice Department objected to the county's proposed plan; subsequently, the county adopted a fair plan resembling the one SRC drew. It will be used in the next election.

Winston County

Winston County, Mississippi is 38 percent black but no black has ever served on its five-member county commission. Using an extraordinary bit of gerrymandering, the county submitted a 1983 plan which fragmented the black community in the county's largest town (Louisville) among four of the five districts so that no district would be majority black. One proposed district (see accompanying map) extends for 26 miles as it winds from the northern boundary of the county through Louisville, finally extending in a strip to the eastern boundary of the county. This district narrows at one point to the 190-foot width of a cemetery.

The other proposed Winston County districts also contained many twists and turns as they moved through Louisville, especially in the black residential areas. Besides gerrymandering the black community out of a district, the odd shapes make it difficult for people to know what district they actually live in. Such confusion is a further inhibitor of political participation.

Winston County hired a private firm which sent the proposed plan to the Justice Department in a slickly packaged booklet. On the booklet's first page a demographer flatly stated that the plan conformed to all the standards of a fair plan according to interpretations of the Voting Rights Act.

Along with a comment letter, SRC sent in an alternate plan. A fair plan in this 38 percent black county would provide for two majority black districts out of five. In this case, however, the segregated residential patterns of the county are checkerboard rather than ghetto style, and thus do not allow for the drawing of two black districts. The SRC plan provides for only one black district, suggestive of a need to consider other measures to give blacks an opportunity to elect representatives of their choice.

The case of Winston County has not yet been resolved.

Brian Sherman is a clinical sociologist who works as a research analyst for the Voting Rights Project of the Southern Regional Council. He has drawn alternate reapportionment plans for more than 20 jurisdictions and is the author of an empirical study of voter discrimination in Georgia: Half a Foot in the Door. Black Participation in Georgia Local Electoral Politics Sixteen Years After the Voting Rights Act. This article first appeared in Southern Changes, the bimonthly magazine of the Southern Regional Council.
At a time when most states were coat-tailing Ronald Reagan, electing one right-wing candidate after another, progressives made striking gains in West Virginia. In 1980, the year of the conservative landslide, most of the conservative leadership of the West Virginia State Senate was ousted from power by an informal progressive coalition of labor and consumer groups. In 1982 this same network nailed down the Senate majority and two of the state's four congressional seats.

A month after the 1982 Democratic primary, Charleston Gazette editor Don Marsh wrote of the strong progressive showing: "My theory is that a new constituency has been formed. The change has been made at the expense of the old political organizations that once dominated elections." Marsh speculated that the "new constituency" consisted of an "informal coalition" of which "the union organizations are major parts – the AFL-CIO, the United Mine Workers, and the West Virginia Education Association... There are other groups in the coalition: the Council of Senior West Virginians, West Virginia Citizen Action Group, conservationists, and a number of others."

In its broadest form, the progressive agenda is extensive; it includes issues like workplace health and safety, utility rate reform, equitable taxation, pro-choice and other issues specifically affecting women, environmental and consumer protection, restrictions on nuclear power, and collective bargaining. As the coalition worked together to unseat legislators who opposed their positions on these issues and replace them with more favorable people, representatives of each group did so
in the belief that a more progressive legislature would inevitably benefit its members. In other words, they realized that they agreed more often than they disagreed.

As Marsh wrote, "The coalition is not compact. All members do not share equal priorities. I think it would be accurate to say, for example, that the education group's primary goal is collective bargaining for teachers. The 'free choice' group's main priority is stopping restrictions on abortions. The mine workers have another interest, and so on." Given the fact that each group is unlikely to endorse the entire agenda of each other group, progressive cooperation has been — and must be — based on an agreement to disagree.

Because of their successes, progressive groups in West Virginia today are faced with a different set of questions. Achieving a degree of political power is one process, but keeping it, expanding it, and operating within it pose new problems.

Can cooperation last? Is this a temporary swing of the pendulum or an actual change in the nature of elections? How does all this relate to the Democratic Party? Does electoral success translate into legislative success? These questions face progressives in more states than West Virginia.

With the elections only a few months away, the political atmosphere in West Virginia is volatile. The state leads the nation in unemployment. The coal and steel industries are severely depressed. Federal funds, upon which West Virginia depended more than most states, have been severely cut back, with ripple effects far beyond losses to specific programs.

The business community is conducting a highly visible "bad business climate" campaign, designed to convince people that more West Virginia businesses will close if voters go along with progressive candidates. West Virginia's state employees are the lowest paid in the nation. The state is under court orders to improve the school and prison systems. The entire state is undergoing a property tax reappraisal. Although most people blame the Reagan administration for the majority of the problems, there is also widespread feeling that the Democratic Rockefeller administration in West Virginia has either done little to alleviate them or else has actually contributed to them.

In other words, what is happening now in West Virginia is this: Everybody is playing with a deck full of wild cards. Although it appears that progressive groups are holding a winning hand, much is in flux, much is uncertain. This seems to be no time to be complacent.

1979 to 1983: What Happened

The night of the 1980 primary election stands out in the minds of coalition members as "the night we started believing in ourselves." Several hundred people passed through the West Virginia Education Association (WVEA) conference room, cheering and hugging each other as, race by race, it became obvious the progressive network had defeated some of the most powerful people in the state legislature, including the president of the Senate, the Senate majority whip, and the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee.

Senior citizen activists and environmentalists slapped hands with AFL-CIO members. The lobbyists for the National Organization for Women (NOW) and the United Mine Workers congratulated each other. "It was an incredible celebration," recalls Cecile Gill of WVEA. "I was personally in a state of shock. We had worked so hard, and we wanted to believe it was possible to beat the power structure. Everything we were hearing had been telling us. 'It's going to work.' But I wasn't a believer until I saw those numbers going up on the chalkboard."

"It was so improbable it would happen," says NOW/lobbyist Bonnie Brown. "And it happened. And then you just think, well, now we can do anything."

Not only had they defeated the politicians most resistant to progressive concerns, but they had made a collective effort to find and back acceptable candidates. Bob Wise, now a member of Congress from the third district of West Virginia, was one of those candidates. Working through the progressive network, he defeated the incumbent president of the State Senate in his first try for public office. Wise describes that election evening as a "possible turning point in West Virginia politics."

He and other candidates won with little or no help from the established Democratic machine. They won through hard work and intelligent use of sophisticated grassroots electoral strategies, including door-to-door canvassing, phone banking, and second-round follow-ups. They researched historic voter patterns to find those groups most likely to vote, and targeted those groups where efforts were most likely to pay off. The campaigns were based on issues rather than strict party appeal and involved a lot of direct person-to-person contact on the part of the candidates and hundreds of campaign workers.

Some of the victories and winning candidates were solid, and some were more shaky that year. In northern West Virginia, young progressive schoolteacher Jean Chace won a state legislature seat by defeating a powerful veteran by only two votes. In southern West Virginia, the Senate Finance Committee chair was unseated by a candidate whose progressive credentials were questionable, but who is nonetheless considered an improvement.

The fact that these kinds of campaigns succeeded at all is quite a departure from tradition in West Virginia. In most counties, Democratic candidates had been elected, with rare exceptions, only with the blessing and support of one of the machine factions of the Democratic Party. The emergence of the progressive network in effect started a new ball game. The progressive network is oriented toward issues and political philosophy, rather than party affiliation. They are willing
to go after “sorry Democrats” and also to support liberal Republicans when appropriate. This rejection of straight Democratic ticket voting has made their activities quite a threat to the conservative old-line Democratic machine politicians.

As is true in much of the South, the Democratic Party in West Virginia is fairly schizophrenic. The state was formed in 1863, when the western counties of Virginia decided to side with the North in the Civil War. Liberal and conservative Southern-style Democrats have been fighting among themselves ever since. Many of the major philosophical and legislative battles within state government regularly take place among Democrats, and the real electoral contest often occurs in the Democratic primary. There is often a big difference between Democrats and the Democratic Party as an organization. Conservative Democrats have controlled West Virginia politics since 1932 (with the exception of two instances in which they aligned themselves with the Republicans to prevent the liberal Democrats from achieving power). Because registered Democrats outnumber Republicans two to one, many Republicans simply register as Democrats.

In terms of issues and philosophy, there is no true two-party system in West Virginia. Recognizing this fact, the people in the progressive network, which represents a substantial proportion of the electorate, went their own way in 1980, independent of the governor and traditional Democratic Party mechanisms, in large part because the Democratic Party was controlled by supporters of the very people they wanted to defeat. Indeed, some of the dominant factions, on a state and a county level, were known to be tied in to the big banks and out-of-state interests who have a vested interest in seeing that significant progressive change does not occur.

The State Senate in the late 1970s was a prime example of conservative Democratic control. The celebration at the WVEA on primary night was doubly sweet to people who remembered how depressing the legislative outlook had appeared just one year before to lobbyists for labor, church, senior citizens, women, the environment, and other progressive interests. All were discouraged and angered by what senior citizen lobbyist Bea Burgess called the “arrogance and total lack of concern displayed by the Senate leadership for our issues.”

“They just thumbed their noses at us,” Burgess recalls. The Coalition on Legislation for the Elderly (COLE) had tried to get a small monthly increase for elderly and disabled Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients: the House of Delegates passed the bill, 98 to 2, but the powerful Senate Rules Committee prevented the popular bill from even coming up for a vote. “We decided right then, that somehow, something had to be done to make sure those people didn’t come back,” remembers Bea Burgess.

Almost every progressive group had a similar complaint. When WVEA lobbyist Steve Haid went to see Senate President Bill Brotherton about a collective bargaining bill, “Brotherton told us flatly that ‘as long as I sit in this chair, there will be no collective bargaining bill passed in West Virginia, and so we thought to ourselves, ‘Okay, buddy, if you’re that inflexible, we’ll see what we can do about taking that chair out from under you.’”

“Those guys felt safe in thumbing their noses because they knew that no one organization had enough power to get them out of office,” said Mike Harmon of COLE. Typically, an individual organization just did what it could for the most acceptable candidates served up by the Democratic
Party. There was some recruitment of candidates going on within a few labor organizations, but no real effort had been made to find candidates acceptable to a broad range of political groups. "In other words," recalls Harmon, "we were all beating our heads against the wall independently."

Two months after the 1979 session, that situation began to change. In May a meeting of people who wanted to explore the possibilities of pooling efforts to improve the atmosphere at the legislature quietly convened in a Charleston church. Despite apprehensions about getting involved with other groups and worries that "it might not work," more than 40 people showed up - staff people and members of at least 15 different organizations. Organized labor, teachers, nurses, consumers, church groups, the handicapped, environmentalists, senior citizens, public employees, women's organizations, higher education, and fair tax groups were all represented.

Within two hours, the group identified some common concerns and targeted eight senators who were on everybody's hit list. "When people started to realize how much collective resources were represented at that table," recalls Harmon, "they really got excited. You could see the smiles spreading around the table. They thought, 'Hey, this just might work.'"

The group continued to meet all summer. It never did have an official structure or name, although it acquired several nicknames, including the Elk River Improvement League and "Orkin" (as in " stamping out pests"). Throughout the four months that Orkin met, relatively few people outside the groups attending the meetings were aware that it existed.

The groups found in each other the kind of recognition and support for issues that the Democratic Party had failed to provide. Although its existence was brief, Orkin accomplished several important things. First, the participants agreed that it is not only a good idea to work cooperatively on elections, but it is also possible. Second, they agreed that it isn't enough to knock out troublesome politicians if you aren't replacing them with people who are going to be more responsive.

Orkin also provided a forum in which people could get to know each other and each other's organizations. "The importance of that shouldn't be overlooked," recalls Cecile Gill, "because before then, we at WVEA, for instance, just didn't know a lot of the people who were involved in the labor movement. We just really had not had that much contact with them. When we started talking with them, we found that really were a whole lot alike." People in the larger labor groups also realized that smaller organizations like COLE, Citizen Action Group, and NOW could reach different constituencies and could provide expertise and research related to issues of common concern.

The successes put progressive legislators in control of the Senate leadership. That was not enough, however, to translate progressive concerns into public policy change in 1981. The conservative Democrats still controlled a majority of the Senate and could block almost anything the leadership proposed. "All that work, and we were still not where we needed to be," remembers Cecile Gill.

But 1980 had convinced progressives that they were headed in the right direction. "In the years immediately following the election," commented Bonnie Brown, "NOW and other organizations placed a lot more emphasis on political activism. It's become a part of what has to be done. We know that if we don't run our own candidates, if we don't put our own people in there, we're making a big mistake."

Accordingly, groups began to put much more effort into finding candidates who would be more than the lesser of two evils. The United Labor Committee, an informal statewide labor network, began to meet regularly to discuss elections and compare notes. Candidates and organization staff attended workshops organized by national progressive groups. CitPAC, a door-to-door canvass for progressive candidates, was put together in time for the 1982 general election.

The 1982 election nailed down a majority progressive vote in the State Senate and sent Bob Wise to the U.S. Congress. One of the leading Democratic conservatives who went down to defeat told a radio reporter on election night that, if the teachers and mine workers could defeat him, "they can defeat anybody in West Virginia."

This time, more members of the various organizations ran and won. Sondra Lucht, a former state NOW president, was elected to the State Senate, while Bonnie Brown, former NOW lobbyist, was elected to the House of Delegates. John Chernenko, a solidly progressive union leader from the northern panhandle, defeated one of the mainstays of the big business community. In all, 23 of the 25 candidates endorsed by CitPAC were elected, not so much because of the influence of the fledgling CitPAC, but because the candidates were, for the most part, supported by the progressive network.

In 1983 electoral victories translated into some major legislative successes. The 1983 legislative session passed what has been called the most far-reaching utility rate reform legislation in the country. It also passed a progressive tax package that concentrated income tax increases in the upper brackets, which had benefited from federal tax cuts. A hospital cost containment bill passed at the last minute.

"The electoral victories in '80 and '82 made it possible to get the utility bill through in '83," says David Grubb, director of the West Virginia Citizen Action Group, which organized the utility campaign (see box on page 65). "The legislators saw what had happened in the elections, they saw the same groups were supporting utility rate reform, and they were hearing from their constituents. So they were willing to listen and do something, despite incredible opposition from the companies."

Although the 1983 session was considered a good one from the progressive point of view, there were several areas where little or no success was achieved. Issues like collective bargaining and state employees' pay raises couldn't even get off of committee. Equitable distribution of property, a top women's priority, was stymied at the last minute. Environmentalists basically held the line where they could, and labor split over an important workplace safety issue.

Under these circumstances, some network participants were more disappointed than others in at least some aspects of the session. If they continue to see no progress on their issues, their enthusiasm for networking might diminish.
In the meantime, the network is constantly expanding. Thousands of people participated in the utility campaign, again coordinated through a coalition of progressive groups. Statewide hearings, call-in and write-in campaigns, and activities at the legislature exposed many of these people to the political process for the first time.

Issue-oriented campaigns are bringing "a lot of individuals into the political process who otherwise were not involved," observes Robert Nelson, part of the progressive State Senate leadership. "They don't like politics and politicians, but they like a particular issue, and they're willing to go out and work for that issue. And in the process, they rub elbows with people in other interest groups and learn about other issues." Once involved, many of them have stayed involved.

As Gazette editor Marsh wrote in his "new constituency" column, "What is happening, I think, is that the various groups are able to accommodate each other's goals and to feel that they are all together in working toward a better society, without having to supply a precise list of goals."

This agreement to disagree has been the operating principle since 1980, replacing the assumption that groups which disagreed on some issues couldn't work together on others. As Mike Burdiss, West Virginia director of the UMW's Coal Miners Political Action Committee says, "There's been an attitude of 'Let's sit down and go over the issues, determine the ones that we disagree on, set them aside, and then do something about the issues that we do agree on.'"

"What this means," Marsh wrote, "is candidates who are identified as sharing the coalition's philosophy are in good shape." In a state where it has always been more important to have machine support than constructive positions on the issues, this is a drastic shift — not only in the way candidates approach voters, but also in the way the voters make their decisions.

Questions

Critics of a movement can supply some very useful questions. Sam MacCorkle, longtime Kanawha County Democratic faction chief, is a thoughtful critic. A lawyer and Democratic Party loyalist, he is well known for his attention to the mechanical details of the electoral process and for his efforts to reduce corruption in county elections by decentralizing them.

MacCorkle notes that the progressive network does not especially concern itself with the mechanics of election day, perhaps assuming that election fraud is no longer a serious problem (see box on page 66). He predicts, however, that old practices will take new forms. "I'll bet you people have been to a dozen courses on image building," he commented, "but you probably couldn't even find one on the mechanics of how an election is set up — how to find good precinct workers, and how computers can be tampered with. And you can't ignore that. You people can do all the image-building you want, and you can go to every door in the county with all of your issues. But you could still lose the election, because some s.o.b. went down to the courthouse on election night and and monkeyed with the computer."

MacCorkle also warns that many time-honored institutional party-politics practices which are more or less ignored by progressives are being fully utilized by the Republicans and conservative Democrats, in ways which the "new constituency" may not be able at this point to counteract. In the 1983 Charleston mayor's race, a coalition of conservative Democrats helped the Republicans develop strength in the housing projects, thereby putting the Republicans back in power in Charleston and providing a base from which to work on the 1984 statewide elections.

MacCorkle worries that history is in the process of repeating itself. An examination of West Virginia political history does show that whenever progressive political elements become powerful, one of two things happens: (1) the conservative Democrats bolt from the Democratic Party and team up with the Republicans to defeat the progressives, and/or (2) the local or state machine politicians somehow rig or steal the election.* Looking at history, MacCorkle does not approve of the "new constituency," because he feels it splinters the Democratic Party and paves the way for the Republicans to get in.

MacCorkle further believes that the progressive network cannot last because "there's no institution, no umbrella organization to help resolve...

*In 1896 the Republicans came to power in West Virginia for the first time, through the open collaboration of the conservative "Bourbon" Democrats, who were threatened by the presidential candidacy of William Jennings Bryan. In 1940, four years after the Southern coalfields were unionized, Democratic Senator Matthew Neely teamed up with the coal miners to take control of the governor's mansion and purge the Bourbon Democrats. When Neely ran for his old Senate seat in 1942, the Bourbons retaliated by combining forces with the Republicans to beat him. In the 1950s Democratic Governor William Marland tried to push a progressive program through the West Virginia Legislature, financed by a proposed severance tax on coal. After beating back the program and the tax, the conservative Democrats crossed party lines in 1956 to help elect a Republican governor. The same thing happened in 1968 when the conservative Democrats helped defeat the AFL-CIO candidate for governor.
Canvassing for Change

By Billy Easton

In May 1983 the West Virginia legislature passed a ground-breaking Utility Rate Reform Bill that gave the West Virginia Public Service Commission (PSC) more power to protect consumers against gas and electric rate hikes than the regulating body in any other state.

Prior to the new law, West Virginia consumers had been socked hard by take-or-pay provisions in the contracts of Columbia Gas System, the state's chief utility. Under take-or-pay, utilities buy gas supplies at higher than market prices in return for a guaranteed supply. Common when a gas shortage is likely, these provisions require utilities to pay for gas supplies even if they are no longer needed or if they are available more cheaply elsewhere.

The campaign for the bill took more than a year of struggle. Canvassers talked with tens of thousands of people. They recruited folks for public hearings and generated scores of letters to legislators. The West Virginia Citizen Action Group (CAG) played a lead role, but the campaign was a combined effort of senior citizen, labor, and community groups.

Without the canvass, the campaign would have consisted of only a handful of organizations taking on the state's power elite. Instead, the public successfully rallied to demand reform.

The campaign strategy was to create a State Utility Rate Reform Task Force to investigate reforms, hold public hearings, and report recommendations to the legislature. Under the sponsorship of State Senator Si Boettner, the legislature established the task force, and CAG executive director David Grubb was selected to chair it.

Grubb's first act as chairperson was to schedule 10 public hearings around the state to hear people's grievances. The hearings became a forum for grassroots organizing and participation. CAG prepared for them by assigning two experienced canvassers, Molly Mitchell and Danny Philpott, to part-time energy organizing internships. Their work with community organizations led to the participation of more than 5,000 people in the hearings - and the large turnout and public testimony greatly influenced the recommendations made by the task force and the eventual legislation.

The gas and electric companies, who were used to having their way with the legislature, found themselves in a tough fight for a change. Electric company lobbyists effectively wielded the scalpel and managed to remove the reforms devastating to them. Important aspects of the bill which were lost included lifeline rates to ensure all consumers the minimum necessities at the lowest charge and reforms to make the PSC more accountable.

The gas companies, however, were unable to resist public sentiment. The intense debate went down to the final four minutes of the legislative session before the bill passed into law. Its most significant features are:

- all anti-competitive clauses in gas contracts are outlawed, including "take-or-pay";
- gas companies must prove they are buying the lowest price gas available;
- the PSC must consider earnings of affiliates - this protects consumers against the double profits corporations make when a producer sells to an affiliated distributor;
- a one-year moratorium is placed on gas utility rate hikes;
- a 20 percent rate reduction on electricity and gas bills in the winter months is granted for 74,000 low-income and elderly households.

Billy Easton has canvassed throughout the U.S. Currently living in New York state, he recently traveled through the South researching community organizations.

disputes." Commenting that "once you're in, you've got to operate," he predicts that it will be nearly impossible to operate when people and organizations inevitably clash over issues and priorities. Then the coalition will fall apart, he warns. Individual issues will take precedence over the cooperation, and that will be the end of it. His basic point has to do with the fact that the new progressive network can disappear in the face of disagreements, while the Democratic Party does not, because it is an institution.

The criticisms and questions MacCorkle raises are particularly hard to answer because there are so many wild cards in West Virginia at this point. The 1983 legislature passed a postcard voter registration bill, and several organizations are actively signing voters up. The legislature also passed a civil service bill allowing state employees to participate in political a variety of progressive groups helped lobby for pro-choice positions on abortion. Environmentalists worked with many organizations on hazardous waste and other issues. The very looseness of the network, justifiably named as a weakness, is also a proven strength in the latitude it gives people and organizations to decide whether to join in on particular issues or campaigns.

Still, the element of surprise is gone. The network has lost that advantage. Its efforts caught the conservatives off guard in 1982; this will not be true in 1984. The progressive network is recognized as a formidable political force, and the Republicans and conservative Democrats are planning their strategies accordingly.

Looking toward the future, the progressive network is counting on continued agreement to disagree, but above all on the fact that voters are becoming increasingly knowledgeable and independent. Since the anti-strip-
**A Change of Conditions**

By Kate Long

In the early 1980s, conditions were right in most parts of West Virginia for a group of organizations to bypass the old channels and elect candidates of their own choice. If the same electoral efforts had been made in the 1950s or '60s, people like Bob Wise would most likely have had the first election stolen right out from under them. What has changed?

Perhaps the most important development is the decline of the patronage system, the tens of thousands of jobs that could be handed out or taken away by whoever was in power. The patronage system helped preserve the status quo.

Some of the machine factions supported by the patronage system served as the fronts for the powerful economic forces that own a great deal of the state's resources. These interests want both their own taxes and government interference held to a minimum. State Senator Robert Nelson makes the point that "whatever coal company or timber company or economic interests were at play in a community had an economic grip on these holdings and communities. That spilled over into a political grip. They managed either through the election process or through outright wheeling and dealing to have the political officials of a given area within their grasp. So they would establish an economic policy and get it effected as political policy." In day-to-day life, this meant that "to a coal miner in Logan County, the Democratic Party was Island Creek Coal Company and the sheriff."

The patronage system still has some strength in the southern part of the state, mainly because that area is so heavily dependent on one industry — coal — and the coal market is extremely depressed. In general, however, political control through patronage has been steadily eaten away by court decisions, expanded civil service, and reduction of the number of government jobs. This means that many voters are now freer to vote on the basis of issues.

Mass communication also helps open up electoral possibilities in West Virginia. The old-line political machines flourished when voters knew little about issues. Uninformed voters (who might be relatives of somebody in a patronage job) were routinely handed a list of candidates (a "slate") before they went in to vote. "That was how many voters used to get their political information," comments Bob Wise. "But now, with mass communication, especially with television, candidates are leap-frogging the slates and the precinct workers. People get their perceptions directly now from the television, from direct mailings, from the door-to-door canvassing, instead of getting information filtered down through the precinct captain. And, as these voters become more educated to the issues and politics in general, I think more and more people are finding it kind of insulting to have somebody picking a paper in front of their faces 30 seconds before they vote, saying 'this is how you're supposed to vote.'"

The use of more scientific methods of reaching voters also helps people who want to campaign on issues. GOING through voter registration lists to identify historic voter patterns, targeting those precincts where the turnout and response are likely to be most positive, phone banks, door-to-door canvassing, and second-round follow-ups all enable the progressive candidate to reach voters effectively with his or her other issues.

"An issue can now overcome the machines and the county organizations," comments Mike Burdiss, UMW COMPAC director, "and it has to do with the new method of getting out the vote."

Burdiss adds a fourth factor:

mine and black lung movements of the early '70s, citizen awareness of and involvement in political issues has grown steadily. "This is our best insurance," comments Perry Bryant, who helped organize CrTPAC. "We see this as we go door-to-door. And unless the Democratic Party is able to adjust and at least include our concerns, then progressives will have to continue to appeal to voters on the basis of concerns, philosophy, and issues first, and party affiliation second."

"What they're doing, in effect, is trying to start a new party," Sam MacCorkle speculates. It would probably be more accurate to say that, for the most part, the progressive coalition has stopped thinking in terms of parties. Almost all of the people in the network would prefer to work through the Democratic Party, but they simply have not been able to get the Democratic Party, as an organization, to respond to their concerns.

Working through the Democratic
Party in West Virginia may not be possible, simply because, by Harry Truman’s definition, there are so many Republicans in the Democratic Party. Truman observed that the Democratic Party is in favor of helping people who need help, and the Republican Party is in favor of helping people who don’t need help. Judging by this simple but useful yardstick, it may be very difficult for the West Virginia Democratic Party, as an organization, to pursue a progressive agenda, even though the times demand a strong political voice for people who do need help.

Given the need for such a voice, can the Democratic Party and the new constituency agree to disagree? Bob Wise, who in many ways symbolizes the success of the past four years’ efforts, puts it very plainly, “I’m not afraid of the way we’re moving,” he says, “because I think it’s healthy. And I think that if the Democratic Party meets that challenge, rather than retreats from it, it’s going to mean a stronger Democratic Party. I’ve got faith that institutions can rise to changes and grow from them, just like people can. But the Democratic Party is going to have to be willing to recognize where people’s interests, needs, and wants are, such as utility rate reform, and say that we’re willing to take that battle on, as Democrats. Not as individuals, but as Democrats. If they’re not willing to do it, then people aren’t going to have much respect for the Democratic Party, nor, quite frankly, should they. If the Democratic Party isn’t going to meet what people’s needs are, then they shouldn’t win. The same is true for the Republican Party.”

If the historical pattern can be broken, 1984 may be the test year. Conservative Democrats (and Governor Rockefeller) are already lining up with Republicans to oppose the gubernatorial candidacy of Senate president Warren McGraw, who has the support of the entire progressive network. Other progressive candidates are similarly targeted. A classic confrontation is shaping up.

Kate Long, a West Virginia native, is president of the board and a lobbyist for West Virginia Citizen Action Group. She is the author of Johnny’s Such a Bright Boy, What a Shame He’s Retarded (Houghton-Mifflin, 1977).

West Virginia’s progressives have had remarkable success at the ballot box, but coalitions are active in other states as well. Since 1980, a significant change has been taking place in Florida politics.

When Richard Stone ran for the U.S. Senate in 1974, he courted the senior citizen and labor vote and barely won. Six years later, both groups claimed they had been betrayed. According to Max Serchuck, president of the Florida Council of Senior Citizens, “Senior citizens, who often cannot afford the astronomical costs of health care, counted on Senator Stone to represent us on national health insurance, but Stone double-crossed us.”

Meanwhile, in 1978, progressive activists in Palm Beach County had founded the Florida Consumers Federation (FCF), and that organization began to build a broad-based coalition to increase citizen participation in economic and political decision-making. Stone’s votes against emergency fuel assistance, his attacks on social security and other programs important to senior citizens, and his Big Oil backing made him a natural target for labor, senior, and low income constituencies; he was also the catalyst needed to fuse the new organization’s coalition together.

Consumers Federation affiliates came together and formed the Committee for the Early Retirement of Senator Stone. The campaign theme
was Stone’s insensitivity to his constituents and his image as a puppet of corporate interests. Hundreds of thousands of leaflets exposing his votes were printed. At the bottom of each was the slogan, “Florida Needs a Senator With Heart . . . Not Stone.”

Flying squadrons of pickets showed up wherever Stone spoke. Eventually, he stopped releasing his schedule publicly, but the coalition to stop Stone discovered that the senator was holding a $100 person fundraiser at the plush Diplomat Hotel in Hollywood on June 8, 1980. The committee called for a demonstration nearby, and more than 3,000 union members, senior citizens, civil-rights activists, and consumer activists responded. Buses arrived from as far as 300 miles away to oppose Stone’s re-election. A film made of the demonstration was soon shown to over 100,000 voters at all the major condominiums in Palm Beach and Broward Counties and at union and retiree meetings across Florida.

Stone was narrowly defeated in Florida's 1980 Democratic primary; coalition politics seemed to work.

After the victory of the Heart Not Stone campaign, the Florida Consumers Federation explored the possibility of creating an ongoing political action committee to elect progressives to public office. FCF was a natural organization to initiate such a program. It had 57 affiliates, representing industrial and building trades unions, feminist groups, senior citizen organizations, civil-rights groups, large condominium and mobile home associations, and community groups. By 1981, FCF had an active door-to-door canvass on issues such as utility rates in many parts of Florida: every evening, dozens of professionally trained canvassers took FCF's message into neighborhoods across the state.

FCF board member and Palm Beach County AFL-CIO president Jerry Millican successfully argued that instead of going statewide immediately, the organization should target Palm Beach County as a pilot project area. Palm Beach was notorious for electing Republicans and other right-wing candidates.

Other board members liked Millican’s plans, and also felt that targeting races in one county would allow FCF to concentrate its resources more effectively. They created a coalition-based political action committee (PAC) named Citizens Coalition for Responsible Government (CCRG) and registered it with both state and federal election officials. The new PAC recruited and ran candidates who represented the interests of the FCF coalition on a wide variety of progressive issues.

Karen Clarke, executive director of FCF, explains: “Too many times we find too few sympathetic ears when we lobby our issues before the state legislature and county and municipal commissions. This pilot project will allow us to elect our own kind to office.”

CCRG’s first step was to hire a nationally recognized campaign consultant to direct all the campaigns, selecting Gary Nordlinger on the basis of his successful underdog campaigns for progressives in Oregon, Wyoming, Colorado, Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia. CCRG felt it was important that their consultant have experience working with the labor movement and other progressive organizations. It was also very important that the consultant train the coalition’s leadership in campaign skills so that CCRG would be less dependent on outside experts in the future.

The second important step for CCRG was to organize training for Consumers Federation affiliates. The Midwest Academy of Chicago, a center of the Citizen Action network of which FCF is a part, conducted a three-day training workshop in Palm Beach County, at which affiliates improved their skills in linking issues and electoral projects.

After Nordlinger’s first official meeting with the coalition in March of 1982, CCRG recruited and interviewed possible candidates. Five candidates were selected, and after an initial review, Nordlinger gave the coalition candidates a 30 percent chance of winning any of the races. CCRG members decided then that even if the coalition lost all races in Palm Beach County, but made a good showing, it would begin to gain the attention of elected officials.

Nordlinger trained all the candidates and their CCRG-provided managers in fundraising and other fundamental campaign techniques. CCRG made it very clear to all the candidates that it would run the campaigns and make the decisions.

CCRG raised $20,000 in seed money through contributions from the political action funds of local building trades unions. A fundraising committee raised $10,000 more within two weeks and later developed a full funding plan using techniques such as
targeted direct mail to FCF affiliates, volunteer condominium canvassing, and various grassroots money-raising events.

The emphasis of the coalition’s strategy was on a grassroots campaign: up to seven personal contacts were made with each voter. Additionally, each campaign delivered up to five pieces of literature to each voter in the county. Two of these leafletting activities, done the last two Saturdays before the election, took 300 and 600 volunteers, respectively. Other coalition activities included a phone bank with a paid staff of 30, a 25,000-piece mailing to all black registered voters, and a 70,000-piece mailing to all Democrats and independents over the age of 65.

FCF ran its regular door-to-door issues canvass in 38 targeted precincts. After having homeowners sign petitions on utility rates and “right-to-know” legislation, the canvassers gave a pitch for the CCRG candidate in that precinct. Canvassers also noted how voters were leaning in the campaign. A 7,000-piece mailing to all who appeared undecided arrived just before the election.

Overall, the coalition used more than a thousand volunteers and distributed more than 250,000 pieces of literature. FCF canvass director Jan Santere remembers, “It was great. Most voters said this was the first time they were able to identify candidates with issues that had important meaning.”

CCRG had felt that one or two victories and a good showing in the other races would be fantastic. In fact, it won all but one of the races!

Coalition candidate Steve Press, a former Legal Services attorney, won a state House seat with 60 percent of the vote. Coalition candidate Ed Healey won another House seat by defeating an incumbent who had strong backing from real estate developers, the American Medical Association, and other special interests. Both hired FCF staffers as legislative aides.

Nancy Pullam, running for state House, was the only coalition candidate who didn’t win. Facing a 10-year incumbent who was also chairperson of the Palm Beach County Legislative Delegation, she was outspent seven to one.

For county commission, coalition candidate Ken Spillias beat long-time incumbent Frank Foster in two heated primaries, and then went on to beat the Republican candidate in the general election, in all cases by overwhelming margins. Foster had raised over $100,000 for his campaign, more than six times the amount available to Spillias.

For U.S. Congress, the coalition supported Brad Culverson in both the primary and the general election. Palm Beach County amounts to half of the Twelfth District, and CCRG limited its efforts to that area. Culverson won in the primary, but lost in the general election. However, in the targeted area he outran his opponent by 5,000 votes, pointing both to the success of the CCRG work and to the need to expand the coalition’s work into other areas.

The Florida Consumers Federation does plan to expand its program statewide. It has opened offices with full-time staff and canvass operations in Tampa, Fort Lauderdale, and the greater Miami region. Together with environmentalists and the labor movement, FCF (and its political arm, the Citizens Coalition) is currently planning for a statewide ballot initiative set for the November 1984 election. The initiative would establish an Environmental Bill of Rights. Collecting more than 400,000 signatures to get on the ballot and then beating the corporate campaign will certainly be a major test for Citizen Action’s Florida coalition, the Florida Consumers Federation.

Andrew R. Banks is a labor educator at Florida International University, assistant to the president of the South Florida AFL-CIO, and a director of the Florida Consumers Federation.
Black mayors now govern 20 cities with populations over 100,000, including four of the six largest cities in the nation — Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Detroit — and some of the largest cities in the Southeast — Atlanta, Birmingham, New Orleans, and Charlotte. In all, there are 229 black mayors across the nation, up from 48 in 1973.

A host of studies have recently asked what difference a black mayor makes for the masses of black urban dwellers.* While they generally point to increased social and political benefits, most studies highlight a number of institutional constraints that shape how these benefits are distributed and how well black mayors improve the economic plight of their black constituency.

Since May 1977, Ernest “Dutch” Morial has been mayor of New Orleans, the seventh largest city now run by a black. His administration dramatizes four trends in contemporary urban politics:

• The severe legal and economic limitations on black mayors, exacerbated by President Reagan’s “New Federalism”;
• increasing alliances between black mayors and white corporate elites in economic development programs;
• different social and economic effects of policies on the black middle class and the black underclass; and
• the adaptation of “civil rights” rhetoric by black mayors to stress individual self-help and to strengthen support for their policies within the black community.

Poverty and Parades

In many ways, New Orleans is a unique city which illustrates the serious difficulties confronting urban America in general. According to the 1980 census, New Orleans is the third largest city in the Southeast, with 557,761 people of whom 55.3 percent are black. Tourism, oil, and shipping pump billions of dollars through its economy each year, but a whopping 26.4 percent of its residents live below the poverty level, making New Orleans the third poorest large city in the U.S. One-third of the city’s blacks lived in poverty in 1980, and the gap in median family income between blacks and whites ($7,598 versus $14,898) is greater in New Orleans than in any...
other major U.S. city.

This widening economic gap is paralleled by increasing stratification within the black community. While the middle class has expanded from 5 percent of the black community in 1960 to about 25 percent today, the black underclass is also growing. A 1982 survey by sociologist Daniel C. Thompson found that nearly a third of New Orleans's black labor force was unemployed or underemployed. “A black underclass that includes 15 percent of the black community has remained virtually untouched by New Orleans’s economic boom,” says Thompson. “The economic boom has not provided them jobs or training or the hope of either.

Many new jobs will continue to be filled by people from out of town until vast improvement occurs in the New Orleans public school system, which now spends about half what other major U.S. cities spend per pupil. More New Orleans blacks attend college today than in the past, but over half do not graduate from high school; the average black resident has less than an eighth grade education. Louisiana has the highest illiteracy rate in the nation, and in 1982, students in New Orleans public schools (85 percent of whom are black) scored the lowest on standardized tests among the state’s 64 counties.

To a large extent, these statistics result from the fact that wealth and political power in New Orleans are concentrated in a tiny oligarchy which, while tolerant of social deviance, unduly influences the direction of economic development and public policy. The crowning symbol of this ruling class, of course, is Mardi Gras, a celebration featuring 50 parades in which the aristocrats of New Orleans stand masked on floats and toss beads and fake coins to throngs of begging spectators. The carnival atmosphere which engulfs the city’s political culture perpetuates a castelike social system based on tradition and secrecy, as well as a tolerance for decadence and cavalier lifestyles among the masses (the “Big Easy”).

“Ernest ‘Dutch’ Morial may have the toughest mayor’s job in the U.S.,” argues Bette Woody of Wellesley University, because New Orleans probably has the most stratified social system of any city its size in the nation:

New Orleans is not as large in terms of population as Detroit or Los Angeles, but as physically distressed as Newark, not as physically distressed as Newark, but the forces shaping the fiscal crisis in the city were far more related to the intricate, parochial politics of a distant past than in other stressed cities. It was the inflexibility of its parochial political tradition, with racial tensions, complex social rules, and sleepy and insulated economic structure which conditioned the smallest kind of change in government.

After five years as mayor, Morial has not changed New Orleans’s “parochial politics” and “insulated economic structures” enough to improve the statistical profile of the chronically poor; but the city has certainly felt the impact of his personal ambition and political determination. The first black graduate of Louisiana State University’s law school, he went on to become the first black elected to the state legislature since Reconstruction, the first black to serve on the juvenile court, and the first black elected to the state appeals court. As the head of the New Orleans branch of the NAACP during the ‘60s, he led some of the largest peaceful demonstrations of the period and expanded the organization’s membership from 2,000 to 12,000. Well before his election as mayor, he had achieved a leading role in both black and white New Orleans society, as symbolized by a position on Tulane University’s board of trustees and by invitations to the most elite of the Mardi Gras balls.

An indefatigable man who thrives on 15-hour workdays, Morial also cultivates the role of a political maverick. His independence at least partly derives from the fact that as a Creole he is not immediately identified with either black or white leaders. In his first campaign for mayor, the then 47-year-old Morial straddled the race issue and bucked both the white political establishment and the traditional black political organizations, which he accused of routinely endorsing whichever white candidate paid the most money.

Indeed, in the 1977 mayoral primary, the major black political groups — SOUL, COUP, OPPVL, and ROOTS — endorsed one of his white opponents. Morial received only 58 percent of the black vote in the primary, but his campaign staff was learning valuable lessons in how to


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Photo by Morris Piliawsky

MORIAL, SECOND FROM LEFT, WITH JESSE JACKSON, SECOND FROM RIGHT

SOUTHERN EXPOSURE 71
bypass the traditional networks to appeal directly to poor, black voters with such lines as, “Believe us, Brothers and Sisters, Dutch may look white, but he lives and breathes BLACK.”

**Financial Limits**

With the help of such rhetoric and a staff of 125 on the city’s payroll, the mayor can now mobilize almost unanimous support among poor black voters for himself or his chosen candidate, as we will see later. But in his first year of office, Morial faced an uphill battle as he attacked the city’s fiscal crisis. Keeping taxes low is so dear to the ruling elite of New Orleans that normal channels for raising public money have literally been blocked by law. The Louisiana state constitution prohibits a city income or earnings tax and provides for a homestead exemption for owner-occupied homes assessed at under $75,000; only 5 percent of New Orleans homeowners pay any property tax.

When Morial took office in May 1978, the city depended on federal and state funds for an incredible 57 percent of its $214 million annual operating budget. With the advent of Reagan, federal funds coming to New Orleans were drastically cut from $123 million in 1980 to $65 million in 1982, so federal and state aid now accounts for only 30 percent of the city’s budget. Anticipating the dilemma of growing demands for shrinking resources, Morial proposed five revenue-producing measures during 1978, including a progressive property tax based upon the size of a house, and an earnings tax to generate revenue from people who work in New Orleans but live in adjacent counties. Not one business leader, union official, academician, or religious leader stood with the mayor.

Despite constant badgering from Morial, the city council refused to accept any of his revenue proposals until 1980, when it finally approved the two most regressive (that is, they put the heaviest burden on those with the least wealth): a flat $100 tax on property and a $50 tax on automobiles. The public outcry against these “service charges” was so deafening, however, that Morial was forced to offer the voters another option.

With the city council and economic elite flatly opposed to a progressive tax on income or assets, Morial urged voters to approve a half-cent hike in the sales tax to seven cents. On November 4, 1980, New Orleans blacks rallied behind the mayor to give the regressive sales tax hike its narrow 105-vote margin of victory. In exchange, the city council repealed the unpopular property and road use service charges, and more significantly, agreed to take any new tax proposal to the voters in public referenda.

Early in his administration, Morial obtained $32.5 million in federal funds to purchase 244 new transit buses, replacing others that were more than 15 years old. But with the advent of New Federalism, New Orleans’s transit service faced an imminent $19 million shortfall. During the 1982 mayoral runoff campaign, Morial reluctantly proposed that a referendum be held for a one-cent sales tax increase to avert a shutdown of the entire transit operation. New Orleans’s poor blacks faced a cruel predicament: Should they raise the sales tax to 8 percent — matching New York City for the highest in the entire country — or should they do without bus service? On May 13, 1982, the second sales tax increase in less than two years passed by 1,700 votes, with blacks supporting the tax by a six-to-one margin, while whites opposed the measure three-to-one. Virtually the same coalition of blacks and a small number of upper-income whites that had twice elected Morial mayor again provided the margin of victory to keep the city’s buses running.

The sales tax was a stopgap solution to the city’s financial crisis, however. Over the mayor’s objections, the city council had placed a one-year time limit on the tax. To alleviate the situation, Morial convinced the state legislature to authorize a referendum on a state constitutional amendment that would lift the homestead exemption for property taxes in New Orleans. To become law, the proposed amendment required the approval of voters in the city and statewide. With Morial campaigning vigorously outside the city, the amendment passed very narrowly, but it was defeated by a margin of 78-to-22 percent in New Orleans.

In 1983, Morial again proposed a city “earnings” tax, which the city council quickly rejected. The state legislature also voted down the mayor’s plan for a constitutional amendment to create a state lottery which would benefit local governments. Finally, the city council proposed renewing the one-cent sales tax, earmarked for transit service. This time Morial remained neutral, refusing to back a measure he considered a bandaid approach to the city’s fiscal problems. Nevertheless, on March 26, New Orleans voters approved a two-year extension of the 8 percent sales tax. Because of this inordinate reliance on a regressive sales tax, the average New Orleans homeowner con-
tributes a lower portion of his or her income for city and state taxes than homeowners in any other major U.S. city (2 percent versus the national average of 5.7 percent, says the federal Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations).

**Corporate Alliance**

Mayor Morial has earned favorable reviews from the white business community of New Orleans for his heroic attempts to improve city finances and his willingness to accept regressive tax structure as a solution. He has won even higher marks for his collaboration in charting the city's economic development plans.

Black mayors like Maynard Jackson, Coleman Young, and Kenneth Gibson have made corporate investment the keystone to their urban development strategies. (In his first year as mayor of Atlanta, Andrew Young has emphasized seeking private capital for the city's economy and, with support from poor blacks, pushed through a 1 percent increase in the local sales tax, accompanied by a dollar-for-dollar reduction in property taxes, a relief for corporations and homeowners). But, as Black Enterprise magazine wrote in 1980, "No black mayor in the country is more committed to black economic ambitions through alliance with corporate capital than Ernest Morial, in New Orleans."

Upon taking office, Mayor Morial developed a comprehensive New Orleans Economic Development Strategy to end the city's dependence on low-wage service jobs. The "basic premise" underlying the plan is that the expansion of the private sector employment opportunities for central city residents, particularly for residents of the city's low and moderate income neighborhoods, is a necessary — though perhaps not sufficient — prerequisite for reducing both the incidence and the effects of poverty, unemployment, and subemployment."

Some critics contend this "trickle down" concept offers little hope for the black underclass; or, as one city official said in 1980, "The mayor is delegitimizing the old strategy of black advancement through reliance on government." Black mayors, however, point out that they are experimenting with private economic development out of necessity, given the cutoff of federal aid, the legal restrictions on local financing of profit-making enter-

Under Morial's direction, New Orleans' booming economy has reached its peak level in this century. Among the highlights are nearly $2 billion in investment in the central business district, including 21 new hotels and office buildings; construction of a $93 million exhibition hall; planning the 1984 New Orleans World's Fair; revitalization of the river front; and development of a 7,000-acre industrial district on previously neglected land in New Orleans East. By objective assessment, the mayor has developed the best economic master plan seen in New Orleans for short-term growth as a regional corporate headquarters and tourism center, while laying the groundwork for long-term industrial development.

The dividends to the white business community from the construction and tourism boom the mayor has nurtured are immediate. But the pay-off for the large black underclass in New Orleans, without whose support Morial could not have won re-election, is slow in coming. One major success story illustrates the ideal mechanics of the mayor's development plan. In 1984, SFE Technologies, a California-based manufacturer of computer parts, will open a $9 million plant with a $7.7 million annual payroll. To lure the plant to New Orleans, the city issued $7.8 million in tax-exempt industrial revenue bonds (purchased mainly by a local bank) and agreed to exempt SFE for five years from a broad array of taxes. In return, SFE has agreed to hire at least 35 percent of its future employees from the poverty-stricken Ninth Ward where it will be located.

Unfortunately, the SFE case is the exception rather than the rule. Recent studies suggest that financial incentives to private companies have limited impact on their location decisions and even less effect on generating sustained economic growth. At best, these incentives encourage businesses already planning to expand or relocate to shop around for the highest public subsidy available. The companies attracted to these marginal incentives are often low-wage manufacturers (like SFE) which may move to another state — or country — as fast as they arrived.

The U.S. Civil Rights Commission recently found that employment disparities between white men, on the one hand, and minorities and women, on the other, persist in expanding industries and communities as well as in those on the decline. A study of firms receiving industrial revenue bond financing in Milwaukee showed that minorities and women were underutilized by 75 percent and that one fourth of the firms have been cited for violations of federal equal employment requirements. One can hardly expect private investment decisions to cure the black unemployment problem; indeed,
private investment decision-making is itself the very cause of the recent loss of millions of jobs and one of the primary forces leading to the decline of urban America.

**Benefits and Brutality**

Putting public dollars directly into minority communities through municipal contracts and jobs has a more immediate benefit, especially for the black middle class. Under Atlanta’s Maynard Jackson, blacks received 40 percent of the contracts for building the new airport. Birmingham’s Mayor Richard Arrington, elected in 1979, boasted in 1983: “My administration has given more work to minority businesses than Birmingham had done in all the other years of its 112-year history.”

During Mayor Morial’s first four-year term, more than $79 million in city funds went to minority contractors. Many of these contractors are too small to bid on the typical downtown project, but the mayor achieved a major breakthrough by negotiating a “set aside” provision in the plans for a new city convention center. It requires that 35 percent of the construction work be handled by minority businesses, at least through subcontracting. In December 1983 he announced “The Mayor’s Job Equity Plan,” which requires all new city-funded construction projects to have a workforce of at least 25 percent minority and 10 percent female workers. Despite his extensive contacts within the white business community, Morial has failed to win similar commitments from the privately controlled authority supervising the 1984 World’s Fair. “We have no control over private activities,” he says emphatically.

Black mayors can, and do, exercise great influence over the hiring practices of public agencies in their cities. A recent study of 40 cities by Peter Eisen-ger shows that between 1973 and 1980 “the only cities where jobs [for blacks in city government] grew faster than the black population were the ones with the black mayors.” During Morial’s first term, the number of blacks in municipal jobs increased by 11 percent, despite budget tightening that cut 1,500 positions. Black executives now head five of City Hall’s 12 departments.

Perhaps the most far-reaching achievement of the Morial administration in the area of affirmative action is the 1983 settlement of a 10-year-old discrimination suit against the New Orleans Police Department. As late as 1982, only seven of the 283 supervisors in the department were black. The consent decree stipulates that one black officer must be promoted for each white promoted until half of the department’s supervisory positions are held by blacks. (In another example of the legal problems Morial faces, the U.S. Justice Department has delayed implementation of the consent decree approved by a panel of judges on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals by requesting a rehearing before the full court.)

Even under a black mayor, public jobs and contracts go mostly to the middle class; and, as we have seen, the black underclass is left on public welfare with little hope of escape. The police play a key role in controlling this underclass, regardless of the mayor’s color. And in New Orleans, their excessive use of force has drawn even more attention than their discriminatory hiring and promotion practices. Between 1980 and ’82, the FBI investigated more complaints of police brutality in New Orleans than in any other city. Between 1975 and ’79, New Orleans police killed more civilians per police officer than any other urban U.S. police force, according to the International Association of Chiefs of Police. (The rate was 5.5 times that of New York City and 9.5 times the rate in Newark.)

Mayor Morial’s failure to stop police violence contrasts sharply with his success in confronting the absence of black officers in supervisory jobs. To some observers, this priority reveals an underlying allegiance to upper-income economic interests that worry less about justice than about protection to pursue private fortunes. “New Orleans Mayor Morial, and most other American mayors of
color, are faced with the classic dilemma of neo-colonialism," says Kalamu ya Salaam, editor-at-large of the New Orleans-based Black Collegian magazine. "Their material interest is with a status quo that conducts and/or condones violent repression of our people."

The outcry over police brutality reached new intensity in November 1980, with the notorious Algiers murders. On November 8, a white policeman was shot to death in his patrol car in the predominantly black, low-income part of the Algiers section of New Orleans. For the next five days, police staged mass roundups of young blacks in the Algiers-Fisher Housing Project, and allegedly used beatings, physical intimidation, even covering people's heads with plastic bags, to extract information. Finally, in a predawn raid on November 13, seven white policemen shot and killed three black Algiers residents, including two considered suspects in the slaying of the white officer.

The killings brought New Orleans perilously close to a riot. Community leaders threatened a boycott of central business district merchants, and a series of marches and demonstrations galvanized blacks as never before around the issue of police violence. The resignation of Superintendent of Police James Parsons helped defuse the explosive situation, and Morial finally established the Office of Municipal Investigation "to investigate and inquire into any alleged misconduct of any city employee."

Many grassroots black leaders remain critical of the mayor's action — or inaction — following the Algiers killings. William J. Jefferson, one of two black members of the state senate, asserts: "Mayor Morial ran in 1977 on the theme that he would end police brutality, but since he was elected, Morial has acted as though police brutality doesn't exist. After Algiers, the mayor hid behind grand juries rather than conducting his own investigation."

**Civil-Rights Rhetoric**

Jefferson, a 34-year-old graduate of Harvard Law School, also believed the Algiers killings and mayor's inability to enact a progressive tax system made Morial vulnerable in his 1982 bid for re-election, especially among poor, black voters. So he ran a vigorous campaign against Morial. Yet Jefferson polled only 7 percent of the total votes, and actually received more votes from whites than from blacks. He did force Morial into a run-off with a conservative white opponent, whom the mayor defeated with 14 percent of the white vote and an astonishing 99 percent of the black vote. In a poll conducted by Rose-Stekler Associates in October 1983, 80 percent of the black respondents gave Morial "excellent" or "good" job ratings, while only 10 percent found him doing a "fair" or "poor" job.

How has Morial achieved such popularity, despite the lack of material improvements for poor blacks?

Morial's tenure as mayor generally conforms to the experience of other black mayors: despite excellent intentions and sometimes heroic efforts, economic and political pressures severely limited what he "delivered" to his black constituents. Yet, like other black mayors, his administration has accelerated the advance of the city's black middle class, and he personally has succeeded in providing an array of symbolic benefits to the larger black community. According to James Button, these benefits generally include articulating black interests, encouraging other blacks to become more politically effective, modifying racial stereotypes, and serving as a role model.

Morial has especially excelled in adapting what can be termed "civil-rights rhetoric" both to exhort blacks to seek upward mobility and greater self-esteem, as well as to attack white institutions that threaten his definition of black interests. Charges of racism are often well founded, but civil-rights rhetoric can also be strategically used by a politician like Morial to reinforce and consolidate his support within the black community. Says Manning Marable, "the black elite employs race as an ideological and cultural tool to maintain and extend its own influence, its hegemony, over the bulk of working-class black society."

Dutch Morial has repeatedly précédent himself to the black community, for example, by deliberate displays of temper against the New Orleans media, especially the Times-Picayune, which he claims has used racist tactics to distort his positions and portray him as a combative, ineffective mayor who lacks direction or a guiding philosophy.

While it is difficult to assess Morial's charges against the local newspaper, his belief that "racial undertones were involved in the state legislature's efforts to "erode the power of the black mayor" seem quite plausible. In the 1983 session, the legislature reduced Morial's appointment power over the New Orleans Aviation Board and stripped him of his power to appoint the members of the New Orleans Audubon Park Commission and the Sewerage & Water Board.

As the alleged victim of a conspiracy by the white establishment, Mayor Morial has gained credibility in the black community for his rhetoric and even stronger voter loyalty. As Joan Crockett, a volunteer community worker in the Algiers-Fisher Housing Project, explains, "The edge Morial has with low-income blacks is that he knows how to be a grassroots person. He sounds like he's one of us... The black community does not believe that Morial has done much for it, but he does care. He's very limited in what he can do."

A second form of civil-rights rhetoric calls on blacks to advance themselves through self-help and self-reliance. As liberal support fades for black advancement through government assistance, more black leaders are emphasizing individual responsibility as the key to upward mobility. Morial's public pronouncements on the importance of the work ethic and self-determination began early in his first term, when a group of black youths stormed City Hall and demanded more summer jobs. Rather than promising government-funded work, Morial advised the protestors to seek jobs in private industry. "Get up early, put on a clean white shirt, and go out looking for jobs," he said. "And if you don't get one, go back the next day."

For five years, Morial has carried this message into neighborhoods and public schools, winning praise from parents and voters, the poor and middle class. During a town meeting in August 1983, black residents of the extremely poor Darse-Florida section of New Orleans criticized Morial for not creating new jobs in the area. The mayor was cheered as he proceeded to lecture the standing-room crowd:

"You've got to get up early in the morning, look at the classified section in the newspaper, roll out of bed, and go out and look for a job. You can't hoot and holler with the owls at night and soar with the eagles in the morning."

In addition to preaching the gospel
of self-reliance, Morial has pushed blacks to take greater charge of their fate by becoming more involved in the city's politics. Since becoming mayor, blacks have registered in record numbers and often turned out for elections at higher rates than white voters. Morial is given credit for almost single-handedly developing a strong political consciousness among black voters. And through these voters, he is turning his popularity into increasing political power for himself.

In the November 1983, elections, Morial used his support among poor blacks to campaign for three candidates challenging black incumbents representing the New Orleans area in the state legislature. All his candidates won, and even though he lost a city charter amendment that would have allowed him to run for unlimited terms for mayor, he demonstrated the electoral strength to name his successor.

As Morial builds a more effective political machine of his own, the question of what material benefits a black mayor can deliver for poor blacks will remain. For the danger of an ambitious politician forsaking his constituents' real interests is no less real for a black elected official than for a white. As Kalamu ya Salaam observes:

Most black elected officials of whatever office find themselves powerless within the status quo. Faced with the choice of fighting a seemingly losing battle against an apparently invincible system as opposed to individual advancement secured by going along with the system, most politicians have succumbed to the pleasure principle.

The challenge for Morial and for the voters of New Orleans will be to turn a new political force into a tool strong enough to reshape the legal, political, and economic system that now poses a formidable barrier to ending poverty in New Orleans.□

A native of New Orleans, Monte Pilawsky is an associate professor of political science at Dillard University and the author of numerous articles on Southern politics and a book on Southern University life, Exit 13: Oppression and Racism in Academia (South End Press, 1982).

Black Politics

RICHARD ARRINGTON
BIRMINGHAM

BY KELLY DOWE

Birmingham, Alabama, was once known to many as the "Johannesburg of America." It was the place where pictures of fire hoses and police dogs made their way into living rooms around the globe, and where virulent racists shocked millions when they bombed a black church, killing four little girls. On October 11, 1983, 20 years after the church bombing and 20 years after Police Commissioner Bull Connor's well-publicized brutality to black demonstrators, the city's voters turned out in record numbers to re-elect their first black mayor. Richard Arrington, Jr., the son of a sharecropper, won with 60 percent of the vote, the largest mayoral victory margin in city history.

The remarkable thing about the 1983 Birmingham election, which came just four years after Arrington won a vitriolic mayoral contest infused with racial divisions, was the absence of race as an overt campaign issue. Arrington and his only serious opponent, City Council President John Katopodis, signed pledges rebuffing all campaign appeals to racism. The electoral contest took place under the watchful eye of two civic committees demanding a clean campaign. And all the city's political organizations endorsing slates of city council candidates put forth biracial lists.

On a rainy election day, 70 percent of the city's registered voters went to the polls. Turnout among black voters, who make up 51 percent of the city electorate, was an unprecedented 77 percent, with most of it going to Arrington. White support for Arrington, still low at 20 percent, was twice what he had received four years earlier.

What does this say about the city once characterized by the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., as "the most thoroughly segregated city in America." It does not say the city is a picture of racial unity. The city's 285,000 residents, divided almost evenly by color, remain segregated in their living patterns. The city's neighborhoods are largely segregated, as are its churches and civic clubs. Many social institutions, such as the most prestigious country clubs and dining clubs remain entirely white. City schools, now 80 percent black, lose nearly 1,000 pupils every year, many of them whites fleeing to mostly white schools in the suburbs.

What the Birmingham city election
of 1983 seems to say is that, regardless of the prejudices of individual city residents, the old “lowest common denominator” brand of thinking (whereby whites did not vote for black candidates) will no longer dictate the city’s official course. Birmingham residents seem to have decided that a united city— or at least the appearance of one—is the way to move forward. There is widespread recognition of the city’s difficulty in attracting new business with its old racist image; accompanying this awareness is the dissipation, after four years, of many whites’ fears of being governed by a black mayor, and the emergence for the first time of a black voting majority.

The First Term

In the summer of 1979, Richard Arrington, then a city council member and a director of a consortium of the black colleges in Alabama, was catapulted into a mayoral election he did not intend to enter. But his friend, white liberal incumbent David Vann, fell from grace among blacks after an incident involving the troubled police department which was still 90 percent white in a 52 percent black city. Blacks were outraged when a white policeman shot in the back and killed an unarmed black woman, Bonita Carter, outside a convenience store. When Vann failed to overrule the police chief and fire the officer, Arrington heeded the call by blacks to enter the mayoral race. The campaign attracted national attention and was characterized almost exclusively by heated racial division. Arrington won a spot in the runoff and defeated Frank Parsons, a white lawyer and travel agency owner. Voting patterns showed a nearly complete split between white and black voters, and Arrington won by a small 2,000 vote margin.

Arrington had his work cut out for him. He faced white flight to the suburbs, a $2 million-plus city budget deficit, an all-time high in the city crime rate, a sagging downtown business district, increasing unemployment (as basic area industries such as U.S. Steel and Pullman Standard shut down), and insufficient low- and middle-income housing in the city. Another challenge lay in the strife-torn police department, whose police chief resigned during Arrington’s first year. There was also the dilemma of bridging two distinct constituencies: the black majority which put Arrington into office, and the whites whose faith he wished to gain to keep the city running.

Whether he liked it or not, when Arrington entered office he was known first and foremost as “the black mayor.” “In my travels,” Arrington says now, “people don’t ask me, ‘How’s downtown Birmingham growing?’ They immediately ask me something about race. But I understand that. There are very few people in this country who don’t assign race either directly or indirectly to everything you can assign it to. And I think it is very significant that Birmingham has a black mayor.

“But you know,” he says, “sometimes I’m tired of people saying, ‘You’re the black mayor . . .’”

It was an idea many people in Birmingham had trouble getting used to. Arrington’s personal style didn’t help matters at first. Reserved and cool in manner, he was perceived by many as stand-offish. He lacked both the creativity of outgoing Mayor Vann and the exuberance of Vann’s conservative predecessor George Seibels. When Arrington failed to make overtures to white civic groups or to ask to address their gatherings, their members faulted him and predicted a crumbling of the relationship between white leaders and city government.

Instead, under Arrington the city made positive strides toward solving many problems. During his first term, figures for commercial construction projects surpassed those of any other administration in memory, resulting in an estimated $965 million in completed or announced projects. These included some $87 million in contracts at the University of Alabama in Birmingham, plus three new downtown office complexes and a federal courthouse building. More than $2 million in the red when Arrington took office, the city ended every fiscal year with a surplus during his first term. This was accomplished with minimal layoffs and cuts in city services such as garbage pickup and street maintenance.

During the same first term the crime rate dropped 10.4 percent and the percentage of black officers in the police department increased from less than 10 percent to about 22 percent of the force. The number of black officers above the rank of patrolman rose from three sergeants to 12 sergeants and three lieutenants. Citizen complaints of police brutality, says Arrington, have dropped 80 percent, and police reports of assaults on officers and citizens resisting arrest have dropped 48 and 45 percent respectively. This improvement stands in marked contrast to the situation in neighboring cities like Montgomery, where strife between the police department and black citizens is escalat-
of exploiting the poor, ignoring women, and pushing aside any elected official who stood in their way.

In a magazine interview before the 1983 election, Arrington defended his actions, but after the election he said that he had erred in making those endorsements. "You're in a dual role in a city like Birmingham," he said. "You need to be the mayor for the entire city; but in the black community you're a civil rights leader. And you have a responsibility to be a civil rights leader.

"But you also have to respond to the fears of the white community. It was my responsibility in those situations to mediate rather than take sides. I think perhaps I should have moved earlier to try to depolarize the situation."

The Second Term

Ugliness did not develop in the 1983 election partly because of the tone set by Katopodis. With black voters almost guaranteed to support Arrington, Katopodis's obvious targets were the city's conservative white voters, and in the absence of another compelling issue, a campaign built on racist fears seemed made to order. Katopodis leveled charges at Arrington of using "machine politics," and he accused the mayor of creating a racially inspired moral problem in the police department. But as the campaign developed, and polls showed Arrington to be in the lead, Katopodis cooled his remarks. Outright appeals to racial fears, which would have run counter to Katopodis's personal philosophy, never materialized.

Now the dust has settled, and the mayor and Katopodis (who has two years left on the city council) have taken opposite sides of the fence once again. But their disagreements now take place within the context of a city government buffetting along as usual. The city faces the same chronic urban problems as many others in America: decreasing population, a smaller percentage of white residents, businesses following the affluent population to the suburbs, and chronic unemployment. Arrington now hopes to ease the city into a transition from a heavy manufacturing base to a base in high technology, especially medical science, and to aid the emergence of a black professional middle class.

These goals call for gargantuan efforts, and Arrington rarely ends the working day before 9:30 or 10 p.m. Recently, at the end of a long day, he sat wearily in his office and talked about his approach to dealing with race relations in Birmingham.

"The key," he said, "is not to try to obliterate the fact that there are blacks and there are whites, or that we have had problems. The solution is accepting that fact, first of all. Because until you accept it, you can't deal with it. You know, when I was first elected, a reporter said to me, 'Do you have any racial bias?' And I said, 'Well, I'm sure I do, I'm a product of this society.'"

Few deny that Birmingham has made progress in political and racial relations since the days of "Bull" Connor. But Arrington's impact will also have to be measured in terms of his policies. In the 1983 election, although race was not an overt issue, most blacks and whites still voted for different candidates. Moreover, in early 1983, CBS reporters found Arrington's strongest white support came from the downtown business community instead of from the white liberals who helped to elect him the first time around. And, while community-police relations are better, and a great deal of city assistance has gone toward housing for low- and moderate-income families, even more attention has been paid to traditional, business-promoted solutions: the ill-fated downtown complex, high technology manufacturing, commercial construction, and budget balancing.

Arrington expresses the hope that Birmingham citizens will think optimistically about the city's future during his administration: "I expect people to criticize me as they would any other mayor. I expect to be the butt of jokes the same as any other mayor would be. You can say, 'He doesn't have leadership ability.' You can say, 'He doesn't know how to inspire confidence.' But don't say, 'Birmingham can't progress with Richard Arrington because he's black.' You would then condemn the entire city."
THE APPEAL OF
THE NEW RIGHT

JERRY FALWELL'S HIGH-TECH/LOW-ROAD APPROACH

The New Right could not exist today without two commonplace items: the mailbox serviced by a public system of mail delivery and the home television set receiving free programming from licensed broadcasters. New Right groups use both with extraordinary skill and in unprecedented magnitude. The outcome is that public opinion is molded, citizens are organized, grassroots lobbying campaigns are mounted, elections are affected — and money is raised to perpetuate each of those achievements — all in a massive, high-tech manner that makes traditional public persuasion, organizing, and campaigning appear almost inept.

Direct Mail + TV = $$$

Consider the numbers: Reverend Jerry Falwell, to pick one noteworthy example, expects to raise $100 million in 1983 through the combined techniques of aggressive direct mail and television fundraising. Along the way, the Lynchburg, Virginia, evangelist will have influenced the opinions of millions of givers and non-givers alike with an astounding barrage of correspondence. Falwell sent out over three

BY BARRY HAGER
and a half million pieces of mail in the late summer of 1983 alone, and not this time to his loyal followers. This was "prospecting" mail, as the direct mail experts call it, mail designed to attract new followers to his cause.

That pace of direct mailing is typical for Falwell and his network of Moral Majority enterprises. In early 1983, he created a new Political Action Committee (PAC), called the I Love America PAC (ILAPAC), to make direct political contributions to candidates. The director of ILAPAC, Granville Graham, promptly announced the PAC's intention to mail four to five million pieces in its first year, before the 1984 elections. Beyond this, Falwell sends massive volumes of direct mail from each of his several entities: Moral Majority, Inc., the Moral Majority Foundation, the Old Time Gospel Hour, Liberty Baptist College, and others.

Falwell's creative use of television for fundraising interlocks with his use of the mails. Beginning just over 20 years ago with a modest locally broadcast radio program, Falwell's television and radio broadcasts of the Old Time Gospel Hour now reach an estimated 18 million Americans every week, resulting in a budget for the Hour of $63.7 million last year. In the course of each one-hour broadcast (and during each of Falwell's frequent prime-time specials on specific political topics) the viewer is hit with multiple pitches for money, along with convenient toll-free 800 numbers and addresses superimposed on the TV screen. Once you give, you're on the direct mail lists — essentially for good. And that guarantees a steady stream of direct mail appeals from Falwell for more money, and eventually from other New Right causes, as lists are exchanged and your name and address adorn other direct mail target lists.

The power of these techniques is unsettling. When Falwell went on the air in late 1982 to announce his plans for a series of prime-time television specials on the nuclear freeze, El Salvador, and the Soviet worldwide menace, he asked his followers for a special effort. The response: over $14 million was raised in barely a month of intensive fundraising.

Six months later, he did it again: On the air to declare a fiscal emergency for his ministry, he embarked on 40 days of prayer and fundraising and raised nearly $10 million by his deadline of June 30, 1983. That money enabled him to stage a highly publicized rally in Cincinnati entitled "The Rebirth of America," at which he announced his plans to double the size of the Moral Majority before the 1984 elections. Falwell's stated goal is to have 13 million Moral Majority members and to raise $25 million for Moral Majority — separate from The Old Time Gospel Hour, Liberty Baptist College, and his other enterprises — by the summer of 1984, when the national political campaigns will be escalating.

Falwell's reliance on direct mail and television is of course far from unique among New Right groups. Figures from a dozen other groups sharing the right wing of the American political spectrum demonstrate prowess in gaining adherents and dollars (see box on page 85). In each case, direct mail and/or the use of television is an important means of achieving support.

Taken together, the proliferation of these groups in the past two decades and their expertise with direct mail and television must not be underestimated. Huge numbers of Americans have reached once or many times by their messages. Over 98 percent of all American homes now have at least one television. Reverend Pat Robertson's program, the "700 Club," alone is on so many stations that it could be tuned in to by nearly 85 percent of the American people on any weekday, and the volume of direct mail sent by Roger Vigerie, the father of the high-tech New Right, alone is equal to a letter sent to over one-third of all Americans each year.

Jerry Falwell's expertise in using the media extends far beyond his regular paid programming. He has achieved the intangible but real status of a celebrity. Falwell himself boasted in a direct mail solicitation to supporters in May 1983:

"Please understand that I am not running around in a haphazard manner. I have a very specific "battle plan" that I believe will successfully reach grass-roots Americans. I've already been on talk shows recently in Washington, Los Angeles, Boston, Baltimore, and on the Phil Donahue show twice in the last two months. I've met with the Editorial Board of several newspapers, including the Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, Baltimore Sun, the Boston Globe, and others. . . . I am appearing on talk shows on both local and national television and radio. . . . I am continuing to place full-page ads in weeklies and dailies around the country. . . ."

The Message of the Media

A cynical marketing analyst might say that the New Right's mastery of the techniques of mass communication is the only explanation needed
for the success of the New Right. We in America increasingly sell our politicians like soap, using basic Madison Avenue techniques, and that's how the New Right is selling its dogma. That explanation suggests that the content of the New Right message is insignificant compared to how it's being sold.

This is, in some ways, a comfortable, lazy explanation of the New Right's success. The harsh reality may be that the substantive appeal of the New Right really does strum chords in people's thoughts that other interest groups have failed to touch.

Several key themes are woven into every New Right pitch:
- Family, viewed traditionally, with a dominant male head
- Nation
- God, viewed without question as the fundamentalist Protestant Jehovah
- Discipline/Work/Authority

Those themes are as much the Old Right's as the New's. When the Vichy government took over in France to collaborate with the Nazis in World War II, they replaced the bold democratic motto of the French Republic — “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” — with their own quintessentially conservative motto: “Family, Nation, Work.”

The attraction of these themes and slogans for the Far Right, both Old and New, is that they evoke values which are almost universal. People from all parts of the political spectrum understand the tremendous human importance of the family. Most people have strong feelings of patriotism. Most are religious in some way, and believe in the value and necessity of hard work and adherence to discipline. By repeatedly invoking these values, the Far Right attempts to monopolize them, implying that anyone who truly cherishes family, nation, and religion will embrace the Far Right political agenda as well.

The new, the different, the unexpected become in the New Right's lexicon the dangerous, the un-American, the ungodly. Any idea or policy which the New Right finds unacceptable is promptly lassoed and branded as anti-family, anti-God, and/or anti-nation.

The Appeal to Fear

Consider the appeal to fear and the use of those four key themes in these letters sent out by Falwell:

Dear Friend: The battle lines are drawn. America is on the verge of a moral rebirth — and I believe we must seize the opportunity while it exists today.

Will you help me fight the militant homosexuals, abortionists, and pornographers who are attempting to destroy the very fabric of our American society?  

June 15, 1983

Dear Friend: I fear for the future of my children. I don't want them to be cremated in the blast of a nuclear warhead. Or die slowly from radiation burns. . . . If the 'freeze-niks' have their way, this country is going to surrender its freedom to the Soviet Union.

I for one refuse to sit back and wait for Russia to take us over or destroy us in a rain of nuclear missiles.

Summer, 1983

Dear Mrs. . . .: Never before have I faced such unbelievable opposition. . . . Four years ago as a private citizen I organized a brand new movement here in America called the Moral Majority. . . . I knew then that abortionists, pornographers, and secular humanists would declare war on me. But I also knew that I could not remain silent about the sins that were destroying America. I could preach about abortion, homosexuality, pornography, and other evils that were hurting the Christian family. . . . But my hands were tied when it came to influencing legislation that would stop these cancers from eating away at this country's foundation.

So under the leadership of the Holy Spirit, I launched the Moral Majority and since that time we have made much progress in returning our nation to moral sanity.

But now all the groundwork we've laid and all the progress we've made is in jeopardy.

August 1983

Dear Friend: Sometime in early October the Senate is scheduled to vote on President Reagan's new Constitutional Amendment to allow our children to pray in public schools. . . . This means we may have as little as 30 days to alert our Senators and Congressmen to vote for the new school prayer Constitutional Amendment — or our children may never pray in school again.

August 30, 1983

Dear Friend: I need immediate financial assistance from every single member of the Moral Majority.

A violent war is raging — only two short hours from the shore line of America.
And we absolutely must alert this nation to the Communist threat in El Salvador, or Nicaragua, or Costa Rica, or Honduras, or Mexico—though they certainly plan a takeover in these countries.

But they plan to force millions and millions of “feet people”—people who are fleeing from Communism—across the borders into Mexico and into our country.

And for only one purpose—to weaken our country socially and economically so the Communists can then step in and take over the United States.

October 14, 1983

In those and dozens of other direct mail letters and televised broadcasts Falwell and his New Right colleagues appeal blatantly to people's fears and encourage them to take action, primarily by sending money to Falwell and his cohorts but also by lobbying, letter-writing, and all the other classic forms of political organizing. Direct lobbying of the Congress is frequently urged, with the names and addresses of the recipient’s senators and representatives often conveniently listed.

Scapegoating

The appeal to fear inevitably involves scapegoating; images of Judas blend with those of Benedict Arnold. Among those named explicitly in Falwell's letters as the causes of America's woes are the ACLU, the National Organization for Women, the National Education Association, the American Library Association, “perverted” homosexuals, “fem libbers,” and “pornographers.”

In 1981 Falwell sent out a major fundraising letter attacking “the left wing American Civil Liberties Union.” Falwell wrote:

...The American Civil Liberties Union is the single most destructive threat to our traditional American way of life. This is because the ACLU is:

1. Opposed to prayer or Bible reading in public schools.
2. In favor of homosexuality as an accepted alternate lifestyle.
3. Pro-abortion.
4. Pro-ERA.
In fact, they have even supported legislation to eliminate criminal penalties for marijuana.

Falwell went on to offer his readers an attached two-page “confidential expose” of the ACLU, noting that “in the opinion of many, the left wing ACLU has had ties with Communists and Communist linked organizations since its very beginning.” Old-fashioned red-baiting is the most noteworthy feature of the two page “expose.” The label “Communist” or “Communism” is used over a dozen times, along with other characterizations of ACLU efforts as “radical” and “pacifist.” Falwell accuses the organization of disseminating propaganda, refers to “the ACLU's advocacy to overthrow the government,” and states that the ACLU has “consistently supported” the “right to advocate murder.”

In February, 1983, as part of his campaign against the nuclear freeze, Falwell wrote a letter suggesting that the “powerful” National and World Councils of Churches were “advocates of unilateral disarmament.” That same month, in a television broadcast, Falwell approvingly noted the Reader’s Digest article on the NCC and WCC, saying, “If you’re giving money that’s going to the National Council of Churches, you are funding revolution, on the left side of the spectrum. It’s an excellent article. Get the January issue, print it in your church bulletins. Get the word out to everybody.”

Throughout 1983, in numerous letters and in repeated television broadcasts, Falwell attacked all supporters of a nuclear freeze, consistently referring to them as “freeze-niks” and as “dupes of the Soviets” who advocate “handing America over to the Soviet Union on a silver platter.”

In his opposition to abortion and to any deviation from the traditional family unit of a dominant man and misrepresenting its status to the federal government for purposes of gaining additional financial support through the “Combined Federal Campaign,” a charity drive for federal employees (along the lines of the United Way) that raises some $101 million each year. The federal Office of Personnel Management agreed with the charges, reclassifying the Moral Majority Foundation.

On May 26, 1983, Falwell sent an urgent telegram to Moral Majority supporters urging them to help sabotage the Democratic Party’s telethon beginning May 28. Charging that the telethon will also be a vehicle to lambast our beloved President,” Falwell asked Moral Majority members to “call in on their toll free number,” thereby tying up the lines and limiting contributions. The New York Times succinctly labelled this tactic a “dirty trick” reminiscent of Watergate.

Flirting with the Law

Reverend Falwell’s fast and furious pace in expanding his empire and spreading his gospel has led him on a few occasions along the edges of what the law permits for organizations supposedly devoted to religion and the public good. Some examples:

*In 1973, the federal Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) accused Falwell of misleading investors from 1971 through 1973. The SEC alleged, in a lawsuit, that while selling $6.5 million in bonds to raise money for his Lynchburg church, Falwell overstated his church’s assets by $1.1 million and falsely represented the financial condition of the church. Falwell signed a court-enforced consent decree in 1978, promising never to mislead investors in the future.

*In October 1982, the Moral Majority Foundation was accused of violating the tax limitations on electoral activity by tax-deductible charitable groups. Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code bars groups receiving tax-deductible contributions from engaging in campaigning for candidates for public office. Yet just before the 1982 Congressional elections, on October 1, 1982, Falwell solicited “tax-deductible” contributions to “mobilize a massive campaign unlike anything the secular humanists have ever witnessed.” Falwell said: “I have a plan which, in my opinion, can reverse the negative electoral predictions... If I can raise the funds to work this plan, I sincerely believe we can repeat much of what conservative Americans did in November of 1980.”

*In the fall of 1983, the Moral Majority Foundation was accused of...
submitive woman, Falwell persistently attacks both feminist groups and gays. In his June 15, 1983 letter announcing a “Clean Up America Poll,” Falwell deplored the fact that “on June 28th, tens of thousands of homosexuals plan to march again in the annual gay march in New York City, where gays fully exhibit their perverted lifestyles,” and asked his readers, “Are you in favor of known practicing homosexuals teaching their lifestyles to our school children?”

In a July 14 letter he attacked “the gays, porn kings, abortionists, and others,” specifically naming both the National Organization for Women and the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL), as groups out to “destroy” the Moral Majority. Referring to NOW’s support for the Equal Rights Amendment, he said, “Remember — if NOW gets its way — your daughter or granddaughter could be marching off to battle in the next war.” In an earlier TV broadcast, in February, he had attacked NOW by referring to the arrest of Ginnie Foat: “Did you read in the paper where the president of the NOW chapter in California was arrested for murder the other day...In this age, when the whole world is trying to debase Biblical womanhood and motherhood, and the role of the householder, and the role of the mother and wife, the Biblical role: thank God there are those people still preaching” the Gospel.

Falwell and Southern Politics

While Falwell is far from alone in constantly preaching the New Right gospel through the mails and over the air, he stands as the preeminent New Right propagandist directly and publicly involved in electoral politics. In addition to his new IALPAC’s financial support for candidates across the nation, he plays an increasing role in specific political campaigns in the South, most notably in his home state of Virginia and in neighboring North Carolina.

In the fall 1983 elections, one of Falwell’s top aids, Harry Covert, a former editor of the Moral Majority Report, ran for the Virginia Senate against Elliot Schewel, Lynchburg’s state senator for the past eight years. New Right financial support, coming from Paul Weyrich’s and other New Right leaders’ PACs, made that state-level race an extraordinarily expensive one. Covert raised and spent nearly $50,000, an amount that just a few years ago would have funded a strong campaign for the U.S. Congress. And both Falwell and one of his associates ministers at Thomas Road Baptist Church endorsed Covert over the air, a valuable bit of free broadcast support. (Falwell claimed he did not know he was on the air when he gave the endorsement.) Falwell defended his endorsement as a minister, while also appealing for support for his Christian candidate, by noting that Schewel’s rabbi put a bumper sticker for the incumbent on his car. Nevertheless, Falwell’s aide was beaten badly in the race, at least in part because Schewel was able to raise enough money to match Covert’s extravagant spending.

Jerry Falwell shows no signs of being deterred by the setback, however. In 1984 it appears that his most intensive electoral involvement will be on behalf of North Carolina’s senior U.S. senator, Jesse Helms. Falwell and Helms have long had a strong, highly public political alliance. Falwell praises Helms as “a national treasure” and publicly wishes that the U.S. Senate contained “100 Jesse Helms.” In the spring of ’83, Falwell turned his “Old Time Gospel Hour” pulpit over to Helms one Sunday night, in one of the most explicit blendings of New Right politics and ultra-fundamentalist religion. Falwell’s endorsement of Helms led to the Moral Majority’s voter registration drive targeted at “Christian” voters in North Carolina. Barnstorming the state-arm-in-arm, Falwell, Helms, and the Moral Majority’s North Carolina director, Reverend Lamarr Mooneyham of Durham, announced their intention to register 200,000 Christians to secure Helms’ re-election in 1984.

Falwell’s electoral ambitions go beyond his substantial efforts on behalf of Helms. He also intends to play a role in the re-election of President Reagan. He has already announced his and Moral Majority’s endorsement of Reagan’s re-election, and his direct mail and television broadcasts contain frequent explicit appeals to his followers to support the work and the candidacy of President Reagan. On one broadcast earlier this year, Falwell explicitly rebuked a Lutheran minister for disagreeing with President Reagan on the nuclear freeze, claiming that Christianity requires allegiance to all policies of the current administration.

Exploiting Traditional Values

The New Right is willing to tackle any issue in the public eye. School prayer, abortion, birth control, pornography, divorce, sexual preferences, and other social issues are blended with national and foreign policy issues like nuclear arms, military options, involvement in the Middle East and El Salvador. Their mastery of the technology of direct mail and the immediate forum they have each day and week on television shows makes it possible for New Right preachers to address any issue that catches the momentary limelight.

Perhaps the most garish example of this ability was the Soviet shooting down of the Korean flight carrying Representative Larry McDonald of Georgia in September 1983. Less than a week after the incident, Falwell had mailed an appropriately outraged letter to thousands of his followers. His letter was full of plans “to use this opportunity to play the Soviets alive in the court of world opinion and to expose their nuclear freeze propaganda for what it is.” Saying that “it is my personal opinion that the Soviets shot down Flight #007 for the specific purpose of assassinating Larry McDonald,” Falwell announced his establishment of yet another entity,
the Larry McDonald Memorial Family Fund, "to help raise funds to take care of his family — the children and widow."

Even as the New Right leaders exploit the headlines of the moment, they adhere to the subtler and more constant exploitation of the four major themes: Family, Nation, God, and Authority. Again, the obvious advantage for the New Right in manipulating these words is that they are symbols with which many if not most Americans readily identify. While too little research has been done on the people who respond to the New Right appeal, the evidence to date confirms the assumption that this audience is predominantly Protestant, white, rural, and small-town. Some scholars further suggest that the prime targets for the New Right are rural or small-town folks who are being confronted with rapid social, technological, or demographic change.* That description fits almost any rural community or small town in the United States in the last decade, and fits many areas of the South particularly well.

Reaching those small-town and rural audiences is possible only through the modern technology of television, radio, and direct mail. By definition, the rural communities and small towns, even if they are growing, remain too small and widely dispersed to be reached effectively by traditional political whistle-stopping or the neighborhood organization tactics that can be effective in urban centers. Falwell's distribution system reflects those facts: his programs are broadcast regularly on 72 television stations across the South, potentially reaching a large proportion of all Southerners.

Appeals to fear, along with scapegoating campaigns, exploit the erosion of old values cherished by traditional, rural people living in a society of enormous and rapid change. These people feel a threat to the old way of life and its values. The New Right willingly distorts what and who the threat is, and appropriates its audience's financial and political resources for its struggle against progressive values.

A 1983 fund-raising letter from Christian Voice, a lobbying group that monitors Congress, vividly captures the confused fear and exploitable anger of the people to whom the New Right appeals:

If pressure-group politics is the only way to get anything done, then we Christians have to be the biggest and strongest "pressure group." Around if we're going to save what's left of what's good and decent about America, and start turning this country back to God. . . .

You and I have to convince our elected representatives that homosexuals and atheists aren't the only ones who have "rights." The average hard-working citizen who is the backbone of our country has rights, too! But they're being taken away from us one-by-one — and we're tired of it.

We want to return to the old values of hard work, thrift, decency, and obedience to the laws of God.

In other words, WE WANT OUR COUNTRY BACK!

It's our money the government is squandering every day on useless and even immoral programs, including "homosexual rights" and killing babies with taxpayer-paid abortions. We want our MONEY back to spend in our own way on the things WE believe in.

They're OUR schools that they've banned all religion in, and are using to brainwash our children with secular-humanist hogwash. Government has replaced God with sex, drugs, illiteracy and rampant violence in our schools. We want our SCHOOLS back! They're OUR sacred and cherished Christian beliefs that the government is trampling all over, and we're sick of it!

WE WANT OUR COUNTRY BACK! — the way it was before God was banned from the classroom — before the vilenest pornography was allowed to be put on the magazine shelf in every corner drugstore — before the ultra-liberals and radicals started separating America from God and before the liberals made our streets safe for rapists and muggers, but not for God-fearing people.

An Unfair Fight

There is an obvious sense in which progressives are in an unfair fight with the New Right. Progressive-minded folks should be appealing to people's hopes and aspirations, as banal as that sometimes sounds, rather than to their fears.

Trying to understand what the New Right is saying to its adherents and its potential converts helps make it possible to shape alternative argu-

political preachers of the New Right may be guilty of exploiting religion for their own political, not spiritual, purposes. And small-town ministers frequently discuss with some bitterness the siphoning of money from their communities by distant television preachers who perform none of the social services which the local brick-and-mortar churches are left to do. Coalition-building across the political, racial, and religious spectrum is the old and often elusive dream of progressives, perhaps especially in the South, but the lesson the New Right is teaching is that if we don’t reach out, they will.

Barry M. Hager is director of the North Carolina office of People For the American Way, a national, non-profit educational group dedicated to the preservation of our constitutional rights and liberties. Over 13,000 Southerners belong to People For. Hager is an attorney, former Time magazine correspondent, and former counsel to the U.S. House of Representatives committee on environment, energy, and natural resources.

The Cast of Characters

It is unlikely that any of the groups or individuals listed here as New Right would quarrel with the label used by Richard Viguerie in his manifesto for their movement. Substantively, these New Right groups share key ideological characteristics. In the economic and business sphere, they are highly suspicious of “big government” and generally oppose federal government regulation or intervention as a solution to social, racial, and economic ills. They generally prefer to give the free enterprise system full rein and show little interest in criticizing corporate America. At the same time, they view the United States as a unique nation with a special mission which requires a very big government indeed in the military and national security sectors. Finally, they generally favor a strong interventionist role for government as an enforcer of a moral code and a policeman of personal behavior.

•Richard Viguerie Company. Richard Viguerie is in many respects the father of the high-tech New Right. He was the first innovator to grasp fully what direct mail could do in fundraising and mass persuasion. In the 1960s, he built his own direct mail target lists by mailing on behalf of George Wallace’s presidential bids. Today he publishes the influential magazine Conserva¬tive Digest, with a circulation of 80,000, and sends out almost 80 million pieces of direct mail each year on behalf of various causes. Viguerie’s privately-held company has assets well in excess of $15 million, Business Week estimated several years ago.

•National Congressional Club, founded by Senator Jesse Helms, has been active in political campaigns and has shown particular prowess in raising money and influencing public opinion through direct mail. It claims a membership of 350,000 and raised $10.4 million in the 1982 election cycle (see article on p. 99).

•National Conservative Political Action Committee, commonly called “nic-pac,” excels in negative campaign advertising and specializes in targeting liberal incumbents in Congress for defeat. They raised nearly $10 million in 1982 and expect to raise nearly $13 million for the 1984 elections.

•Christian Broadcasting Network, a media conglomerate headed by Reverend Pat Robertson, has four TV stations in major markets, radio stations, a cable network with 20 million subscribers, a ½-hour broadcast seen each weekday on 150 TV stations, and other assets including a four-year university. The 1982 revenues of this conglomerate were $110 million.

•Christian Voice. A lobbying group, CV has become known for its “Moral Report Cards” on members of Congress. The group claimed significant influence on the outcome of the 1980 elections through its ratings of the morality of legislators, and also has claimed to have reached through direct mail 60 million Americans with its message about the importance of a school prayer amendment and other “Christian” legislation. They claim a membership of some 328,000 and an annual budget of $1.5 million.

•Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress. Set up by Paul Weyrich, a New Right organizer, with funding from beer magnate Joseph Coors and direct mail entrepreneur Richard Viguerie, the committee gives training and support to New Right candidates for office and also lobbies for conservative positions, on an annual budget of $1.5 million.

•Conservative Caucus, headed by Howard Phillips, the Nixon appointee who gained notoriety for his court-thwarted attempt to disband legal services for the poor, characterizes itself as a grassroots citizens’ organization, with a membership of 300,000, a budget of $3.5 million, and an avowed aim of affecting national elections.

•Eagle Forum. Phyllis Schlafly, premier opponent of the Equal Rights Amendment, established this group as an “alternative to women’s lib” and supports a range of “pro-family” efforts such as fighting ERA, sex education in public schools, and textbooks which have a feminist or sexually egalitarian content. The Forum has 50,000 members and a budget of approximately $250,000.

•Concerned Women for America, another national women’s group styled as an alternative to the League of Women Voters and the National Organization for Women (NOW), claims a membership of 200,000 and a budget of $300,000.

•American Legislative Exchange Council is a national clearinghouse organization of New Right state legislators, with an annual budget of $1.8 million, including over 350 corporate donors.

•The Heritage Foundation is the most prominent think-tank for the New Right. Its massive blueprints for deregulation of business and for dismantling many of the social welfare programs of the country were highly influential in late 1980 in shaping Reagan administration objectives. In 1982, Heritage produced over 100 policy papers on a budget of $8 million from 120,000 contributors.

•Free Congress Research and Education Foundation, another Paul Weyrich-associated group, is a think-tank focusing on family-related issues, with a budget of $2 million. □
Opposition is not always for women to leave the abusive relationship. Another solution is to hold the male accountable for his actions. Arresting the abusive spouse is a key way to do this and perhaps to stop the violence. However, the rate of arrest and conviction is abysmally low. A 1979 Louis Harris Associates survey of women in Kentucky — one of the few statewide spouse-abuse studies conducted — reveals that one Kentucky woman in 10 was the object of physical violence from her husband in 1978, yet less than 10 percent of the victims called the police for help. When the police are called, few prosecutions or convictions result. "The Ohio Report on Domestic Violence," a 1979 study, points out that during a nine-month period in Cleveland, Ohio, 15,000 calls to the police involving incidents of domestic violence resulted in only 460 arrests.

The reluctance to hold the male accountable is a reflection of the perception by some policemen that domestic violence is not a crime but a private act of violence excluded from the criminal justice system’s process of arrest and conviction. It is also a reflection of the belief of policemen, based on experience, that the abused spouse will drop the charges against the batterer. Not only do women fear reprisals for pressing charges, but the reasons they have decided to remain in a relationship, such as lack of money or no place to go, are at stake if the abuser is arrested and convicted.

"Women think if they can outfox the pattern [of violence], they can stop it," says Merchant of the reluctance of women to press charges.

Merchant suggests another way to hold the abuser accountable is for the woman and the man to enter counseling and come to terms with the dynamics of their relationship. She says that leaving the relationship, without coming to terms with what has happened, may only result in the abuser going into another abusive relationship.

Whatever the future of additional legislation regarding such legal techniques as warrantless arrests and protective orders, most people agree that shelters are essential to give battered women a place to go to escape the abusive situation. With this in mind Virginians Against Domestic Violence (VADV) began their campaign to legislate for more funding for shelters.
THE STRATEGY

VADV was formed in 1979 by a group of women concerned about the oppression of women in general and of abused women in particular. The group is an all-volunteer, citizens' organization with representatives from the corrections system, mental health and social service agencies, domestic-violence projects and shelters from across the state, and the Catholic Diocese of Richmond.

Prior to VADV's formation, the General Assembly enacted several laws which laid the groundwork for the group's eventual foray into the legislative arena. One of these empowered judges to order counseling for abusers; and a second allowed for the training of police in the handling of wife-battering cases. Neither provision is actively enforced on a statewide basis. However, a third piece of legislation proved significant. It called for funding shelters with Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) money. This resolution also directed the Department of Social Services (DSS) to provide information and referral services to abused spouses through its Title XX program.

The bill alerted the Department of Social Services to the need for resources to serve victims of domestic violence. A department study, which indicated that there were only two shelter programs in the state, resulted in increased pressure on the state LEAA agency to make more money available for shelters and in the passage of a 1980 law making the DSS the responsible agency at the state level for services to abused women. Even though national LEAA funding began to dry up, a Virginia office of domestic violence was established in the DSS. These preliminary legislative steps raised public and legislative awareness about domestic violence and gave spouse abuse institutional support from a state agency.

At this point VADV entered the legislative arena hoping to find funding for shelters for battered women. Lisa Lerman of the Center for Women Policy Studies in Washington helped develop a marriage tax bill, Lerman was invited to speak to the subcommittee of the advisory board of the Richmond YWCA's Women's Victim Advocacy Program, according to Sheila Crowley, then staffperson for the board. The group asked Lerman to address the subcommittee about the experiences of other states with marriage tax laws.

The Commissioner of the Department of Social Services, William L. Lukhard, and Delegate Warren G. Stambaugh of Arlington both advised against introducing a marriage tax bill because of the likelihood it would not be passed. Stambaugh explained to Louise Van Horne, president of VADV at the time, that such measures often lack support because legislators are reluctant to support special taxes.

According to Van Horne, Stambaugh suggested that VADV approach the House Appropriations Committee or the gubernaltorial candidates to obtain an amendment in the budget bill to provide money for shelters. After these contacts failed, the lobbying process for a marriage tax began.

In the months between the 1981 and the 1982 legislative sessions, VADV began to work with the Virginia Chapter of the National Coalition to Prevent Child Abuse, which was interested in a marriage tax law to fund programs designed to prevent child battering. Louise Van Horne believed that the child abuse group brought the necessary support of prominent figures. "We had the grassroots organization, but they had the high-level contacts," she explains, adding that the members of the child abuse group were in the position to talk to legislators in social situations.

The Department of Social Services also was anxious for the child abuse and spouse abuse groups to work together. "When I heard both groups were interested (in the legislation), I had an interest in bringing them together," says Bennet Greenberg, a legislative assistant with the state department of social services.

In February 1982, Sen. Frederick C. Boucher, a young but generally well-regarded legislator, introduced this bill: "Tax on license. — On each marriage license issued under [Section number] 20-14 there is hereby levied a license tax of ten dollars, which tax shall be collected by the clerk when the license is issued and accounted for as in the case of other state taxes collected by him." It was enacted with surprisingly little controversy.

How did this bill become law? What does VADV's experience portend for future "women's" legislation? An analysis of the legislation indicates that its passage depended on several key factors.

First, in drafting the bill, VADV identified it as something non-threatening to lawmakers. Consideration was given to language which would increase its support and by-pass built-in prejudices against women's legislation. As originally drafted the bill was called The Family Violence Trust Fund, a name which evoked images of the family unit and measures to keep that unit together.

Another important factor in writing the bill was its length and complexity. It is helpful to write "a simple little bill," but it is also risky. A shorter and therefore broader bill may be open to interpretation — both by bill drafters and legislators. Donald C. Lemons, a member of the board of the Virginia chapter of the National Committee for the Prevention of Child Abuse, met with DSS's Bennet Greenberg, and they decided to limit the bill to a few lines in length. Lemons, a Richmond trial attorney experienced in writing legislation, then prepared the bill. He says that he did not want to specify what percentage of funds would be earmarked for spouse abuse or child abuse programs because he was looking toward the development of a grant process which would be open to applications for money from both programs.

Once the legislation was drafted, VADV searched for a patron. Its first choice was Delegate Dorothy S. McDiarmid from northern Virginia. She had sponsored the legislation which had made the DSS responsible for domestic violence programs. A powerful and well-respected member of the General Assembly, McDiarmid was also the chief strategist for the doomed attempt to pass the ERA. Unfortunately, her ERA commitments didn't leave her enough time to
 Copies of the bill and pertinent statistics were sent to other possible sponsors. Sen. Frederick C. Boucher expressed interest in the bill and eventually became its chief patron. He often supported women's issues and was enthusiastic about the legislation. Although in his early 30s and one of the youngest members of the legislature, Boucher impressed activists with his hard work and diligence, and he was respected by prominent people such as Pat Perkinson who knows the legislature after working in state government for 20 years. “I think people in the General Assembly and otherwise respected him for his studious approach to his legislative assignments,” she says. “They took him very seriously and I think that helped immeasurably.”

Ironically, it can be a good strategy for a male to sponsor what is considered women's legislation. Although there were women in the General Assembly who served the same number of years as Boucher, he had acquired more influence than most female lawmakers. In Virginia, as in most other states, women's relatively recent entry into the political arena means that many lack the seniority and the necessary power base to be effective in legislative bodies. As an example of the difficulties women face, in the same year that the marriage tax was passed, a divorce bill that gave women property rights was sponsored by a man and enacted. A similar bill, sponsored by a woman, had failed the previous year.

“Making the Strategy Work”

While VADV searched for a patron, it also began to enlist partners in addition to the Coalition to Prevent Child Abuse. Unexpectedly strong support came from law-enforcement officials including the chiefs of police and sheriffs’ association. “We started out working with the police department,” says Deborah D. Cobb, executive director of the Charlottesville spouse-abuse shelter and current president of VADV. Cobb explains that John deK. Bowen, the chief of police of Charlottesville, although initially resistant to the shelter, became one of its major supporters. In fact he travelled to Richmond at the request of VADV to talk with legislators about the importance of the marriage tax bill.

“VADP also enlisted help from local PTA and religious groups. Despite the growth of fundamentalist religious influence in Virginia, such as Lynchburg’s Jerry Falwell, many of the traditional churches endorsed the proposed marriage tax measure. One of the board members of VADV was a representative of the Catholic Diocese of Richmond, and grassroots support from the religious community was also forthcoming. As Joan Shepherd Jones, a former delegate from the Lynchburg area and member of VADV says, the locally based support of ministers was a result of their work with spouse abuse and the many referrals they made to shelters.

“It was a never-give-up process,” says Deborah D. Cobb of the work to inform people in the community about the importance of shelter programs. “We just kept going,” she says of the need to plan in advance and not let down in the effort to win support for the marriage tax bill.

“It was psychologically exhausting,” adds Louise Van Horne, president of VADV in 1982. When the bill was finally reported out of a legislative committee, she says, it was a “high”
that quickly faded when she realized that more work would have to be done to urge individuals to call their legislators before the next meeting. "It was like a roller coaster," she concludes. "It was very scary and exhilarating."

Because of its revenue-generating properties, the marriage tax bill – Senate Bill 279 – was assigned to the Senate Finance Committee, the most powerful committee in the General Assembly. VADV members attended the committee's hearing on the bill with a coterie of supporters prepared to give the senators a detailed account of the seriousness of the problem of spouse abuse and the need for shelters.

After Boucher's brief presentation, Pat Perkinson, a woman who served as the administrative assistant for public relations in the late 1960s to former Governor Mills E. Godwin, Jr., testified that Senate Bill 279 is "an appropriate way to raise funds to deal with a problem that is widespread in marriages."

The committee approved the bill without hearing any further testimony. "I think the work that we did behind the scenes with the committee members before that day really had it sewn up," Perkinson says, recalling that she talked to most of the committee members and wrote notes to those she did not know well. VADV members all over the state had talked to legislators about the bill. The organization even developed fact sheets which it sent to each shelter program, with tips on how to approach lawmakers and what to say to them.

VADV members did not ease up on their efforts even though the key Senate Finance Committee approved the measure. For each hearing, they were prepared to testify and made sure that committee members were called the day of the hearing by group members or influential people in the community. SB 279 passed in the Senate and went next to the House Finance Committee. Again VADV put its network into action calling legislators and preparing to testify for the bill. William L. Lukhard, commissioner of the DSS, testified at the finance committee hearing and expressed his support for the measure. This gave legislators a sense of the commitment of the agency which would administer the shelter funds.

"This lobbying effort had a lot of appeal to rural legislators as well as urban legislators," adds Joan Jones, who was a delegate for eight years. She believes that rural legislators are particularly aware of the lack of services for abused women in their districts. Support of rural interests proved once again to be of great advantage in Virginia.

The marriage tax bill was sent to the full House where it was easily passed. On July 1, 1982, it became law.

The legislative session culminated in language amending the appropriations act to make $400,000 available each year for two years to fund spouse abuse and child abuse prevention programs. The money is distributed on a competitive basis by the Virginia Family Violence Prevention Program of the Department of Social Services.

In the first round of funding, grants averaging $13,000 each were awarded to 34 projects, including nine spouse abuse programs, 11 programs combining child abuse and spouse abuse services efforts and 14 child abuse prevention programs.

"On average, people received less than half of what was requested," says Marion S. Agnew, spouse abuse program specialist for the Virginia Department of Social Services, explaining that agencies requested $4.1 million for the first cycle while only $600,000 was distributed. The applications were reviewed by a panel which included representatives from VADV and the Virginia Chapter of the National Committee for the Prevention of Child Abuse.

"Spouse abuse efforts mainly targeted and focused on working with battered women," Agnew comments. These included money for new shelters, intervention and transportation and community education. In addition, in Fairfax County in northern Virginia, a counseling project for abusers was funded.

For the second cycle, 20 projects were awarded $10,000 each. "This time there was an emphasis on community-based projects," says Agnew. She explains that because there was not enough money to fund whole programs, the money was used to attract local matching funds.

Agnew reports two cases of local governments giving more money for shelter programs as a result of increased state funding for shelters. The first of these is the Shelter for Help and Emergency (SHE) in Charlottesville, where an outreach worker was hired with state funds raised by the
Midwifery in Arkansas was not a controversial issue until the summer of 1982 when Carolyn Vogler, a young lay midwife, opened the Delta Maternity Center in Dermott. Perhaps it was Vogler's training in Texas that offended the state's medical community — for her work in razorback country precipitated one of the most unusual legislative battles in the state's history.

Dermott, 115 miles southeast of the state capital at Little Rock, is poor and mostly black. It is a dusty farm town located deep in delta country, a region known for its poverty and Southern traditions as well as for its rich crops of rice and soybeans.

Driving through this part of Arkansas one gets the feeling that time has stood still: there are no shopping centers, movie theaters, or fancy restaurants. Tractors meander along a two-lane highway. Spreading out from the road are wide expanses of farmland; only an occasional gas station, grocery store, or hamburger stand puncuates the countryside.

The roots of lay midwifery are planted deep in this soil. Here poor people have long looked to elderly black and white women, the "grannies," to deliver their babies. Indeed, the grannies are the backbone of lay midwifery in Arkansas. During the 1920s the state's health department, realizing the lack of doctors in rural Arkansas, began fostering an organized midwifery program in which "upstanding women" in the local communities would be recognized as midwives by the department. Because of this program, lay midwifery "granny style" was not only popularly accepted in rural Arkansas — it was also sanctioned by law.

In 1947 the health department continued its support of midwives by upgrading their training and supervision. A manual was written, classroom training was made available, and, most significantly, the grannies were required to work under the supervision of physicians. Under this requirement midwives could not see a patient unless a physician had stamped the patient's "blue card."

These rules prevailed until January 1979, when a new regime in the health department, convinced that midwifery was unsafe and incompatible with modern medical practices, phased out the program. The midwives received a form letter telling them that their services were no longer needed and informing them that their practice
was now illegal. While many of the grannies were intimidated enough by this official edict to stop practicing, some continued to deliver babies. But those midwives were not viewed as a threat by the Arkansas Health Department because the few that remained active were localized, unorganized, and secretive.

At about the time of the 1979 clamp-down, Carolyn Vogler returned home to Arkansas from El Paso, Texas, where she had trained at the Bethlehem Childbirth Center. In Arkansas, she practiced midwifery quietly for several years until, in a calculated push for legalization, she decided to go public and opened the Delta Maternity Center in July 1982.

This challenge to the medical establishment brought a quick response. The director of the health department, Ben Saltzman, charged that Vogler was violating the state's Medical Practice Act by practicing medicine without a license.

However, no action could be taken against Vogler until the state medical board received a complaint, and nobody in Dermott, which has an extreme shortage of health care for the poor, was complaining, at least not publicly. Despite grumblings from those who viewed the maternity center as providing inferior care, the opening of the clinic was warmly received by most of the community. After meeting Vogler, residents were impressed by her intelligence and personality. And the idea of good maternity care for the remarkable sum of $300 appealed to the general population.

Two days after the center opened, members of the state medical board announced that a complaint had been filed against Vogler by physicians outside of Dermott. Immediately following the filing of the complaint and accompanying lawsuit, two Dermott physicians who had initially agreed to provide Vogler with medical back-up declined even to assist in giving orders for a simple blood test to be performed for her patients at the local hospital. This fueled speculation that the suit was encouraged by the medical establishment in order to get a court injunction and shut Vogler down.

Vogler's situation looked bad. Not only were the state's physicians mobilizing against her, but she had no political connections, no money, and not even a state organization of midwives to lend her support. The fight to legitimize midwifery looked as if it would be over before it had even started. But Vogler knew how to make the best of a bad situation. The idea that midwifery filled an important need in Arkansas was good and she was not afraid to fight for it, nor were a handful of her supporters.

While midwifery is an old tradition in Arkansas, many still associate it with the delivery of children under substandard conditions. Vogler projected a positive image, and impressed people with her intelligence, warmth, and knowledge about midwifery. Contact with Carolyn Vogler dispelled the image that lay midwives were incompetent or irresponsible people. State senator Jack Gibson, who later became closely involved in her cause, described her affectionately as "full of spunk and charm."

Arkansas is poor, ranking forty-eighth in the nation in per capita income and forty-sixth in the number of physicians per 100,000 people. The state has several good medical facilities, but they are concentrated in the urban areas — Little Rock, Hot Springs, Fort Smith. Doctors do not like to practice in the rural portions of the state where there is little money and few educational, social, and cultural opportunities. While health care is accessible in places like Dermott, it is expensive. Maternity care in Arkansas, including doctors' fees and hospital stay, costs between $1,500 and $2,000. Carolyn Vogler was offering this care for a fraction of the usual cost in a region where the infant mortality rate — 33 per 1,000 live births — was three times the national average.

Vogler knew that to make midwifery legal again she would have to back her arguments with facts and put them before the Arkansas General Assembly. She rejected a solution through the courts as being too risky, too long, and too costly. Winning in the courts might help her and the Delta Maternity Center, but it would not advance the status of other midwives.

A good legislative idea and strong personal assets are not enough, however, to turn an idea into law: an effective legislative advocate and a well-planned strategy are also necessary. Legislators are most likely to respond to pressure from people whom they know and trust. Vogler was fortunate to have

The midwives received a form letter telling them that their services were no longer needed and informing them that their practices were now illegal.

CAROLYN VOGLER AND A CLIENT
the support of Charles S. Gibson, an attorney practicing in Dermott whose father had been a highly respected senator in the legislature, as well as the support of his wife, Sherry, an activist in the community. The Gibsons were already fond of Vogler and convinced of her cause. They encouraged her to “come out of the closet” and let the public judge the merits of her cause; and they were outraged when she was sued by the medical board. Charles Gibson supported her with unlimited free legal service and, more importantly, the Gibsons provided Vogler with the legislative connection she needed: Gibson’s cousin, a state legislator who agreed to introduce a bill to legalize midwifery.

Senator Jack Gibson met Vogler on a tour of the Delta Maternity Center. He recalls, “What she said sounded good to me and I was impressed with her. I did a little research on my own and found that we had one of the highest infant mortality rates in the country along with one of the lowest ratios of physicians to population. That convinced me.”

With legislative help now a reality, Vogler and the Gibsons concentrated on developing a strategy to legalize midwifery in Arkansas by pursuing a campaign to influence the Arkansas General Assembly. A two-part legislative strategy was devised. Jack Gibson would introduce a bill, with little fanfare, to exempt midwifery from the state’s Medical Practices Act. Vogler would act as the chief spokesperson for the campaign, and deal exclusively with the media; the Gibsons would provide legal and logistical support.

All agreed that favorable media coverage was needed to legitimize the issue for Arkansas’s politically cautious legislators and to publicize the story of how powerful doctors were picking on a woman who helps poor women. The tactics during this part of the campaign worked well. Vogler was open to the press and never critical of her tormentors in the medical community, emphasizing often that she would like to work under a doctor’s supervision. She was quick to answer any charges leveled against her. When the medical board stated that midwifery was unsafe, she pointed out the high mortality rate in the state, comparing it to the lower rates in countries where midwifery was common. When she was assailed as incompetent, Vogler cited the number of
babies she had delivered and cared for. When doctors said they could do better, she noted that there were few physicians in the delta region and that maternity care was expensive.

The campaign’s media strategy was so effective that Byron Hawkes, associate director of the Maternal Division of the Arkansas Health Department, wrote Vogler a public letter of apology for remarks he had made before the state medical board:

_There comes a time in everyone’s life and professional career, when arrogance comes face-to-face with humility. . . . I cannot condone out-of-hospital obstetrical delivery of mother and the newborn but I am realistic enough to recognize that segments of today’s society wish this experience . . . because of the economic roadblock that now truly exists in Arkansas and in all states. Mrs. Vogler wishes to meet this need and has placed herself into a fighting pose. I admire her stance._

Hawkes went on to apologize for the “intemperate statements I have made against her” and concluded with an endorsement of her general aims: “Her position, and that of others in this state, must be legalized in a formal manner and status be given to the goals this ancient movement deserves.”

Hawkes’s letter of apology marked a turning point in the campaign. Vogler and her supporters knew then they had a chance to win, but they still had to deal with the Arkansas General Assembly. That body appeared extremely foreboding to the group which had a generally unpopular image and was under attack by one of the most powerful and established political forces in the state, the Arkansas Medical Association (AMA).

The basic structure and ideological orientation of the legislature also proved a substantial roadblock. The Arkansas General Assembly is a part-time institution which meets for only 60 legislative days every two years. Like most other Southern legislatures, its membership is senior, heavily Democratic, overwhelmingly male (four females out of 135) and largely conservative. The Arkansas legislature has looked unkindly upon women’s issues including the ERA, which it refused to ratify. In 1981 it enhanced its conservative reputation by passing a creation science bill which was quickly found unconstitutional in federal district court. However, because of the part-time nature of the legislative job in Arkansas, representatives spend a large amount of time in their home districts handling constituents’ problems. Though the Arkansas legislature is conservative, it is also sensitive to citizen demands and pressure from the right quarters.

The effects of the strategy devised by Vogler and the Gibsons were not unnoticed by members of the legislature. One of their senior colleagues was pushing the bill in the Senate. And, more important, the midwifery issue was no longer being viewed as special interest legislation but as legislation which would benefit all poor people in Arkansas. Vogler said in her press statements, “Midwifery is a feminist issue, a rich person’s issue, a right to life issue, a religious issue, a survivorist issue, and a poor people’s issue. It cuts across all classes of people. It’s everybody’s issue.”

With the base of support broadening, and the medical establishment complacent, the midwifery forces lobbied the legislators directly by organizing a network of supporters, friends, and clients. For his part, Senator Gibson practiced American pluralistic politics by the book: “I got me a midwife, a doctor, a Catholic priest and went to work.” Heavily represented by the clergy and the liberal medical community in Arkansas, the coalition convinced the Senate to pass the bill even before the medical establishment had organized for a legislative fight. The bill (SB 203) to exempt midwives from the state’s Medical Practices Act streaked through the Senate by a vote of 25 to 7.

In the House the going was much more difficult. The bill got an early “do pass” from the House Public Health Committee, but by the time it hit the floor the doctors were ready for it. Despite an unusual suspension of the rules which allowed Vogler, Father Joe Blitz (director of the Office of Justice and Peace in the Catholic Diocese of Little Rock), and Dr. John Wolverton to address the entire House, a campaign by the AMA to have local doctors call their legislators culminated in a 33 to 43 defeat for the bill.

Compromise is the essence of legislative politics. It means that if you can’t get a full loaf, get half, and if you can’t get half, get something. With too few votes, Vogler’s forces were compelled to compromise. Under the rules of the Arkansas General Assembly, a vote can be expunged and the bill brought up again. This was done to allow a compromise bill to be put before the House. The new bill legalized midwifery in only those counties where 32.5 percent or more of the population lives below the poverty level. This version passed 52 to 20 and was signed into law as Act 838 by Governor Bill Clinton. Thus midwifery was legalized in six of Arkansas’s 75 counties, including the county in which Dermott is located.

The partial victory of the midwives in Arkansas is surely the exception rather than the rule, but it does suggest that legislators may listen to good ideas when they are carefully and strategically presented. Second, the midwifery struggle in Arkansas seems to belie the axiom that many Americans hold about our political system — that little can be done to influence it. The midwifery issue was put on the legislative agenda and passed by a midwife who had never been active in politics before, an activist priest, several Delta legislators, one of whom had never sponsored a bill before, and two dedicated Dermott activists. A member of the Arkansas Medical Board summed up the situation when he heard the midwifery bill had passed by saying, “Three thousand doctors got beat by one midwife and a country lawyer.”

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Arthur English teaches at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock. John Carroll teaches at Southeastern Massachusetts University. They are the co-authors of Citizens Manual to the Arkansas General Assembly.
During the last days of summer in 1948, Henry Wallace went South campaigning for the presidency and challenging the segregation system head on. Starting in Virginia and on through North Carolina, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee, Franklin Roosevelt's second term vice-president encountered violent street scenes and mob protest as he carried his message of political reform and racial justice to more than 20 nonsegregated gatherings—a first for a presidential candidate. This Southern campaign, now almost forgotten, broke new ground in the South and paved the way for the Civil Rights Movement that began in the 1950s.

As Progressive Party candidate for the presidency, Henry Wallace made racial issues second only to his peace plank, which challenged the emerging Cold War polarization between the U.S. and Soviet Union. But in the South, civil rights was the central focus of his strategy. This was due largely to the influence of Wallace's Southern supporters who had struggled for more than a decade to promote economic, political, and racial reform in the region. The Progressive Party effort in 1948 provided a platform for appealing directly to the Southern electorate across racial lines.

Henry Wallace's key advisers included two decidedly atypical Southern Democrats who were at the forefront of New Deal reforms under Roosevelt. C.B. "Beanie" Baldwin of Radford, Virginia, had worked for Wallace in the Department of Agriculture and was involved with some of the most innovative programs initiated under the New Deal. As head of the Farm Security Administration (FSA), Baldwin was especially sensitive to the plight of tenant farmers and sharecroppers in the South. He believed that the long-term solution to the problems of poor farmers depended on their becoming an active part of the Southern electorate. Because a "poll tax" prevented even many white farmers from voting, Baldwin authorized funds for payment of the poll tax through FSA loans.

Another Wallace adviser was Clark Foreman, a native of Atlanta, who began his term in Washington in 1933 as special adviser to the president on negro affairs. President Roosevelt consulted Foreman when he launched his ill-fated attempt to purge from office conservative Southern Democrats, the strongest opponents of the New Deal. Foreman's recommendations to the president triggered the study which led to the 1938 Report on the Economic Conditions of the South. The far-reaching list of recommendations in the study became the "Bible" of liberals, North and South, who wanted to transform the region. Shortly after its publication, Southern New Dealers joined in establishing the Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW), an organization devoted to building a political base of support for New Deal reforms in the South.

Before this could take place, however, liberals had to challenge the complex structure of voting restrictions which disfranchised the majority of blacks, poor farmers, laborers, and others who stood to gain the most from New Deal reforms. As the first step in a campaign to increase the
electorate, the SCHW spearheaded a drive to abolish the poll tax. This led to the establishment of the National Committee to Abolish the Poll Tax (NCAPT), directed by Virginia Durr. The NCAPT built a nationwide network of support and succeeded in getting anti-poll tax legislation passed by the House of Representatives several times. But each time the House approved the bill, Southern senators successfully filibustered to defeat it.

Toward the end of World War II, efforts to mobilize liberal Southern voters were invigorated by the establishment of the Congress of Industrial Organizations Political Action Committee (CIO-PAC). Low voter turnout in 1942, CIO analysts thought, contributed to the election of the most conservative Congress in more than a decade. This threatened the gains made by labor under the New Deal. Clark Foreman, who directed CIO-PAC's affiliate, the National Citizens Political Action Committee (NCPAC), observed that too many Americans still failed to understand "the relationship of politics to food, clothing, and shelter."

With their sights set on the 1944 election, CIO-PAC and NCPAC initiated a nationwide voter education drive. In many cities, CIO-PAC moved registration booths right into the factories. This campaign was a huge success; several conservative congressmen and senators who were opposed by CIO-PAC went down to defeat in the primaries. And one of the most prominent conservatives, Martin Dies, head of the House UnAmerican Activities Committee, declined to run in the face of organized CIO opposition. Political analysts credited the PACs with causing a much larger voter turnout than expected, and this was critical to Roosevelt's re-election.

Clark Foreman and James Dombrowski, one of the founders of Highlander Center (see S.E. July/August 1982), took leave from SCHW to work with the PACs on the successful 1944 campaign. After the election, CIO-PAC and SCHW formally joined forces in a nationwide voter education and registration drive. With financial assistance from the CIO, SCHW established state offices throughout the South to organize liberals and labor around a program of social and economic reform. The focus on expanding the electorate faced a two-fold challenge: to overcome legalized voter restrictions, and to break through the tradition of not voting.

Expansion of the Southern Conference's efforts to conduct statewide voting campaigns coincided with the Supreme Court's momentous decision in the case of Smith v. Allwright in April 1944 outlawing white-only primaries. With the greatest legal obstacle to black voter participation thus removed, Southern black leaders immediately set about organizing black registration and voting drives. Within two years, black voter leagues were established in almost every Southern state. In this period, black voter registration tripled from an estimated 200,000 in 1944 to 600,000 in 1946.

Increasing black political activism stimulated the efforts of the SCHW and CIO-PAC in the South. Unlike traditional Southern liberals, who continued to pursue a more gradual approach to race issues, those working with the Southern Conference and CIO-PAC welcomed the expanding black political involvement. Clark Foreman, Virginia Durr, and James Dombrowski were among those who not only opposed segregation on moral grounds, but believed it had to be confronted before the broad range of Southern economic problems could be effectively considered. Prepared to challenge the segregation system, they realized the black vote would hasten the demise of Jim Crow and encourage progress toward racial justice in the South.

Believing the black vote would provide solid support for their programs, SCHW and CIO-PAC had joined with the NAACP and black voter leagues in promoting registration drives in black communities in 1944. The NAACP publicly praised the SCHW and adopted a resolution endorsing its work. SCHW hired Osceola McKaine, co-founder of the Progressive Democratic Party in South Carolina, to work with local black organizations throughout the region. CIO-PAC similarly hired Henry Lee Moon, a native of South Carolina, to encourage and assist Southern black voter leagues.

During the postwar period, SCHW and CIO-PAC were part of the broad liberal coalition within the Democratic Party dedicated to preserving and advancing New Deal reforms. Most liberal Democrats seriously questioned Truman's ability to follow through on Roosevelt's program for the postwar period, which was charted in his "Economic Bill of Rights." This concern, however, was soon eclipsed by the issue of Communism, brought to the forefront by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). For those joining the ADA, priority was given to routing Communist Party members...
and sympathizers from labor and liberal organizations. This coincided with a basic support for President Truman's hard line toward the Soviet Union.

Others, represented by the Progressive Citizens of America (PCA), continued in the tradition of the popular front. PCA opposed Truman's foreign policy as a departure from Roosevelt's conciliatory approach toward the Soviet Union. Moreover, they remained doubtful of the President's commitment to the promise of the New Deal. Henry Wallace had long been heralded by liberals as heir apparent to the Roosevelt legacy, a political leader of vision and conviction. When it became clear that Truman would be renominated by the Democratic Party in 1948, Beanie Baldwin, Clark Foreman and several other advisers urged Wallace to run on an independent ticket. On December 27, 1947, Wallace announced his presidential candidacy.

Wallace's Progressive Party provided more than a platform for his political views. As an independent candidate, Wallace demonstrated his uncompromising commitment to basic social reforms in contrast to Truman's hollow pronouncements.

Nowhere was this contrast more striking than in the arena of civil rights. One day before the official announcement of his candidacy, Wallace elaborated his position on civil rights in a speech in Tulsa, Oklahoma: "I am here to say, Jim Crow in America simply has got to go," he began. While praising the report of Truman's Special Committee on Civil Rights, he argued that it was no substitute for action. Wallace called on the federal government to use its influence, through appropriations, to enlarge and equalize educational opportunities in the South and desegregate the schools. Regarding jobs, he urged Truman to put the full weight of his administration behind a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) to end job discrimination within the federal government by executive order. Wallace concluded by saying the Justice Department "must use its full resources to stop the whole bagful of tricks by which Southern registrars and other officials deny Negro citizens the vote," and added, "We can't demand free elections in the Balkans and be passive about restrictions at home."

Support for Wallace's candidacy emerged in every Southern state. Although small in numbers, it represented a notable variety of black and white individuals including a scattering of old Populists, local CIO organizers, preachers, white collar workers, small businessmen, and college students. J.P. Mooney, Charlie Wilson, and Mike Ross, white Southern organizers, had been at the forefront of implementing the CIO's policy of integrated unions in the South, as well as active in the PAC's Southern effort to organize black voters. Each took an active role in organizing Southern states for Wallace. Asbury Howard, black organizer for the Mine Mill and Smelter Workers, was active on Wallace's behalf in Birmingham, Alabama. The Price sisters from North Carolina, who worked for the Southern Conference, took charge of coordinating statewide efforts, Mary Price in North Carolina and Branson Price in Georgia. A Committee for Wallace was established early on in Georgia by Larkin Marshall, black editor of the Macon Daily World, and Reverend Isaiah Dumas, pastor of the First Unitarian Church in Atlanta.

Herman Wright, a Houston attorney, led in organizing support for Wallace in Texas, building a core group of campaign workers from Homer Rainey's 1946 gubernatorial race. J. Lewis Henderson, son of a tenant farmer and former public relations director for the Farm Security Administration, organized a Wallace for President Committee in his native state of Mississippi. Support for Wallace in Arkansas centered in Little Rock, where Daisy Bates played a pivotal role, working out of her husband's newspaper office (The Arkansas State Press). Virginia Durr led in organizing the Progressive Party in Virginia, and the Food and Tobacco Workers Union provided an important base of support. Dr. Alva Taylor, former professor of sociology and religion at Vanderbilt, and Clara Vincent, a Chattanooga housewife, led the early effort for Wallace in Tennessee. They were joined by Reverend D.V. Kyle, who organized a base of support for the Progressive Party among blacks in Memphis.

Activist Palmer Weber agreed to coordinate the Southern campaign effort on the condition that Louis Burns, black civil rights activist and director of the Southern Negro Youth Congress, could join him as co-director and that
they have the freedom to run the campaign as a head-on attack against the segregation system. Weber, a native of Smithfield, Virginia, never accepted Jim Crow as a fact of Southern life. While a student at the University of Virginia during the 1930s, he was active in a well-publicized attempt to integrate the graduate school. And in 1938 he wrote a magazine article on "The Negro Vote in the South," anticipating the potential of the black vote as a force in Southern politics.

Weber’s early career paralleled Foreman’s and Baldwin’s. As an adviser to several congressional committees and liberal senators, he promoted progressive social and economic legislation— including anti-poll-tax legislation and a bill creating a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission—in the face of strong opposition from the Southern bloc. Weber left Capitol Hill to join the CIO-PAC, ultimately directing its research division. He also served on the board of the SCHW and helped to coordinate the efforts of both organizations to expand the liberal electorate in the South. Recognizing that race discrimination remained the greatest stumbling block to political and social progress, Weber viewed the Wallace effort as another avenue for pressing the fragile limits of the segregation system and breaking the long tradition of political disfranchisement and apathy.

The Progressive campaign in the South was a pathbreaking interracial effort. Blacks actively participated in organizing support for Wallace in every Southern state, and many ran as Progressive Party candidates for public office. Black ministers, funeral home directors, and college administrators played crucial roles by providing facilities for integrated meetings. Reverend Martin Luther King, Sr., opened his church in Atlanta to Progressive Party organizers and personally invited members of his congregation to sign the petition for securing a place on the ballot. Noting that only registered voters were eligible to sign, King used the opportunity to urge people to register and instructed them on how to do so. Many other established black leaders took part in the Wallace campaign, some openly and some behind the scenes. Even for those who maintained their bases within the major parties, a primary political goal was to get blacks to the polls. Consequently they appreciated the Progressive Party as the only political organization committed to securing voting rights for blacks and gave it their unofficial support.

The immediate objective of the Wallace effort in the South was to get on the ballot. Requirements for third parties varied from state to state: Tennessee required a petition with 15 signatures; Mississippi, 50 signatures; Virginia required 250; and Alabama, 300. North Carolina required 10,000; and Georgia, 55,000 signatures. The Progressive Party focused its energies on the petition drive in North Carolina and Georgia. Student volunteers covered both states with petitions. Since only registered voters qualified to sign, the petition drive was another vehicle for promoting voter registration, as well as publicizing the Progressive Party. In North Carolina, over 35,000 signatures were collected while in Georgia the number exceeded 80,000. The Progressive Party succeeded in getting on the ballot in every Southern state.

In addition to promoting voter registration, the Progressives responded to the system of fear and intimidation used to keep blacks from the polls. The Isaiah Nixon case in Georgia serves as an example of this response. On September 8, 1948, Isaiah Nixon, a 28-year-old black man, attempted to vote in the Democratic primary. At the polling place in Alton, Georgia, the sheriff told Nixon that he had the right to vote, but advised him not to. After Nixon chose to exercise his right, two white men pulled up to his home, and shot him dead in front of his wife and six children. Branson Price, head of the Progressive Party in Georgia, recalled that the incident was well-timed to serve notice to blacks that they had better stay home on election day. Price contacted Nixon’s widow to get a positive statement from the family. After affirming that they would vote and refuse to be intimidated, the Nixons taped statements for the Progressive Party to broadcast on election day.

During the campaign, Paul Robeson, vice-presidential candidate Glen Taylor, and Henry Wallace toured the South, bringing the platform of the Progressive Party directly to the Southern people. Following the policy of non-segregated meetings established by the SCHW, the speakers for the Progressive Party implicitly challenged Jim Crow in city after city. Wallace’s fall tour attracted the most publicity. As the first presidential candidate to tour the South on an anti-segregation platform, Wallace was accompanied by a host of newspaper reporters, representing most of the major white and black national newspapers. Wallace’s personal secretary, Edith Roberts, a black woman originally from Kansas City, accompanied him.

While the tour was well received at its first stop in Virginia, a violent outbreak in Durham, North Carolina, set the tone for the remainder of the tour. Wallace was the target of rotten eggs and tomatoes from jeering crowds. A rally in Burlington, North Carolina, verged on a full-scale riot. Police Commissioner Eugene “Bull” Connor
personally monitored an explosive crowd in Birmingham, with a large supply of tear gas on hand. And the Ku Klux Klan staged a cross-burning to coincide with Wallace's appearance in a black church in Knoxville, Tennessee. Throughout the trip, the candidate and his supporters were called Reds and communist sympathizers. Nevertheless, the integrated entourage continued traveling together by bus through most of the South, refusing to patronize segregated businesses. Instead they picnicked and stayed with local supporters along the way.

Angry opposition to Wallace did not deter his supporters, who turned out in more than 20 Southern cities. This fueled Wallace's determination to be heard. Echoing the Report on the Economic Conditions of the South, he spoke of the region's great potential, which had been "held back by a wall of privilege resting on the twin pillars of segregation and poll taxes." Wallace challenged those moderate liberals who were committed to working within the limits of separate but equal justice. Believing segregation was inherently unequal and a sin, Wallace attacked Jim Crow with evangelical fervor, hoping to appeal to the fundamental Christian principles he thought he shared with the great majority of Southerners.

The significance of third party efforts is often viewed in terms of their impact on the two major parties. Henry Wallace made civil rights a major issue of the 1948 presidential campaign. Wallace clearly influenced a reluctant President Truman to adopt a strong civil-rights program, after three years of wavering in the face of the Southern bloc in Congress. Truman could not afford to lose black votes to Wallace, particularly in Northern cities, in what promised to be a close race with Republican candidate Thomas Dewey. On November 2, 1948, Wallace received 1,157,172 votes, Truman got 24,105,812, and Dewey narrowly lost with 21,970,065.

The Progressive Party, however, had a larger significance. It provided a focus for early stirrings of the Civil Rights Movement, rallying Southerners of both races who were prepared to challenge segregation and who recognized voting reform as essential to achieving racial justice in the South. In 1948 Henry Wallace provided Southern New Dealers and black civil rights activists with a platform with which to reach out to all Southerners. Douglass Hall, a black reporter who covered Wallace's Southern trip for the Baltimore Afro-American, recalled the experience as "an historic, pioneering tour in race relations and civil rights." For Daisy Bates, who went on to lead the desegregation of Little Rock public schools, Henry Wallace inspired hope: "I had been waiting all my life to hear someone say what he said."

The Progressive campaign of 1948 represented an uncompromising commitment to basic principles that characterized the political careers of Beanie Baldwin, Clark Foreman, Palmer Weber, Virginia Durr, and others who joined in the effort. This spirit would survive the increasing challenges during the decade ahead, and ultimately carry the Civil Rights Movement to its legislative victories of the 1960s.

Just a year after the '48 election, Weber wrote of hopeful signs to Wallace. "The general struggle for civil rights is mounting to the view and pitch you set in your campaign." Weber cited the appointment of William Hastie as the first black federal district judge, the Supreme Court's agreement to review three civil-rights cases early in 1950, and the fact that the Senate would be forced to consider civil rights when Congress convened in the new year. "All of this we owe to your not faltering on the simple principle of human rights . . . which underlies the American Revolution of 1776 . . . and the whole vast panorama of the world today. We owe it to ourselves to hold that torch firmly high regardless of the consequences because that is the way forward. I suppose the proudest days of my life were those we spent in the South last year. There is more than one way to measure political success."

Pat Sullivan teaches at Emory University. She recently completed her doctoral dissertation on the Wallace presidential campaign.

One of Wallace's campaign speeches, delivered in Richmond, Virginia, appears in "Voices from the Past" on page 120.
THE jury is still out on how Ronald Reagan is faring with the 98th Congress, but one thing about this congressional class is clear: its members owe more to the nation's corporations, trade associations, and labor unions than to the president himself.

After collectively investing upwards of $190 million in the 1982 elections, these groups have shown little reluctance to call in their congressional chits for key House and Senate votes in 1983. And there's little doubt they'll be upping the ante for the 1984 elections. PACs now account for more than a third of all money raised by congressional incumbents, and they give three times as much money to candidates as the nation's political parties.

On one side of the political poker table are the nation's 3,400 political action committees — PACs, as almost everyone calls them — which seek to buy access, and votes, with congressional campaign contributions. Corporations and trade associations from the South, late to deal themselves into the PAC game, today are among its highest-stakes players.

Even Southern members of Congress have joined the ranks of the nation's PACs. The very biggest one, in fact — the National Congressional Club — is the brainchild of Republican Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina; it spent more than $10.4 million during the mid-term elections to generate support for conservative causes and candidates. Republican Senator Jeremiah Denton of Alabama has his own PAC, the National Forum, as does Democratic Representative Andy Ireland of Florida, who says his champions the cause of small businesses.

But the powerhouse PACs in the South are run, for the most part, by major corporations like Coca-Cola, Winn-Dixie, Federal Express, and South Central Bell. Others are sponsored by big trade associations: the Alabama Farm Bureau Federation, the National Cotton Council, and the American Sugar Cane League, to name just a few. Bakers (Georgia's Flowers Industries) and bankers (Trust Company of Georgia) have PACs, as do a grab bag of other enterprises, including Vidalia, Georgia-based Piggly-Wiggy Southern; Jitney-Jungle of Jackson, Mississippi; and the Tennessee Walking Horse Breeders and Exhibitors Association.

Under federal campaign law, PACs can give a candidate up to $5,000 for both the primary and general elections, while an individual contributor can give only $1,000 for each. This gives PACs considerable clout, because an
ally group of them tends to be drawn to the same batch of congressional incumbents. Textile and tobacco companies, for example, frequently focus on members of the House and Senate agriculture committees and on the appropriations subcommittees that help decide how much Congress spends on agricultural price supports.

Republican John Napier of South Carolina raked in $230,494 in PAC money in his 1982 campaign, owing much of it to his seat on the House Agriculture Committee. (The money, however, didn’t help Napier enough: he was defeated for re-election.) Democrat Richard Shelby of Alabama took in $169,526, greased largely by his desirable assignments on the House Energy and Commerce Committee.

Most of this money came from business PACs. “We have a kindred philosophy,” Shelby says. “You don’t support your enemies, you support your friends. And who are your friends? Those with the same philosophical bent.”

What do companies and associations with PACs really want? Some seek nothing more than access—an open door and an open ear on Capitol Hill—while others try to reward friends for their votes or punish enemies at election time. Still others claim PAC money has no effect whatever. “When we do go to the Hill,” says Pete West, Washington legislative affairs manager for Delta Airlines, “it’s usually of more interest for them to hear us than for us to go to them. They look at us as the experts and the leaders.”

But there is more to most PACs than good corporate citizenship. Of the 20 Fortune 500 companies headquartered in the Southeast, 16 have PACs, usually bankrolled by voluntary contributions from the uppermost echelons of management. These PACs rarely act solely to promote ideological stances. They’re interested in the business before Congress, which often happens to be their own.

The PAC run by Coca-Cola, for example, leans heavily toward Democrats, who got two out of every three dollars from Coke’s campaign chest. The PAC’s largest contribution ($4,000) went to Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, perhaps the nation’s most liberal senator. But one of the Senate’s leading conservatives, Republican Orrin Hatch of Utah, got a check from the Coca-Cola PAC, too. The contribution to Hatch had to do with his sponsorship of a bill designed to strip from the Food and Drug Administration the power to produce its own safety findings on food products and chemicals. That issue is of such importance to Coca-Cola that company vice president Carl T. Leonard, Jr., was dispatched with some regularity to Washington to lobby for the legislation.

There are several examples of when the Deep South didn’t need a lot of help on Capitol Hill. From 1921 to 1966, Southerners routinely chaired more than half of all committees in Democratic Congresses.

Today, however, Southerners have no iron grip on congressional seniority, nor can they always speak with a single voice, largely because of the erosion of the Democratic Party’s power in the region. So Southern corporations and trade associations—and what few unions there are—turned to PACs to win friends and influence legislators in the nation’s capital.

Southern agricultural interests have parlayed PACs into affluent adjuncts of their Capitol Hill lobbying operations. For nearly a decade, the dairy industry has funneled the most money into congressional campaigns nationwide, and the South has its share of PACs sponsored by state dairy cooperatives. Dairymen, Inc., for example, has PAC affiliates in Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. But sugar, cotton, tobacco, and citrus are the big-money crops in the South, and PACs representing these industries have emerged as among the most powerful.

The New Orleans-based American Sugar Cane League spent $134,576 on congressional elections, much of it channeled to members of House and Senate subcommittees with jurisdiction over the sugar price-support system. In the House, by mid-1972 all 17 members of the Cotton, Rice, and Sugar Subcommittee had received PAC money from the League—$14,350 in all, in amounts ranging from $200 to $3,000. Another $9,700 went to 13 members of the House and Senate subcommittees overseeing agricultural appropriations and taxation.

How the American Sugar Cane League gets its congressional ducks in a row is illustrated by two key Senate votes in 1981 involving price supports for sugar. When Jesse Helms moved to kill an amendment eliminating price supports entirely, none of the 21 senators who received contributions from the League’s PAC opposed the Helms position. And when Democrat Daniel Inouye of Hawaii acted to squelch an amendment to reduce the price supports, the League scored nearly as well—suffering only a single defection.

Price supports for tobacco are also a hard-fought issue on Capitol Hill, and seven out of the 10 members of the House Subcommittee on Tobacco and Peanuts picked up campaign contributions from the PAC of R.J. Reynolds Industries of North Carolina. (An R.J. Reynolds subsidiary, San Francisco-based Del Monte foods, has its own PAC.) In the Senate, $2,100 went to three members of the Agriculture Committee, $2,500 went to two members of the agriculture appropriations subcommittee, and $1,000 went to Republican Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming, chairman of the finance subcommittee on energy and agricultural taxation.
Another agricultural heavyweight is the National Council for the Advancement of Cotton, whose PAC pumped $123,575 into 1982 congressional races. The Council's money went overwhelmingly to incumbents ($119,325). By mid-1982 28 Senate candidates and 123 House candidates received support, with emphasis on incumbents holding choice committee assignments. In the House, 32 members of the Agriculture Committee collected $26,975, seven members of the agriculture appropriations subcommittee got $7,800, and six members of the water and power resources subcommittee — which has jurisdiction over federally subsidized irrigation projects — got $6,950. In the Senate, 10 members of the Agriculture Committee collected $8,150, four members of the agriculture appropriations subcommittee got $6,500, and two members of the finance subcommittee on agricultural taxation got $4,075.

"This industry goes to these people over a period of years and asks for their help," says Macon Edwards, the Council's vice president for Washington operations. "I think it's probably natural that when they get into their race and need help, we reciprocate."

These three agricultural PACs are far outstripped in total spending by the Alabama Farm Bureau Federation. It spent over a half-million dollars, but only a small portion of it went to congressional candidates. It helped to be from Alabama: Republican Senator Jeremiah Denton got $5,000, but candidates from elsewhere qualified if they sat on congressional committees dealing with agricultural issues. Democrat Jamie Whitten of Mississippi, who chairs the House appropriations subcommittee on agriculture, got $1,000. So did Democrat Thomas Foley of Washington, who chaired the House Agriculture Committee until he was appointed to serve as Democratic Whip.

"When I came to this town 12 years ago we had mostly committee chairmen from the Cotton Belt, and Congress operated differently," says the Cotton Council's Edwards. "It was a topside-down operation at that time; it's a bottomside-up operation now. You don't have the committee chairmen dictating policies and decisions as you did 12 and 15 years ago. These days we have to broaden our base and put together as large a coalition as we can."

Among all Southern political action committees, and in the nation as well, is the National Congressional Club, the Jesse Helms money-making machine. But despite its mammoth fund-raising efforts, few candidates actually receive money from this PAC. Of the $10.4 million raised in 1981 and 1982, the National Congressional Club contributed only $135,263 to federal candidates, some of whom, including Republican Senator John Warner of Virginia, and Alabama's Jeremiah Denton, have no shortage of campaign funds.

Public records show that the Congressional Club spends gargantuan sums on postage, telephone, salaries, and other kinds of overhead. In one typical month (April 1982), the PAC's expenditures included: $211,660 for advertising and fund-raising; $46,380 in salaries for 50 employees (five of them in Washington); $32,025 for taxes; $28,171 for consulting and contract labor; $25,769 for rent, utilities, and telephone; $21,922 for postage; and $9,929 for the rental and purchase of equipment. Printing accounted for another $7,105, and there was $7,641 in miscellaneous reimbursements; $6,725 in office expenses; $4,737 in airline travel; and $3,442 in media production. The rest of the PAC's itemized expenditures — $6,708 worth — went for film and photographs, food and entertainment, security and computer services, and insurance. That all adds up to $412,214.

During the same month, the National Congressional Club doled out a grand total of $1,000 in contributions to candidates. But even if the club isn't particularly generous when it comes to writing checks to politicians, it has made its political presence felt nonetheless.

Through massive direct-mail campaigns, the PAC has compiled a mailing list of a half-million regular supporters of conservative causes. Significant amounts of money are spent promoting those causes which offer, through a kind of trickle-down theory, direct exposure to candidates who agree with the PAC on such issues as school prayer and a constitutional amendment to ban abortion. President Reagan's budget-cutting campaign in 1981 was a prime example: the club reportedly helped generate more than three million calls and letters to Congress in support of his tax and spending cuts.

Helms himself will be facing re-election in 1984, and he has a formidable opponent in James Hunt, the popular Democratic governor of North Carolina. Even with its swollen war chest, the Congressional Club compiled a dismal record in 1982: only three of the 15 candidates it endorsed won, and all five house candidates the Club backed in Helms's home state were defeated.

Critical of the PACs, like Common Cause president Fred Wertheimer, contend that they fragment and distort the democratic process by making candidates beholden to narrow interests rather than to their own constituents. "PACs are a key factor," Wertheimer says, "in the growth of the special-interest state." While quid pro quo arguments are rare, he adds, "the process does provide access and influence and it does affect decisions."

More than three years ago, Harvard University's Campaign Finance Study Group found that "PAC money is interested money." Little has changed since. Here's a rundown of the issues in which major PACs from the South are interested:

Medical professionals. Doctors and dentists have been lobbying for a law that would take them out from under the regulatory thumb of the Federal Trade Commission and allow them to fix prices. The American Medical Association, which runs one of the largest PACs in the nation, invested $2.5 million or so in the 1982 elections, but even that figure understates the clout of doctors in the political
marketplace. The AMA's state affiliates have their own PACs, which concentrate largely on state and local races.

The Texas Medical Association PAC spent $1,061,845 in the 1982 elections (making it one of the largest PACs in the South), but only $71,240 of that went to congressional candidates. It played both sides of the political fence — freshman Senator Paula Hawkins, a Republican, got $5,000; her challenger in 1980, Democrat Bill Gunter, got $3,500 — and even gave $1,100 to Democrat Andy Ireland, who had no opposition last time out. For the eight other AMA-connected PACs in the Southeast, the pattern was similar.

The American Dental Association, which spent roughly $700,000 in the 1982 elections, has a similar set-up. The Florida Dental PAC spent $190,742, with only $10,629 of that amount going to congressional candidates. Unlike many other PACs, most of its money went to challengers — the one exception was a $200 contribution to Republican Representative Bill Young, who ran for re-election unopposed.

Bankers. Bankers represent another powerful force in the world of PACs, and several of the 25 largest PACs in the Southeast are operated by banks or savings and loan associations. One of the biggest of these is Virginia BankPAC, which spent $133,507. Less than one-fourth of the amount, however, went to congressional candidates. The Virginia bankers heavily supported Republicans; Representative Dan Daniel, a seven-term incumbent, was the only Democrat to receive a contribution.

Most other banking PACs — including ones operated by the Trust Company of Georgia and First Atlanta Corporation — also concentrate on state and local races. The notable exception is "Barnett People for Better Government," a PAC run by Barnett Banks of Florida, which contributed to members of the Senate and House Banking Committees. Much of the PAC's $72,750 in contributions to congressional candidates stayed in Florida.

The American Bankers Association spent over $1 million total, and its members are pushing for a law that would require individuals (but not businesses) declaring bankruptcy to eventually repay their debts. The bill had 255 co-sponsors in the last session, a sign that the banking and credit PACs just may see their investment pay off.

Shippers. In September 1982 the House of Representatives passed a bill euphemistically described as "maritime regulation reform." Debate was limited to 40 minutes, and after the bill had passed, 303 to 33, did many members of the House learn that the maritime bill would relax price-fixing rules for shipping cartels and eliminate criminal penalties and triple damages for antitrust violations.

The shipping bill was backed by the maritime unions and giant shippers, including LTV Corporation, whose New Orleans subsidiary, Lykes Bros. Steamship Company, has its own PAC. Its "Active Citizenship Campaign" played a major role in spreading contributions among members of the House Merchant Marine Committee;

$6,650 went to 18 of them, including $1,500 to Democrat Walter Jones of North Carolina, who chairs the committee. In the Senate, $3,250 in PAC money went to members of merchant marine and ocean policy subcommittees.

Insurers. Nashville's NLT Corporation is principally an insurance holding company, but until 1982 it also owned WSM (the nation's largest clear-channel radio station), the Grand Ole Opry, and the Opryland Hotel. Its PAC — "NLT Employees Good Government Committee" — sticks, for the most part, to insurance. It also focuses largely on incumbents: of the PAC's 32 contributions through mid-1982, only two went to congressional challengers.

In early 1982, Congress began an extensive overhaul of the tax laws that apply to insurance companies, and PAC money flowed to members of the congressional committees in charge.

The NLT PAC was no exception: it sent $5,500 each to seven members of the Senate Finance Committee and $4,500 to each of eight members of the House Ways and Means Committee.

THE LIST OF PACS

from the South reads very much like a corporate "who's who in America," and more than three-quarters of the region's Fortune 500 companies have dealt themselves into the PAC game. Here are past performance charts for some of the biggest:

Coca-Cola. The Coca-Cola Company calls its PAC the "Nonpartisan Committee for Good Government," and nonpartisan it is. Through August of 1982, it gave contributions to 48 Democratic and 41 Republican congressional candidates. There is, however, one partisan catch: the PAC's contributions to Democrats were, on average, twice as large.

And more than one-third of the PAC's money — $17,300 in contributions out of $45,775 through mid-1982 — stayed right at home in Georgia. This PAC doesn't mind hedging its bets now and then; in Georgia's First Congressional District, for example, it gave money to three Democrats and one Republican.

The Coke money also covers the entire political spectrum of two-party politics. Democrat Paul Simon of Illinois, one of the leading liberals in the House, got a check; so did Republican John Rousselot of California, a former member of the John Birch Society.

Beyond its interest in the Food and Drug Administration, the Coca-Cola PAC contributed money to members of the House and Senate agriculture committees and subcommittees that deal with migrant labor issues (Coke owns Minute Maid orange juice).

Another Coke concern is a national bottle bill, which would require consumers to pay deposits on soft-drink containers.

Federal Express. The PAC run by the Memphis-based Federal Express Corporation puts almost all of its money into congressional races, and little wonder: virtually every facet of its business — from aviation to trucking — is regulated by the federal government and shaped on Capitol Hill. In the House, the Federal Express PAC sent contributions to 34 members of the Public Works and
Transportation Committee through mid-1982 — $15,385 in all. Sixteen members of the Post Office Committee also got contributions, as did seven members of the appropriations subcommittees that act on the Postal Service budget and transportation matters. The pattern has been much the same in the Senate.

"Access," says Mary Harvey Jones of Federal Express's government affairs office, "that is the biggest key — to sit down and get them to listen." But Federal Express doesn't leave door-opening to its PAC contributions. It also spent more than $53,000 through mid-1982 to lobby members of Congress directly.

At the time Congress was grappling with the issue of airline deregulation, Federal Express had no PAC — a situation that soon changed. But, says Jones, there are limits to a PAC's influence on Capitol Hill. "Buying a vote? I just don't think that can happen."

Delta Airlines. While most PACs methodically search for sympathetic candidates, Delta's smallish PAC has found too many politicians knocking on its door. "Phone calls, letters, you name it," says Pete West, Delta's Washington legislative affairs manager. "We were in a position where we were just saying to them, 'Our PAC is depleted — maybe next time.'"

Delta's PAC spent $33,150 on the '82 races, channeling $11,900 of it to House and Senate candidates. The largest PAC contribution went to Atlanta Democrat Elliot Levitas, a member of the House Aviation Committee. In 1981, Levitas engineered a congressional compromise that withstood pressure from other airlines seeking to weaken federal airport noise standards. Delta, which already had purchased $7 billion worth of quiet Boeing 767's, supported Levitas.

Outside Georgia, Delta aimed all of its PAC money at incumbents with choice committee assignments. Among the recipients: Howard Cannon, the Nevada Democrat who was a ranking member of the Senate Aviation Committee until he lost his bid for reelection; the late Adam Benjamin of Indiana, who chaired the House transportation appropriations subcommittee; and James Florio of New Jersey, chairman of the subcommittee on commerce, transportation, and tourism.

Winn-Dixie. The king of the corporate PACs in the Southeast is run by the Winn-Dixie Stores chain, based in Jacksonville. In 1982, its "Sunbelt Good Government Committee" had contributed $319,863 to over 150 congressional candidates, virtually all of them incumbents.

Much of this PAC's money was doled out to members of congressional committees that oversee agricultural legislation or write the nation's tax laws: $24,225 to 19 members of the House Agriculture Committee; $24,000 to 19 members of the House Ways and Means Committee: $14,600 to six members of the Senate Agriculture Committee; $12,500 to seven members of the Senate Finance Committee; and $12,000 to members of the House and Senate appropriations subcommittees with jurisdiction over agricultural programs. The Winn-Dixie PAC also sent contributions to four members of the Joint Economic Committee's panel on agriculture and taxation.

Jim Walter. The Jim Walter Corporation's PAC, based in Tampa, concentrates on congressional contests, and tends to favor Floridians and Democrats — in that order. As the nation's third largest supplier of building materials, its two principal interests concern tax laws and safety standards for construction materials. Through mid-1982 it gave $4,000 to three members of the Senate Finance Committee and $7,500 to ten members of the House Ways and Means Committee. The House Subcommittee on Health and Safety was fertile ground: five of its seven members received contributions from the PAC. In all, the PAC spent $109,214, of which $91,300 went to candidates ($84,300 to incumbents).

Days Inns of America. The PAC of this Atlanta-based, 33-state motel chain is called the "Civic Responsibility Group," reflecting its desire to "have a part in trying to elect good folks to office," says assistant to the president A.B. Albritton. The PAC started small in the last election: it contributed $1,000 to Atlanta Democrat Wyche Fowler, who sits on the House Ways and Means Committee, and $100 to Democrat Richard Ray, who was newly elected to the House from Georgia's Third Congressional District.

"If there's a piece of tax legislation that will cost this company, we'd say Wyche, please take a look at this — we don't want to raise our room rates," Albritton says. "He's a good friend of the company and has listened to when we have concerns about legislation. But he's not always voted how we'd like him to vote.

"I don't think the country should worry about PAC spending. Big PACs can give all they want but they can't vote any more than anyone else. And that's what decides elections."

OVER THE COURSE OF THE last election, PACs served congressional incumbents quite well: Incumbents received roughly 78 cents of every PAC dollar contributed to House and Senate candidates. And despite the attention focused on the switch of two dozen or so seats in the House, the real lesson of congressional elections is that more than nine out of 10 incumbents are re-elected, many of them without serious opposition. In 1982, 70 percent of PAC contributions went to congressional winners.

So what does all this PAC money buy? There are, of course, the tradi-
PACs are by the end of 1981, there it incumbents with the tersed in influencing also its in $320 including $2,722 in automobile $13,378 an aside for his re-election Gillis Long, and Democrats Jerry Huckaby and Gillis Long — had more than $200,000 on hand in their campaign coffers. Long, who chairs the House Democratic Caucus, led all House incumbents with more than $500,000 set aside for his re-election bid.

A look at Long’s spending habits may leave people wondering whether he was really running for office or merely using PAC contributions to replenish his personal cash dispensary. Long’s largest expense during 1981 — a non-election year that followed an uncontest ed race in 1980 — was $11,405 for a new car, plus $5,195 for automobile insurance, maintenance, and gasoline. In all, Long spent more than $95,000 of his campaign funds in 1981, including these expenditures: $13,378 in contributions to organizations ranging from the Salvation Army to the Department of Music at the University of Arkansas at Monticello; $7,455 for printing; $1,192 for soft drinks in his Washington congressional office; $2,722 for various tickets, including $320 worth of the Super Bowl variety; $3,982 for postage; $4,974 for airfare; and $317 for “equipment” at Murrell’s Television in Washington, D.C. The campaign committee also spent $111 for a “staff function” in the clubhouse of a West Virginia racetrack, an expenditure that outstripped its total media budget of $100.

PAC money often flows to powerful incumbents like Long whether they need it or not, a clear sign that many PACs are interested in something other than influencing elections — they are not so much participating as investing. In 1984 the flood of PAC money threatens to become a tidal wave. In 1979 there were 2,551 PACs registered with the Federal Election Commission; by the end of 1981, there were 3,149; by the end of 1983 there were more than 3,400. While many of them are inactive or anemic, the collective clout of the nation’s PACs is on the rise.

There is a certain attraction to the civics-book justification for PACs: that small contributors, by banding together, can make a big difference. PACs, it is argued, increase participation in the political process by involving people who once felt they could have no impact on their own. But despite these claims, most PAC money — at least in the case of corporate committees — comes from the uppermost echelons of management.

Consider the Coca-Cola Company’s PAC contributor list, in which an employee’s spot on the corporate totem pole can almost be determined by the size of his or her annual contributions to the Nonpartisan Committee for Good Government. Through the first eight months of 1982 the heftiest donations came from chairman of the board Robert Goizueta ($3,075) and president Donald Meough ($2,125). Others on down the line — division president, executive vice presidents, senior vice presidents, and vice presidents — kicked in contributions of decreasing scale. But in few respects could Coke’s PAC be construed as representative of anything but upper management.

At the PAC run by the Georgia Railroad Bank and Trust Company in Augusta, a contribution went out to only a single candidate, Democrat Doug Barnard, Jr. Barnard’s 28-year career at the bank was interrupted when he was elected to the House in 1976. He was re-elected last year with 100 percent of the vote. And the largest contribution of the Broyhill Furniture Industries, Inc. PAC ($2,000) went to Republican Representative James T. Broyhill of North Carolina, who before his election to Congress was associated with the family business. He was re-elected with 93 percent of the vote. Barnard and Broyhill attracted plenty of other PAC money, too, because many PACs don’t mind betting on a one-horse race.

Some worry that the increasing clout of PACs in the electoral arena will crowd out individual contributors, making them something of an endangered species. “It does concern me,” says Democrat Wyche Fowler, “that with the growth of PACs there has begun to be a diminishment of individual contributions.” Democrat Elliot Levitas goes one step further. “As a matter of precaution,” he says, “there ought to be some outside limit that any candidate may receive from PACs just so that they are not the only participants in the electoral process.”

That limit, however, is not likely to be imposed. Congress has a vested interest in the current system, and most incumbents don’t want to vote for anything that removes their own built-in edge. Proposals for placing a ceiling on a candidate’s total contributions from PACs have been defeated in the past, and plans for public financing of congressional elections have fared even worse.

As PACs proliferate — and proliferate they surely will — they are not likely to create better government . . . just more expensive government.

Bill Hogan and Diane Kiesel are freelance writers and members of “The City Desk” writers group in Washington, D.C. A version of the article appeared previously in Atlanta magazine.
You see this ad? If you’re reading this, you probably care enough about clean water that it sounds pretty interesting to you. Well, it did to me. I jumped on it. Called up, interviewed, aced my training period, and got the job, canvassing for the Clean Water Action Project.

That’s right, I’m a canvasser, a Clean Water Action Projecter, you might say. Instead, you’re probably saying to yourself, “Who’s a canvasser? What’s a canvasser? And why do you always come around so late?”

Frankly, we work between four and nine in the evenings because that’s when most people get home. We come door to door so we can answer your questions, and help you finish dinner.

But seriously, folks, canvassing is primarily two things — education and fundraising. We alert people to the hottest current water pollution, toxics, clean-up, and prevention issues. We update folks on what the Clean Water program and research staff have accomplished over the years — bills drafted and passed, laws strengthened, citizen coalitions founded, resources safeguarded. And we raise the bucks to allow Clean Water Action to keep on working FULL TIME.

The key to the whole process is face-to-face contact. Personal contact allows more people to participate — more than 90 percent of Americans support clean water goals (according to the polls), but they rarely have a chance to act on their opinions. Canvassing allows thousands of folks every night to meet activists, sign petitions, invest money in a cause they believe in, get involved, and ask questions. Just think of all the times you’ve wanted to talk back to the TV or radio or newspaper. (But don’t take it out on your friendly canvasser, please.)

Where our fundraising function is concerned, some of us think of ourselves as monetary policy consultants, helping you set the level of liquid assets (M-1) in your personal economy. We’re not becoming millionaires at it like some policy consultants. We start at around $7,200 a year, and some of us make close to 10K a year, almost enough to buy a used Dart.

Why, you ask, is a canvasser willing to exist on a subsistence salary? Well, there’s the obvious reason that we like clean drinking water and fishable/swimmable rivers as much or more than the next person. Then there are the not-so-obvious reasons. For this writer, a stand-up comic whose career will be made or broken in those midnight gigs when the audiences are loosened up, one reason is that the hours are so good. Canvassers work from 2:00 to 10:30 p.m. or so, and seldom, if ever, have to make the cost-benefit analysis of whether to miss Johnny Carson tonight or snooze at work tomorrow.

For others, a big attraction is the weather. Canvassers love weather. We live to trudge through your neighborhood, sweat running down our backs, sun staring us in the eye. Temporary blindness is not too high a price to pay for clean drinking water. If sweating is your style, try our Tallahassee office in July. How long can you canvass before ducky under a sprinkler? Some canvassers like rain. There is nothing like being wet and cold in your neighborhood. Still others adore winter canvassing — our Minneapolis office is sometimes known as the “Clean Ice Action Project” — defending the rights of ice canoeers everywhere.

Canvassing has yet another attraction — upward mobility. Field managers, who help train and handle a crew of canvassers, graduate to become canvass directors — hiring, firing, running whole offices, tracking budgets, and so forth. Or they can do internships working with Clean Water’s program staff people: researchers, lobbyists, organizers, writers, and others. Several of these program staffers were canvassers once themselves, and all of them have done at least a few days at the doors.

So everybody at Clean Water knows the two rules of canvassing: “be polite” and “get it in writing.” A canvasser will not say to someone who is “not interested”: “That’s okay, just invite me in and I’ll antagonize you.” As for the writing, we want you to sign not
just the support statement but also a check. A check is safer than cash for us in the field until 9:00 p.m. and it’s also a receipt for you.

But what about you? Who are you? My extensive research (in Washington, DC, and Maryland; Virginia, North Carolina, and Florida; and Iowa and Minnesota) has identified six basic kinds of “doors,” as we affectionately refer to the folks behind the surfaces we knock on.

To begin with, there is the so-called “virgin” door. This is who we were before we answered the ad in the paper. This is the person who recently moved to the area, whose home is new, or who simply hasn’t been home when we’ve come around in years past. These folks we treat gently, letting them know:

Yes, we helped write and pass the Clean Water Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act, the latter passed after tests showed literally hundreds of toxic chemicals combining into unhealthy compounds in the drinking water of New Orleans, Louisiana, last stop on the Mississippi River; we helped stop the dumping of radioactive wastes from Three Mile Island into the Susquehanna River and Chesapeake Bay, which support 10 percent of the economies of Maryland and Virginia, and yes, we work with the League of Conservation Voters, an affiliated organization that publishes congressional voting records on environmental issues, then canvasses door-to-door to inform the public, raise funds, and get out the vote. Together we’ve built important coalitions with voters in Durham, North Carolina, and Tampa, Orlando, and Daytona Beach, Florida. We’re working on drinking water and sewage treatment and toxic dumps and all kinds of problems that are worrying you. We’ve written up in the Minneapolis Star-Tribune and the New York Times, not to mention the Washington Post, which has comics. Let us continue to work on these issues FULL TIME. About that contribution, we’re asking people to come as close to a dollar a month for the year as they can. We want to save you money: the Safe Drinking Water Act will be renewed and strengthened to make the polluters pay to protect the clean groundwater resources of all, and the billion-dollar Tennessee-Tombigbee Canal won’t be built with taxpayers’ dollars. And you’ll be able to take as much credit for it as anybody. So help us out at the door, and save yourself the price of gas every month, bringing the dollar into our office, or the extra $2.20 in stamps plus envelopes. A good box of envelopes has got to run you at least 75 cents.

The next group of people commonly refer to themselves as “not interested,” “not tonight,” “I’m washing the sink,” or “I’m watching Tic-Tac-Dough.” These people we simply ask to read the statement of Clean Water goals and to ask any questions they might have. Thinking is not required, but we feel it’s healthy.

The door we’re least fond of, coincidentally enough, is the door that is least fond of us. This is the slammed door. Since this is a family publication, we can’t print what we call them, but often it is an extended play on what we’ve just been called. A canvasser learns to deal with rejection, and is ennobled in the process.

One of the most challenging doors we face is the person who says, “I gave last year and nothing happened.” You’re the kind of folks we call “feisty.” To this person, we say:

A common mistake — simply because
we work so hard with bureaucrats and politicians does not mean we ourselves do nothing. Last year, for instance, we testified before the U.S. House water resource subcommittee; got Maryland governor Harry Hughes to budget an additional $203,000 for hazardous waste management; testified in favor of down-zoning western Fairfax County, Virginia, to protect the Occoquan drinking water reservoir from runoff pollution; helped push through some strengthening amendments to the Clean Water Act; and opened new offices in Virginia and Florida, among other things. No, it's not that nothing happened; it's just that we haven't been to your door for a whole year, and nobody else is keeping you up to date on these things. Get our newsletter. You'll stay up to date on the issues, and next year you can tell us what happened.

A similar type of door is the person who remembers us from last year and wants to know what's going on this year. To this person we recommend our newsletter. We say, “It keeps you up to date on the issues, gives you something tangible for your support, and also helps us that much more. Your generosity is appreciated. You also get to read some semi-humorous prose like this. You don't have to laugh; but if you do there's no extra charge.” We call you “concerned.”

Last but never least are the wonderful people who, as soon as we mention, “Clean Water Action...”, leap forward to say, “Yes, come on in. I'll get my checkbook. How much is your newsletter this year? Isn't there a book that comes with that? I'm really glad you're out there doing this work.” Thank you. We call you “friends.”

Jay Hepner has just completed his “First National Tour,” singing and playing original songs door-to-door with his guitar, asking a dollar a song, or three for two dollars. He returned to Clean Water Action in January 1984. Parts of this article previously appeared in the Clean Water Action News.

There are many microcomputers on the market, including the Apple, the Kaypro, and the IBM Personal Computer. For a purchase price of about $2,000 to $3,000 you get the computer with the basic programs needed for the applications described here. Since there are already about one million microcomputers in American homes, even a low-budget campaign should be able to find someone willing to put theirs to service in an election.

There are limits to the capabilities of microcomputers. They generally can be used best in small-scale campaigns because they can store only limited amounts of information, but any list that has more than a dozen names can be handled more efficiently on a machine than by hand.

Here are some of the ways a microcomputer was used in the Michaux campaign and others. All applications require a low level of skill and anyone who has studied a basic user's manual or had a few lessons should be able to perform them fairly easily.

**Fundraising:** A microcomputer can eliminate the need for “Dear Friend” letters. A fundraising letter is first typed into the computer. Corrections can be made before it is printed out. The names and addresses of possible contributors are also typed. With simple instructions, the computer will print personalized letters, inserting a different name and address each time. Personalized letters bring in more contributions.

**Mailing Lists:** Because editing and revising can be performed simply on a computer, mailing lists can be kept up to date for a variety of needs besides fundraising. The computer can sort the lists by zip codes so that bulk mailings can be done faster. This is important in a close campaign, where staying in touch with voters is critical.

**Targeting Votes:** A list of registered voters — with information such as race, party, and responses to questionnaires or surveys — is typed into the computer, which can then print a list answering basic questions such as: Which voters are black? Which precincts have a history of voting for progressive issues? It can also answer more elaborate questions such as: If 20 percent more voters were registered in the fifth precinct, how would this affect our chances of winning? Organizers can use this information to determine where to concentrate their
efforts. The results can also boost motivation for campaign workers. Instead of blindly pounding the pavement, canvassers can be told, “We need 200 more votes in this precinct. Here’s a list of possible voters.”

_Election Day Targeting:_ As soon as information about the number of votes cast in various precincts becomes available, it can be typed into the computer. This information can be compared to known statistics about the precinct’s voting history. Organizers can then determine where to concentrate last-minute efforts to get out the vote.

_Surveys and Polls:_ The computer makes surveys and polls on voter attitudes more efficient and cost-effective. Surveyors can have the answers to their questionnaires fed directly to the computer. The results are produced almost immediately. (When done by hand this process is painstaking and not always accurate.) The results can be used to decide what issues to stress in a campaign or to whom direct mail should be sent. Polls can also “legitimize” specific issues: “Our studies show that 85 percent of people in the county are concerned about chemical wastes.”

The key issue in the use of microcomputers, says O’Reilly, is whether people are willing to invest their time and money in the technology:

_The microcomputer is a real valuable tool. But it’s a thing. It can’t do_ anything without someone to make it work. Microcomputers are a combination of hardware, software (the programs), and politically active people willing to give the time to get some mastery of it. It’s critically important in applying computers in politics, and in any other areas, not to approach the situation with preconceived ideas about what can be done. And not to treat computers as peripheral mechanical items. With imagination and experimentation, important and unforeseen new ideas can be developed. That’s the secret potential of micros; because they are becoming so cheap, one can weave them into new places and applications that can have a big impact — if we are open to the possibilities and are willing to try new things.

Reams and reams of neatly printed paper can be dangerously impressive, but Jesse Helms’s conservative juggernaut, the Congressional Club, is built on computer mailing lists and computer technology. A lot of progressives see technology as anti-political. They think of computers as distant cousins to nuclear reactors and MX missiles. That’s simply fatuous.

Phaye Poliakoff is a freelance writer living in Durham. Special thanks to Kim Blankenship and Jim O’Reilly for assistance in preparing this article.

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**TAX LAWS**

Section 501(c)(3) organizations: First, any organization that can receive tax-deductible contributions under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code is prohibited from attempting to influence elections: it cannot directly or indirectly support or oppose any federal, state, or local candidate for any elective office. However, (c)(3) organizations may devote a portion of their resources to lobbying (up to percentage limits based on total expenditures) or may engage in voter registration and voter education activities if they are strictly “nonpartisan.”

The line between non-partisan and electoral activities is less than clear, but generally any implication that an organization supports or opposes a particular candidate or party is considered electoral.* Even “educational” activities such as publishing the voting records or issue positions of candidates,
especially near election time, with a hint that the organization views some votes or positions more favorably than others, can be deemed electoral and therefore jeopardize (c)(3) status.

Voter registration drives, candidate forums or debates, publication of candidate positions, or other activities that could affect elections must be executed carefully to avoid suggesting that the organization favors one candidate over another. For example, in a voter registration campaign sponsored by a (c)(3) organization, staffers and volunteers should not wear buttons supporting a candidate or party or attacking “Reaganomics.”

Also, employees, board members, and others closely connected with a (c)(3) may voluntarily participate in a political campaign, just as any other individual can; but be certain that their personal efforts for or against candidates are not paid for by the organization (for example, by its phones, copy machine, or payroll). If a (c)(3) employee wishes to work as a volunteer in his or her spare time for a candidate or an electoral organization, a formal leave of absence from the organization may be advisable, especially if many hours are involved or the employee is highly visible.

Other tax-exempt organizations: Tax-exempt organizations under Section 501(c)(5) (labor unions) or Section 501(c)(4) (advocacy or social welfare groups) are permitted to take electoral positions so long as such activity does not constitute the organization’s primary activity. In addition to direct lobbying, a (c)(4) membership organization can use its dues money or other funds to communicate its electoral positions to its bona fide members; that includes using letters, publications, canvassing, and phone calls to urge its members to vote for or against a particular federal candidate. But when the organization reaches beyond its membership with its electoral positions — for example, through mailings, canvassing, or radio ads — it must do so only with PAC funds, as described below.

FECA
Organizations which engage in overt electoral activities — advocating the election or defeat of federal candidates or providing financial support to them — are known as political action committees (PACs) and must register and file detailed reports with the Federal Election Commission (FEC). A PAC may be tax-exempt under Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, but money it spends outside its electoral purposes is taxable.

FECA establishes a complex set of rules and regulations governing basic PAC activities such as solicitation of funds, limitations on contributions and expenditures, and reporting requirements. Several distinctions among PACs are very important:

Independent vs. Connected: An independent PAC is a free-standing entity; it is not controlled or supported by any other organization or corporation, and it may solicit funds from anyone. A connected PAC, by contrast, is controlled by another entity — such as a labor union, a (c)(4) advocacy organization, or a business corporation — and generally must limit its solicitations to the members (or shareholders) of its connected organization. The connected organization can pay the PAC’s administrative and fundraising expenses, but cannot otherwise contribute to it.

Multi-candidate PACs: A PAC, connected or independent, qualifies for multi-candidate status if it has had more than 50 contributors, supported more than four federal candidates, and been registered with the FEC for at least six months.

Contribution Limits: A multi-candidate PAC may contribute up to $5,000 per federal candidate per election (primary and general elections are considered separate elections); other PACs are limited to $1,000 per candidate per election. Individuals, who may contribute only $1,000 per candidate per election, may contribute up to $5,000 per calendar year to any PAC. (Both types of PACs may contribute $5,000 per calendar year to other PACs.)

Contributions vs. Independent Expenditures: A contribution generally is defined as anything of value, other than a volunteer’s time, given or loaned to a candidate. Contributions may be cash or “in-kind” services, such as printing (which must be valued at the market price the candidate would have paid to purchase them). The total value of contributions must not exceed the limits stated in the preceding paragraph.

Independent expenditures are electoral expenditures not approved or requested by, or otherwise coordinated with, a candidate or a candidate’s campaign organization. They are subject to no dollar limitations. Thus a PAC may devote unlimited resources to urge people to support (or oppose) a candidate, if it carefully avoids formal or informal coordination with the candidate.

Corporations vs. Unincorporated Organizations. Other than PACs, FECA generally prohibits corporations — for-profit and nonprofit — from making electoral expenditures, with limited exceptions such as membership communications or paying the administrative and fundraising expenses of their connected PACs. An unincorporated, all-volunteer effort is generally not subject to IRS or FEC.
regulation in how its volunteer members spend their time.

The main reason to incorporate, however, has nothing to do with the tax or election laws - it is to protect the people involved in an organization from being held personally responsible for the organization's debts and obligations. Usually, this protection is so important, and the cost of incorporating is so low, that it would be unwise not to incorporate.

CONCLUSION

The tax and FECA rules summarized here explain only some of the laws' basic components. There are numerous gray areas and highly technical exceptions and definitions not mentioned. In addition, there are state election and charitable solicitation laws. But with some help from a knowledgeable lawyer and, perhaps equally important, a friendly organization already involved in electoral activity, an effective operation can be organized quickly and relatively inexpensively.

Any organization considering political involvement should send for the Federal Election Commission's "Campaign Guide for Corporations and Labor Organizations" (call the FEC at 800-424-9530). There is no comparable helpful IRS publication.

Two handy publications designed for 501(c)(3) organizations offer additional insights on what they can and cannot do under the law:

- "Lobbying and Political Activity for Nonprofits," available from the Children's Defense Fund, 122 C Street, NW, Washington, DC 20001; and
- "Do's and Don'ts of Public Affairs Activities During an Election Campaign," by Planned Parenthood, 810 Seventh Avenue, New York, NY 10019.

Thomas Asher is a Washington, DC, attorney who represents progressive organizations, including Citizen Action, SANE, Nine to Five, Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition, Center for Defense Information, and Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy.

American Politics or Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. The Almanac, published every other year, includes the ratings of 10 groups and also chooses 15 key votes itself, designed to show how each member voted on major issues of current interest. And CQ does an annual listing of ratings by eight organizations, some of them different from the Almanac's. Rather than try to rate members of Congress yourself, you'll probably find everything you need to know from these sources.

Knowing what your state legislators are up to is another matter. Doing a rating is a time-consuming chore, and most state-level groups don't have - or don't think they have - the resources to do one. But state legislatures are important; they make decisions that affect as many aspects of life as Congress does. They may not have the power to send aid to El Salvador, deregulate natural gas, build a dam or a breeder reactor, or vote money for nuclear war. But they can raise your insurance rates, charge a sales tax on food, kill the ERA, spend your money on highways instead of day care, or build prisons instead of schools. What they do affects you every day.

How do you choose which votes will tell you who is and isn't on your side? First you must determine what legislation is important to your group; probably there are measures you'd like to pass and measures you'd like to kill. Then you must figure out which record votes are the best indicators of a legislator's position on the measures. This is the critical step - and the hardest to get right, because politicians can be sneaky about putting their real sentiments on the record.

The vote on final passage of a bill is rarely the one that tells you which legislators were there when you needed them most. By then the fate of the bill is usually known, and if either side is winning by a wide margin, several legislators may switch sides, depending on how they want their constituents to think they voted.

Typically, you will find the real test of a lawmaker's position is his or her vote on a procedural motion or a floor amendment to the bill.

For example, say you are opposed to a newly introduced bill that will seriously weaken the state attorney general's consumer protection powers. It is late in the session, and a new bill
can't be voted on unless two-thirds of the members vote to suspend the rules. They do, and the bill eventually passes by a small majority. That vote to suspend the rules is what killed you, and that's the one to pick.

Or let's say you want to pass a bill giving the attorney general strong consumer protection powers. It eventually passes, but not before the business lobby has eaten away at it with amendments, leaving an empty shell that tells the attorney general to protect consumers but doesn't give him or her the power to do it. You pick the votes on the most damaging amendments.

If you've been at the capitol all along lobbying for your cause, you'll know which votes were the critical ones - and you'll know which legislators gave strong support and which simply voted correctly. If you haven't been at the capitol, you must talk to people who were there, both lobbyists and friendly legislators. You'll never figure out what went on just by reading the legislative journals or daily press.

Once you've picked the votes, you can draw up a chart listing how each member's stand matches your view of the correct vote - positive, negative, or absent. You can then compute each legislator's percentage of correct votes to give her or his rating: nine votes that match your positions out of 14 in the sample yield a rating of 64. Come the next election, you won't have to take the incumbent's word for how she or he represents you; you'll have facts.

Linda Rocawich is a staff member of the Institute for Southern Studies.

approach which provides a yardstick to evaluate progress and which aids the strategic use of resources (people, money, services) when and where they are most needed.

- Action translates this planning into pressure by involving people in the most influential ways possible and at the most crucial times. Action serves to create pressure on the opposition and to build your organization by involving people in applying pressure.

- Resources make the campaign. Besides money, resources include people, skills, and "in-kind" contributions (such as the use of a computer).

- Timing is determined by questions such as: When are we strongest? When are they weakest? How can we make these two conditions happen at the same time?

- Strengths and weaknesses of both your campaign and the opposition need to be assessed. An open, honest evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of your campaign should be conducted before, during, and after it is finished. The analysis of the opposition's strengths and weaknesses

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**Tactical and Strategic Research**

BY BARRY GREEVER

STRATEGIC RESEARCH

Strategic research enables an organization to plan a strategy and evaluate the use of timing, action, and resources so it can focus its maximum strength against the weakness of the opposition. This definition holds true for a community struggling to prevent its destruction as well as for organizers in an electoral campaign.

Strategic research applies to an electoral setting in at least two specific arenas: when a candidate is running for any office and when citizens are organizing to have legislation passed or killed.

A strategy for elections and legislation includes several elements:

- **A plan** is an orderly, methodical

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SOUTHERN EXPOSURE 111
is conducted by asking questions such as: Where are they vulnerable? Can we throw their timing off? Is there a way we can force them to use their strengths at the wrong time for them and the right time for us?

Strategic research might answer the following questions for organizations making decisions during an election. The campaign staff will want to ask these questions of both their candidate and the opposition’s. In the process of answering these questions, intelligence is gathered by taking pieces of information, looking for patterns, and putting them together in order to know what needs to be known.

- Which candidate will help build the organization’s membership, funds, resources, and media coverage?
- Which candidate will build credibility for the organization?
- Which candidate offers the organization a victory?
- Which candidate will deliver on promises after the victory?
- Which candidate will have the most positive impact on organization members (as opposed to the public at large)?
- Which candidate will acknowledge the organization’s work while she or he is in office?
- If the candidate ran in previous elections, where did his or her campaign contributions come from?
- If the candidate has been in office, what was the impact of her or his past legislation or activities?
- What do power blocs of all political persuasions (chamber of commerce, labor unions, minorities, etc.) think of the candidate?

TACTICAL RESEARCH

Research has the responsibility not only of assessing candidates but also of keeping them honest after they are elected. Tactics involve specific applications of resources (people, money, staff, meetings, actions) to strengthen your position at a particular point in an overall strategy. The strategy determines which tactics — including the use of research as a tactic — should be used, and when and where to apply them in an electoral or community campaign.

Research as a tactic generates pressure by producing information which is either politically, socially, or legally embarrassing to the opposition; or which bolsters your position. This information can be used behind the scenes or publicly and usually carries with it the threat of exposing some embarrassing economic or political relationship, or facts which the opposition would rather not see publicized.

Borrowing from theology (sins of commission and omission), tactical research looks for two types of patterns: commission (what the opposition does do) and omission (what they don’t do).

Patterns of commission useful in an electoral setting might be:

- Contributions from outside the district. In one campaign, for example, 60 to 70 percent of the contributions came from outside the state in which the candidate ran. The money was given due to his membership on a very powerful congressional committee.
- Many contributions coming in after the elections. This is not illegal nor necessarily politically embarrassing, but it certainly raises the question, “Is there a purpose? Why did contributors send money after the election?”
- Contributions from specific economic and/or political interests. When most of the money comes from a very few political and/or economic interests, it answers the question, “Who has the candidate’s attention?” It can also answer the question, “Who owns the candidate?”

Some patterns of omission might be:

- Reports of campaign contributions not filled out fully as required by law. All too often the practice is to give only the name and address of the contributor and the amount of the contribution. Sometimes the cumulative contributions as of the date of the report are given. Usually the law also requires the address of a contributing business and a description of its principal activity. This information is required in federal elections, and states are increasingly adopting the federal requirements.
- Reports not filed in legally mandated locations. Federal elections, for example, require forms to be filled out in each state where expenses have been incurred. This doesn’t usually happen, and, if revealed, this information can be politically embarrassing to the candidate.

Research is time-consuming, and requires early planning. Often it must be initiated even before the decision has been made to become involved in a campaign. It also requires resources during the frenetic days of the campaign, as well as access to the candidate and/or the strategy committee, and to other skills. But well-executed research increases the chances of winning.

CASE STUDY: RESEARCH AND TAX REFORM

Several years ago, Ralph Nader’s Tax Reform Group worked out a research methodology which analyzed the campaign contributions of and legislation introduced by former U.S. Representative Wilbur Mills, a one-time candidate for president of the United States. The research was part of an overall strategy to win tax reform in the House Ways and Means Committee, which Mills chaired for many years. If the strategy failed to achieve tax reform, we hoped it would at least begin to chip away at Mills’s power over the committee.

By studying Mills’s campaign reporting forms, it was possible to determine the economic interests of the contributors to his election campaigns. We then applied the same analysis to legislation Mills had either sponsored or co-sponsored in Congress. We found a high correlation between dairy interest contributions and legislation Mills supported. This made an effective report released through the media in Mills’s home district in Arkansas. We made a strategic decision to release our findings where he would be politically more accountable rather than in the politically protected environment of Washington. The report became one element of a major scandal around Mills and dairy money.

The research found other patterns: Mills had not filed reports in the right ways or in all the states required by law. Our report charged “campaign reporting irregularities and a special relationship between the dairy interests and Mills.” The words were carefully chosen. We did not charge any illegal actions, just “irregularities.” You can build a political case against an official whether she or he has done anything illegal or not. The case against Mills was basically not a legal case, though there were technical violations of the campaign reporting laws. We demonstrated a relationship between Mills and the dairy industry that was politically embarrassing to Mills. Media coverage of the ensuing scandal was international.
As part of our strategy we then moved on to the next ranking member of the Ways and Means Committee, Al Ullman of Oregon. We decided not to focus on him because the distance to Oregon and the scattered population of his district would have required a level of resources we couldn't commit. So we focused on the third-ranking member, Joel T. Broyhill, a Virginia congressman for many years.

The research we conducted around Broyhill was an improvement over the Mills effort in two important ways. First, the methodology was expanded to include economic interests Broyhill had personally acquired (mostly in real estate). Second, the report was released two weeks before Broyhill was expected to be easily re-elected. This element of timing was crucial. Releasing the report in the heat of the campaign made the difference in Broyhill's defeat. He attributed his loss to the report — which he called a smear.

RESEARCH SOURCES

Several general manuals are available which provide a good guide to research methods and sources. The NACLA Research Guide (North American Congress on Latin America, 151 W. 19th St., New York, NY 10011, $5.00), and one by the Institute for Social Justice (4415 San Jacinto, Dallas, TX 75204, $3.50) are just two examples. There are also research and organizing manuals focusing on specific issues: the Center for Community Change (1000 Wisconsin Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20007) has published several, including Citizen Monitoring: A How-To Manual ($3.50). People still seem to find my "Tactical Investigations for People's Struggles" helpful, even though it was written years ago.

The following are some of the more common sources used in the electoral arena. Use them creatively. For example, if you find that a candidate sits on the board of a hospital and also owns a factory with a high accident rate, that candidate has a weakness you can exploit.

Ethics Statements are called by different names in different states, but usually are referred to by this term. These list income from outside sources such as dividends from stock, consulting fees, income from speaking engagements, and sales commissions, and they are useful for finding economic relationships. Not all cities require ethics statements, but they are consistently available on the state level. Local officials are usually required to file them somewhere in city hall, and state officials often file them at the office of the secretary of state. To track the statements down on the local level, try asking the city clerk; on the state level, try asking the state librarian.

Statements of Extra-Judicial Income provide the same information as ethics statements, but for federal judges. Copies are filed with the clerk of the court for each court jurisdiction.

Campaign Reporting Forms are found locally in the office of the elections bureau (also called the board of elections). Forms for state elections are usually filed in the secretary of state's office or with the state board of elections. These forms also give the expense records of campaigns.

The Federal Elections Commission (FEC) monitors federal election laws. It has reports on all contributions to candidates for federal office. FEC publications list contributions by source and by recipient. All reports relating to federal campaign finance since 1972 are available for public inspection and copying. FEC's toll-free number is (800) 424-9530. Write for publications to FEC, 1325 K St., NW, Washington, DC 20463.

Tax Records show how much property a person owns, who owns a particular piece of property, the assessed value of the property, improvements on the property, and delinquent taxes. These records are available in municipal or county courthouses and at the tax supervisor or assessor's office.

Court Records tell you if a person was ever arrested, sued, or had judgments brought against him or her. You can also find out from these records if that person has ever had anyone else arrested or has sued anyone.

Minutes of Meetings of all public city agencies, such as the city council and the board of education, are public information. You can determine how a person voted on a particular issue.

City Directories list individuals by their addresses as well as by name. They also give their occupations, places of business, and other people living in their households. Directories are useful for a number of purposes, including getting more information on contributors.

Standard and Poor's Registry of Executives and Directors tells who sits on the boards of directors of various companies. This is useful for tracking down a candidate's contributors or officeholder's economic relationships and charitable involvements (boards of hospitals, foundations, service organizations, etc.). This should be available at public and university libraries.

Who's Who directories exist for almost every vocation, location, and minority. These are useful for learning a person's biographical data, corporate involvements, and past political relationships. Klein's Guide to American Directories will lead you to the right source.

Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory has special value, since many candidates and lobbyists are lawyers. It gives information on all lawyers and most law firms in the country, including biographical data and a partial listing of corporate clients. This directory will often give information on the financial worth of a firm or lawyer, and a rating of his or her legal ability.

Barry Greever has been an organizer and researcher for many years. He has worked with Ralph Nader's Tax Reform Group and the Carolina Community Project. He recently began working as a staff member of the Appalachian Alliance.

SOUTHERN EXPOSURE | 113
RESOURCES

GENERAL LITERATURE

Almanac of American Politics, by Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa; in addition to giving succinct biographies and voting records of every member of Congress, the Almanac summarizes the ratings assigned to each by a number of interest groups. Order from National Journal (see address below), $16.95.


Ballot Initiatives: History, Research, and Analysis of Recent Initiative and Referendum Campaigns, by David D. Schmidt. This is an Initiative News Report special report (Capitol Publications, 1983).

Bankrolling Ballots Update 1980: The Role of Business in Financing


Black Elected Officials and their Constituences, by Thomas Cavanagh and Denise Stockton (Washington: Joint Center for Political Studies, 1983), $4.95.


Citizen Involvement in the Local Budget Process. Order from the Center for Community Change, 1000 Wisconsin Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20007. $2.50.

Citizen Monitoring: A How-To Manual from the Center for Community Change, 1000 Wisconsin Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20007. $3.50.


Congressional Quarterly, Order from Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1414 22nd St., NW, Washington, DC 20037. $726/year.


Democratic Fact Book: Issues for 1982. This is available from Democrats for the '80s, 3038 N St., NW, Washington, DC 20007. $10.


How to Use Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, by Barbara Phillips (Washington: Joint Center for Political Studies, 1983). $4.95.


"Left with the Ballot Box," by Heather Booth, in Working Papers (May/June, 1980).

The Making of a Black Mayor, by John Dean (Washington: Joint Center for Political Studies, 1973), $2.50.

National Civic Review, published by the National Municipal League, 55 W. 44th St., NY, NY 10036. Monthly, $25/year for subscription and membership in the NML.


Thunder on the Right: The "New Right" and the Politics of Resentment, by Alan Crawford (New York: Pan-
The Center for Community Change
1000 Wisconsin Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20007
(202) 338-3565
The Center has a number of publications on a wide variety of organizing subjects. It publishes The Monitor newsletter, which analyzes federal legislation and policy from the perspective of community organizations and their needs, and contains information on what local groups are doing in their communities. Six issues a year; $25 (institutions), $15 (individuals and nonprofit organizations), and $5 (individuals and nonprofit organizations on limited budgets). Write for a free publications list.

The Center for the American Woman and Politics
Eagleton Institute, Rutgers University
New Brunswick, NJ 08901
(201) 828-2210
This is a research and education center established in 1971 to develop a body of knowledge about women’s participation in American public life and to assist in efforts to increase women’s contributions to the political process.

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MAIL TO: Campaigns & Elections, Box 807, 1621 Brookside Road, McLean, VA 22101 or CALL (703) 534-7774 for a free brochure.
CQ publishes Congressional Quarterly, an exhaustive publication on activities in Congress, and a number of other publications; write for a list.

Democracy Project
145 E. 49th St., 9D
New York, NY 10017
(212) 308-0707
The Democracy Project is a nonprofit educational institute that critiques conservative policies and develops alternatives, mainly in four areas - economic democracy, citizen access to government, health/safety regulation, and crime.

The Joint Center for Political Studies
1301 Pennsylvania Ave.
Suite 400
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 626-3500
The JCPS is a national, nonprofit, tax-exempt institution that conducts research on public policy issues of special concern to black Americans and promotes informed, effective involvement of blacks in the governmental process. Focus is the monthly newsletter of JCPS. $12/year.

League of Women Voters
1730 M St., NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 429-1965
The LWV-US and the LWV Education Fund together engage in a great number of programs, including both education work on candidates and lobbying on specific issues chosen biennially. Write for a free list of their extensive and valuable publications.

National Black United Front
415 Atlantic Avenue
Brooklyn, New York 11217
(212) 586-1991; 625-8292; 638-0811
NBUF is a mass-based, activist, progressive movement that focuses on conditions facing the black community nationally and internationally.

National Committee for an Effective Congress
505 C St., NE
Washington, DC 20002
(202) 547-1151
NCEC was founded in 1948 to counteract the influence of special interest contributions on federal elections. By pooling individual contributions and targeting races, NCEC has a significant impact on congressional elections.

National Council of La Raza
1725 Eye St., NW
Washington, DC 20006
NCLR publishes agenda: A Journal of Hispanic Issues bimonthly, at $15/year. It also provides technical assistance, advocacy, research, model legislation, and information to its formal constituency of 140 community-based Hispanic organizations and to the general public.

People for the American Way
1015 18th St., NW
Suite 300
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 822-9450
North Carolina Office:
310 East 3rd St.
Winston-Salem, NC 27101
(919) 721-1931
This group monitors right-wing activities and is a nonprofit educational group dedicated to the preservation of our Constitutional rights and liberties.

The Project for Investigative Reporting
on Money in Politics
2004 National Press Building, 12th Floor
Washington, DC 20045
(202) 544-1141
The project provides grants to journalists who wish to undertake investigative reporting on the role and influence of money in American politics at state, national, and local levels.

Public Citizen Congress Watch
215 Pennsylvania Ave., SE
Washington, DC 20003
One of the Nader organizations, Congress Watch publishes The Congress Watcher. Bimonthly, $8/year.

SANEPac
711 G St., SE
Washington, DC 20003
(202) 546-7100
SANEPac is the political action committee of SAN, a national organization which works to "develop public support for a policy which will lead away from war and towards peace with justice." Its Rapid Response Network consists of 10,000 grassroots activists organized into phone trees in at least 350 congressional districts.

VOTER REGISTRATION & VOTING RIGHTS LITERATURE


"The Voting Rights Act: What It Means, How to Make It Work for You," published by the American Civil Liberties Union. Free from the ACLU, Public Information and Education Department, 132 West 43rd St., NY, NY 10036.

VOTER REGISTRATION & VOTING RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS

American Civil Liberties Union
132 West 32nd St.
New York, NY 10003
(212) 944-9800
Southern Office:
52 Fairfiled St., NW
Atlanta, GA 30303
(404) 523-2721
The ACLU specializes in civil liberties law, and is deeply involved in voter discrimination issues. Contact the national office to locate your local and/or state affiliates.

Center for Constitutional Rights
853 Broadway
New York, NY 10003
(212) 674-3303
CCR focuses on constitutional issues, including discrimination.

Human SERVE Fund
1515 Broadway (41st Floor)
New York, NY 10036
(212) 921-3540
The Human Services Employees Registration, Voting, and Education Fund was formed to help mobilize a national voter registration movement by human service workers and agencies.

Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights
733 15th St., NW
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 628-6700
The Lawyers Committee covers all aspects of racial discrimination law, and has a number of local and regional offices.

Legal Defense Fund
10 Columbus Circle
New York, NY 10026
(212) 586-8397
Previously affiliated with the NAACP, LDF has the largest legal staff of any civil rights organization and concentrates on all aspects of racial discrimination law.

Legal Services Corporation
733 15th St., NW
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 272-4000
If you are poor or unemployed, you may be eligible for free legal assistance on voting rights matters from a local legal service organization. Look in your phone book or call the national office.

Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund
28 Geary St.
San Francisco, CA 94108
(415) 981-5800
MALDEF specializes in discrimination law, and has offices in the Midwest, Southwest, and West.

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
186 Remsen St.
Brooklyn, NY 11201
(212) 858-0800
Southern Office:
970 Martin Luther King
Atlanta, GA 30314
(404) 688-8868
The NAACP specializes in racial discrimination law, and has state and local chapters throughout the U.S.

National Coalition on Black Participation, Inc.
1301 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Suite 400
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 626-3500

The National Coalition on Black Participation, Inc. is a national nonprofit tax-exempt membership organization. Founded in 1976, the National Coalition conducts voter education programs and works through its membership and with local communities to increase black participation in the electoral process. Operation Big Vote is a program of the National Coalition.

Native American Rights Fund
1506 Broadway
Boulder, CO 80302
(303) 447-8760
The Fund represents indigent Native Americans exclusively, and has offices in the West and Southwest.

Project VOTE!
1200 15th St., NW
Suite 201
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 293-3933
Project VOTE! is a nonpartisan organization working with a broad spectrum of national and local groups to initiate and coordinate campaigns to register low-income and unemployed voters using traditional and innovative strategies.

Rural Voter Project
1900 M St., NW

The National Women's Political Caucus has been dedicated to the election and appointment of qualified women to public life. We have had many successes, but our work is not complete: only 24 members of Congress are women, and 13 percent of state legislators are women, and women represent less than 7 percent of the federal judiciary.

As the only national membership organization exclusively dedicated to the election and appointment of qualified women to political office, we know that more women in government will ultimately mean a better America for everyone.

From the county to the capital, the state house to the White House, our winning streak has just begun.

National Women's Political Caucus

Yes! I want to help put women in their place. Please enroll me as a:

- GOVERNING MEMBER .................. $35.00
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- ASSOCIATE MEMBER ................... $20.00
  Covers national NWPC membership and a subscription to the Women's Political Times.

Enclosed find an additional contribution to help NWPC strengthen its programs.
Amount of contribution: $

TOTAL AMOUNT ENCLOSED: $

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MAKE CHECKS PAYABLE TO:
National Women's Political Caucus
1411 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005

SOUTHERN EXPOSURE | 117
The VEP assists local groups in 11 Southern states with voter registration and education activities, including research, training, and technical and financial assistance (see article on p. 41).

CAMPAIGN & TRAINING LITERATURE


Campaign Manual, Order from the Democratic National Committee. $5.

Campaign Workbook, by the National Women's Education Fund. Provides basic how-to information for all types of campaigns. $25 ($18 each in bulk).


"Defending State Prevailing Wage Laws" describes grassroots lobbying and offers suggestions on media relations, Order from Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO. $2.50.


"Election Financing" capitalizes profiles of corporate PACs and tells how unions can obtain financing for their PACs. Order from the Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO. First 25 free (10 cents each in bulk).


From Obscurity to Oblivion: Running in the Congressional Primary, by Louis Sandy Maisel (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1982). $6.95.


"Grass Roots Lobbying" gives techniques for successful lobbying on the local level. Order from the Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO. First 10 free (50 cents each in bulk).

The Green Vote Handbook, by Rob Kutler (San Francisco: The Sierra Club, 1982). $1.50 ($1 each for 10 or more).

How to Run a School Board Campaign — and Win, by C. Schwartz. Campaign strategies plus the nuts and bolts of publicity, fundraising, and getting out the vote. Order from the National Committee for Citizens in Education, 410 Wilde Lake Village Green, Columbia, MD 21044. $5.95.

In Order to Win..., National Conservative Political Action Committee, 1911 North Fort Meyer Drive, Suite 706, Arlington, VA 22209. This is a manual for a state legislative campaign.


Lobbying on a Shoe String, by Judith Meredith and Linda Myer, available from Massachusetts Poverty Law Center, 2 Park Row, Boston, MA 02116. $6.95.


The Political Woman's Handbook, by Suzanne Paizis (Sacramento, CA: Creative Editions), P.O. Box 22246, Sacramento, California 95822. $5.95.

Politics: A Practical Handbook, by the American Association of University Women, Livermore-Pleasanton Branch, P.O. Box 661, Livermore, California 94550. $1.25.


CAMPAIGN & TRAINING ORGANIZATIONS

The Baltimore Information Coop 1443 Gorsuch Ave., Baltimore, MD 21218 (301) 338-7626

The Coop has information for sale on the use of computers in campaigns, including programs for precinct targeting and other uses.

Citizens' Leadership Foundation 600 W. Fullerton Chicago, IL 60614 (312) 975-3890

CLF provides training and technical assistance to the leaders and members of issues organizations to raise their levels of electoral involvement. It also sponsors a program to educate, register, and encourage citizens to vote.

Democratic National Committee 1625 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, DC 20036

National Women's Education Fund 1410 Q St., NW Washington, DC 20009 (202) 462-8606

The National Women's Education Fund is a nonpartisan national training and information service for women and public leadership. Its goals are to teach women to gain access to the public policy process, to earn positions of influence within that process, and to develop and use the skills and resources necessary to lead effectively. NWEF conducts seminars and one-day training workshops and has a wide variety of written and audio-visual training materials.

National Women's Political Caucus 1411 K St., NW, 11th Floor Washington, DC 20005 (202) 347-4456

The NWPC was organized to work for women's equal political participation. It encourages and assists women candidates for public office through its Campaign Support Committee. In addition, NWPC staff and members lobby on the local, state, and national levels about issues of importance to women.

Republican National Committee 310 1st St., SE Washington, DC 20003

The Women's Campaign Fund 1521 New Hampshire Ave., NW Washington, DC 20036 (202) 332-1000

The Women's Campaign Fund is a bipartisan organization that provides assistance to women candidates for office. The organization focuses on national races, allocating the bulk of its resources to campaigns for the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. Candidates receiving financial assistance are selected from among women with progressive stands on issues affecting the quality of life and human needs, and with the ability to conduct a vigorous, professional campaign with a realistic chance of winning.
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Reclaiming the New South

by Henry Wallace

Henry Wallace, a white Progressive Party candidate for the American presidency in 1948 (see article on p. 94), spoke out with unprecedented fervor against segregation, Jim Crowism, and black disfranchisement. His populist philosophy and ideals and the substance of his speeches delivered across the nation during his campaign tour made him the target of harassments like red baiting and cross burnings.

On August 29, 1948, Wallace addressed members of the Progressive Party in Richmond, Virginia, protesting segregation and poll taxes and the Dixiecrats and “Trumancrats” who perpetuated them. The Dixiecrats were white Southerners who bolted the Democratic Party when Truman ran for president, considering him far too liberal. The Dixiecrat candidate for president, Strom Thurmond, ended up with 1,169,021 votes, almost all from the South, and 38 electoral votes. Wallace got 1,157,172 votes, mostly from outside the South, and no electoral votes. The following is excerpted from the Richmond speech.

The Dixiecrats are an invention to make the Trumancrats look liberal. The Dixiecrats are an invention to divert the people of the South from real problems to false ones, from high prices to hot words, from the great issue of war and peace to the rantings of demagogues.

There is a new party in the South — but it is not the Dixiecrats. For the first time in almost 100 years, a new party has been started in the South. Men and women of all stations . . . of all races and creeds, are standing together to fight within the ranks of the Progressive Party for their dream of abundance. For the first time the men and women of the South . . . are forging an instrument to achieve political freedom for Negro and white together, to advance to an American standard of living . . . .

The men who have held the South in bondage for so many years are frightened. They must retain their poll tax barriers to political freedom. They must retain their wage differentials and the flow of their dividends out of the South. They must wield the club of segregation to defend their profits. The Democratic Party . . . is now facing a new tide — a Progressive Party which threatens to wash away their vested interests.

So they conjure up the Dixiecrats and they prepare a diversionary circus. But look at them closely and compare them with the men in the Southern machines that have stayed inside the Democratic Party. Do they differ on the cold war? Not in the least. Do they differ by as much as a hair on keeping high prices? Not so you can notice. Do they differ in their bitter opposition to labor unions and their support of Taft-Hartley? Not by their votes. On none of these fundamental issues does a Byrd differ from a Wright.

Do they even differ on the subject of civil rights? The answer is right here in the state of Virginia: not once has a Byrd or a Smith who stayed with Truman voted any differently on civil rights measures than those who deserted him to form the Dixiecrats.

No, they are quite content to stay in the Democratic Party. They know . . . that the Democratic Party is the most important instrument to defeat civil rights legislation. They know the segregation order is not an order: they know the bar to discrimination in the federal service is meaningless; they know that Truman’s deeds on civil rights have never matched his words . . . .

If Truman meant really to strike at the evils of discrimination and segregation that rob the people of the South, both Negro and white, of half their wages, their health, and their education, he would summarily reject the support of a Byrd. But when we find that Truman and his managers not only accept but court the reactionary Southern machines, the defenders of privilege and the preachers of hate, we know there is no real gulf between the Dixiecrats and the Trumancrats.

In and outside the Democratic Party, the Dixiecrats serve a useful function. Byrd is a most vigilant defender of the people’s money when that money is needed for schools or housing or social security — and just as ardent a spender for greater armaments as Truman. Byrd fights against federal bureaucracy, but his own machine rests on a larger number of office holders per capita than any other state. And most of them spoilsmen. New roads are too expensive, new schools an extravagance; flood control and power development will soften the fiber of the people. But arms and draft laws in peacetime and building for war — on those Byrds and Trumans, the Wrights and Thurmonds, join with the Tafts and Deweys . . . .

A New South is rising. But the tide of that New South has been held back by a wall of privilege resting on the twin pillars of segregation and poll taxes. We in the Progressive Party are here to reclaim that New South, to regain its precious heritage of freedom and equality. We say that some part of that rich Southern treasure must be returned to help build the South. We say that no man anywhere in the land must work for less than a dollar an hour and that such a minimum must be written into the law. We say that the giant corporations that have drained off the income of the South must be taxed to build the schools and the roads and the hospitals the South needs. We say that un-American, anti-democratic practices of discrimination and segregation must go — and with them the one-party system that has borne an instrument for exploiting the people of the South. □
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Government on Horseback
1982 by Si Kahn/ Joe Hill Music Transcription by John Roberts

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The president stepped off the silver screen
He said, People put your lives here in my hand

C#m D A

Let the sulfur smoke of progress fill our land
'Cause we've got government on horseback again

C#m D A

We can turn our country's honor white again
Let the sulfur smoke of progress fill our land

C#m D A

We can make it on our own

C#m D A

Running on testosterone It's government on horseback again

C#m D A

Back again

C#m D A

Back again Yes we've got government on horseback again

C#m D A

Hell out of the commies It's government on horseback again.

"Help me give our land a golden goose
Turn our native corporations loose
High voltage lines will go the extra mile
Now it's power to the people, nuclear style"

And we've got government on horseback again
Back to the days when congressmen were men
We can make it on our own
Running on testosterone
It's government on horseback again

"Blow out the lamp beside the golden door
We don't need cheap foreign labor anymore
Without the unions and the ERA
We will all have twice the jobs at half the pay"

And we've got government on horseback again
Back to the days when congressmen were men
We can make it on our own
Running on testosterone
It's government on horseback again